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I. INTRODUCTION
Revenue Sharing' was signed into law at Independence Hall
in Philadelphia on October 20, 1972 with all the oratory and
trappings of an historic occasion. President Nixon declared "we
return here [Independence Square] to renew the federal sys-
tem."'2 Later he referred to revenue sharing as the basic ingre-
dient in the "new American Revolution to return power to the
people and put the individual self back in the idea of self-gov-
ernment."' State and local officials of both political parties also
expressed tremendous support and enthusiasm. New York's
Mayor John V. Lindsay called the event "a day of victory for
America's states and cities, a major step toward relieving the
enormous financial and physical pressures on them."'4 How-
ever, the release of the President's Budget on January 29, 1973
and the prospect of the impoundment of various programs
amounting to more than $8 billion5 aroused cries of "treason"
1. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 1221 et seq. (1972) [hereinafter referred to as the ACT]. The term
"Revenue Sharing" as used throughout the text and the footnotes will
refer to the federal assistance program provided by the Act.
2. Statement of President Nixon at signing of the Act, Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania, October 20, 1972, in 4 NAT'L J. 1911 (1972).
3. President's Budget Message to Congress (Jan. 29, 1972), in
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1973, § C, at 21, col. 6; see U.S. OFFICs OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET, SPEcIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT-FISCAL YEAR 1974, 210 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SPE-
CIAL ANALYSES].
4. Adams, Can Uncle Sam Bail Out New York?, Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 23, 1973, at 12, col. 4, quoting an earlier statement of
New York Mayor John V. Lindsay.
5. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1. The report of the
Office of Management and Budget to the Congress concerning im-
pounded funds provides a list totaling $8.7 billion. 119 CONG. REC.
§ 2012 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1973).
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and "double cross" from those same officials.6 Mayor Lindsay
dropped his talk of "a day of victory" and instead voiced his
criticism that the new federal budget allocations "confirm the
worst fears of urban Americans that the Federal government is
abdicating its responsibilities to our cities."7 San Francisco's
Mayor Joseph L. Alioto, once a strong proponent of Revenue
Sharing, concluded that this program was not "new" money, but
merely "substitute" money to replace funds that had previ-
ously gone to urban programs in categorical grants.8 He indi-
cated that San Francisco would lose $40 million as a result of
projected federal budgetary cutbacks in exchange for $18 mil-
lion in Revenue Sharing funds.9 Wesley C. Uhlman, Mayor of
Seattle, referred to Revenue Sharing as a "trojan horse full of
impoundments and cutbacks and broken promises."10
Although cabinet members placed the burden of many of
the budget cuts in the categorical aid programs squarely on the
shoulders of Revenue Sharing," President Nixon continued to
maintain that Revenue Sharing was "new money" for the states
6. Henry Maier, Mayor of Milwaukee, was quoted as describing
revenue sharing as "a gigantic double cross of the city poor and the
rural poor of America," in Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 24, 1973, at
2, col. 1.
7. Adams, supra note 4, at 12, col 6.
8. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 22, 1973, at 2, col 3.
9. Id. It is interesting to inquire as to the congressional intent
with respect to Revenue Sharing directly supplanting other federal pro-
grams. The report of the Senate Committee suggested that "the broad
purpose of this legislation is to fill a gap in the present aid programs by
granting State and local governments complete flexibility in the ex-
penditure of the new aid funds so as to supplement the present categor-
ical aid and to secure a more balanced and efficient system of Federal
aid." S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16 (1972) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. However, Governor
Milton 3. Shapp of Pennsylvania stated that in exchange for about
$200 million of Revenue Sharing, the President's budget would cut
$365 million from Pennsylvania. Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 9,
1973, at 8, col. 2. For cutbacks in other states, see Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6. Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia is
quoted: 'I think Revenue Sharing is a big hoax and a big mistake," in
Governors' Conference, 31 CONG. Q. 353 (1973).
10. Statement by Mayor Wesley C. Uhlman, Christian Science
Monitor, Feb. 24, 1973, at 2, col. 2.
11. See Pierson, Pros & Cons: Do Libraries Need Federal Aid?
White House Says No, But Librarians Say They'll Suffer, Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 27, 1973, at 42, cols. 1-3. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of
ILE.W., when asked what would happen if Special Revenue Sharing
funds were not used in part to finance libraries, indicated that if this
response occurred in a significant number of states he "would not hesi-
tate to recommend that we do something about it, and that might take
the form of an additional categorical program." Large, Putting Strings
on Federal Aid, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1973, at 20, col 4.
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and localities. 12 As evidenced by his budget message of January
30, 1973, the President appears more dedicated than ever to the
concept. 13 In particular, he attached new urgency to Special
Revenue Sharing. These four programs of broad purpose grants
in the areas of education, law enforcement and criminal justice,
manpower training, and urban community development, totaling
$6.9 billion, would replace 70 existing categorical grant pro-
grams.
Once the euphoria surrounding receipt of the initial Revenue
Sharing checks waned, the practical realities of the Revenue
Sharing program rapidly surfaced. The tremendous controversy
which surrounded the method of allocation was reflected in
3,800 formal objections to the initial allocations, which resulted
in massive reallocations.' 4  At the political level, many Con-
gressmen began to worry that Revenue Sharing would reduce
their ties to special interest groups and could be used to sub-
sidize political rivals.15 Further, many Congressmen viewed Rev-
enue Sharing-Special and General-as part of the direct assault
by the Executive aimed at removing from the Congress its role
of establishing national priorities.10 After a few short months
as the hero of a new federal system, Revenue Sharing has now
become the villain or at least the scapegoat.
In this light, it is necessary to study the origins of revenue
sharing, its history and policy justifications, together with the
legislative background, enactment and implementation of the
specific program of General Revenue Sharing to ascertain the
substance and merits behind the voluminous political rhetoric.
In the last analysis, it is hoped that the substance and merits of
the program rather than the rhetoric which surrounds it will
determine whether Revenue Sharing is the "bright new hope"
12. President's Radio Address of March 3, 1973, in N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 1973, at 20, col. 7. In the President's Message to Congress on
February 4, 1971, proposing the revenue sharing legislation he had
stated:
All of this would be "new" money-taken from the in-
creases in our revenues which result from a growing economy.
It would not require new taxes nor would it be transferred
from existing programs.
President's Message on Revenue Sharing, 29 CONG. Q. 392, 393 (1971).
13. SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note 3, at 210; N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1973, § C, at 21, cols. 1-6.
14. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1973, at 20, col. 1; Havemann, Revenue
Sharing Report/Problems snag Nixon plan as complaints from local
areas mount, 5 NAT'L J. 389 (1973).
15. See 4 NAT'L J. 1926-27 (1972); Banfield, The Real Issues Behind
Revenue Sharing, Washington Post, May 30, 1971, § C, at 4, col. 5.
16, See 4 NAT'L J. 1910 (1972).
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the success of which will result in the replacement of most of
the categorical grant programs with Special Revenue Sharing or
whether the concept is to be discarded on the heap of dismal
federal failures.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The concept of federal revenue sharing is not a new devel-
opment, either in theory or in practice. A form of revenue shar-
ing was instituted in the United States as early as 1836 but it
did not become a serious alternative for financial assistance to
state and local governments until the middle of the 1960's. By
1970 every state except Delaware, Montana, Texas and West Vir-
ginia distributed some portion of its revenues to localities for
general local government support. 17 Within the world commu-
nity, revenue sharing has been utilized in nearly a dozen coun-
tries.'8
The most ambitious federal revenue sharing plan in the
United States was implemented during the Andrew Jackson Ad-
ministration with the passage of the Surplus Distribution Act of
1836.19 The sale of large tracts of public land and higher cus-
toms revenues due to an increase in foreign trade had caused the
accumulation of an embarrassingly large surplus of federal rev-
enues. After the public debt had been eliminated, Congress
passed legislation which provided that all funds in the Federal
Treasury as of January 1, 1837, with the exception of $5 million,
would be distributed to the states in four installments. The dis-
tribution to the states was "in proportion to their respective rep-
resentation in the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States. '20 Although there were no requirements as to
how the money was to be spent, the states were placed under a
pledge of faith to repay the money whenever it should be re-
17. ADVISORY COMAII'SSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE-LocAL FnANcEs: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES AND SUGGESTED LEGIS-
LATION 72-112 (1972). The per capita state-aid for general local govern-
ment support in 1972 ranged from $0.02 in Vermont to $65.21 in Wiscon-
sin. Id. at 72.
18. Countries utilizing revenue sharing include Australia, Sweden,
United Kingdom, Malaya, West Germany, Argentina, Brazil, India, Ni-
geria, Pakistan and Rhodesia. A collection of several articles on the
individual experiences of these countries can be found in STAFF OF
SuDcovEm. ON FIScAL PoLIcy OF TIIE JOINT ECONOMC COMMIrTEE, 90TH
CONG., IST SESS., REVENUE SHARING AND ITS ALTERNATIvES: WHAT Fu-
TURE FOR FISCAL FEDERALISM?, pt. 1, 401-643 (Conum Print 1967) (here-
inafter cited as JEC PAPERs].
19. Act of June 23, 1836, ch. 115, 5 Stat. 52.
20. Id. § 13.
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quired "for the purpose of defraying any wants of the public
treasury."' 21 Of the $37 million available, $23 million was dis-
tributed in the first three installments during 1837. A financial
crisis forestalled the final payment. Although the states could
have been required to return the money already distributed
to them, it was never requested.
With a hiatus of over one hundred years, the concept of rev-
enue sharing reappeared in several governmental task force re-
ports on federal-state fiscal relations during the forties and fif-
ties but had a less than enthusiastic reception.22 A Department
of the Treasury special committee considered the revenue shar-
ing concept in 1943 but recommended its implementation only
with respect to distribution of the revenue derived from the to-
bacco tax.23 The first Hoover Commission Task Force Report
in 1949 recommended broad grants on a functional basis, yet re-
jected revenue sharing on general principles of federalism.
[I]t would have the disadvantages of making States more de-
pendent upon the National Government for general revenues
and possibly increasing the supervision of the National Gov-
ernment over the States' general governmental functions.24
In 1955, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, known
as the Kestnbaum Commission, recommended a grant-in-aid ap-
proach, but again rejected "a comprehensive subsidy program"
on the basis that it would deprive the states of fiscal autonomy
and financial responsibility. 25
However, in spite of its inauspicious beginnings, the concept
would not die. In 1958 Melvin Laird, then a member of the
House of Representatives, submitted a revenue sharing bill in
the second session of the 85th Congress. 20  In 1960 economist
Walter Heller, based on his experiences as an advisor to the Gov-
ernor of Minnesota, proposed that revenue be distributed to the
21. Id.
22. A summary can be found in Kaufman, Recommendations of
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and Earlier
Government Commissions, in JEC PAPERS, supra note 18, at 195-245.
23. SPECIAL COMMIrTEE DESIGNATED TO CONDUCT A STUDY ON IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL, STATE
AND LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONS, S. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 155-
58 (1943).
24. REPORT TO COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS, S. Doc. No. 81,
81st Cong., Ist Sess. 130 (1949).
25. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID ON THE STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 115 (1955).
26. H.R. 12080, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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states with "no strings attached." 27 Although no mention of
revenue sharing was made during the 1960 presidential cam-
paign, by 1964 federal financial support to states became a na-
tional political issue. President Johnson spoke vaguely of aid
"over and above existing aid" and the Republican candidate,
Barry Goldwater, proposed that both personal income and fed-
eral inheritance taxes be shared with the states.
During this period the primary stimulus for revenue shar-
ing came from the so-called Heller-Pechman plan. In June, 1964,
before his retirement as Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers, Walter Heller had formulated the main outlines of a
revenue sharing program.2 8 With his interest aroused, President
Johnson ordered a task force chaired by Joseph Pechman of the
Brookings Institution to refine the Heller plan.29
The Heller-Pechman plan suggested revenue sharing as a
supplement to existing specific grants-in-aid which it was felt
"should remain the basic method of providing assistance . . .,,"
Rather than premising revenue sharing on political considera-
tions, the plan saw it as a means of eliminating the anticipated
"fiscal drag," estimated at $6 billion, which would result from
income tax revenues accumulating at a rate faster than the
growth in the Gross National Product. The plan called for the
regular distribution of a specified portion of the federal per-
sonal income tax to the states, with no mandatory pass-through
requirements from state to local governments.31 One percent of
the federal income tax base was to be set aside in the first year.
Thereafter, the amount set aside was to rise 0.2 percent per
year until a 2 percent limit was reached. The revenue was
to be automatically distributed to the states without annual
appropriations by placing the funds in trust. Use of the money
was to be unrestricted except that it could not be used for high-
way construction and the states would be required to comply with
27. See W. HELLER, NEw DIMENsIONS or PoIcIAL ECONOMY 147(1966); Levy & de Torres, Federal Revenue Sharing: An Introduction
to the Basics, TE CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD 6:9 at 10 (1969).
28. See U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., June 29, 1964, at 59.
29. The task force report was never officially made public, but
both Heller and Pechman subsequently published papers that described
the essential features of their proposal. See W. HELLE, supra note 27,
at 117-72; PECEMAN, PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSrUM ON FEDERAL TAXA-
TION, 874 PAi'mIurTs 71-85 (1965).
30. PECHMAN, supra note 29, at 81.
31. But by 1967 Heller proposed a simple fixed-percentage pass-
through (preferably 50%). See H. PERLOFF Am M. NATHA, REvENuE
SHARING AN THE Cre 34 (1967).
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 The distribution for-
mula was based on population, but the plan envisioned two mod-
ifications. The per capita amounts were to be multiplied by a
tax effort factor to provide an incentive for increased state and
local tax efforts, and 10 percent of the funds was to be allo-
cated on a per capita basis to the states which ranked in the
lower third of all the states on the basis of per capita income.
President Johnson quietly abandoned the proposal in the final
days of the 1964 campaign as a result of his irritation over leaks
of the proposal to the press and his sensitivity to opponents of
the plan, primarily the categorical grant oriented Executive De-
partments and groups representing labor, education, welfare and
health.33
When the Vietnam War provided an unfortunate solution to
the "fiscal drag" problem and the Johnson Administration em-
phasized the categorical grants-in-aid as its chosen instrument to
implement the "Great Society," the Republican Party adopted the
concept of revenue sharing as an alternative to the categorical
grant approach. In 1966 the Republican Coordinating Commit-
tee submitted its own proposal 34 which rejected categorical
grants-in-aid and recommended setting aside an initial 2 percent
of both federal personal and corporate income tax collections
(as opposed to the Heller-Pechman tax base which was limited
to the federal personal income tax), with a gradual increase to
10 percent. One half of each state's share would be computed
on the basis of returning income tax collections to the state in
which they originated. In order to achieve a measure of equali-
zation, the other half would be based upon population and per
capita income. However, "[e] qualization grants [would] only be
made available to the States which themselves contribute a fair
proportion of their per capita incomes to the cost of their own
State and local services" 35 and would be reduced proportionally
"if the State and local units [did] not apply an adequate amount
of State and local tax revenue [to the cost of their own govern-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
33. For a summary of the opposition arguments, see Otten and
Seib, No-Strings Aid for the States, 32 THE REPORTER 33 (Jan. 28, 1965).
34. TASK FORCE ON THE FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE, FINANCING THE
FUTURE OF FEDERALISM: THE CASE FOR REVENUE SHARING (1966).
35. Id. at 5.
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ment]."s6 In addition, the Committee proposed broad functional
grants in areas such as mental health.
Beginning in 1965, revenue sharing also became a high pri-
ority concern of the Congress as evidenced by the fact that in
the 89th Congress 57 bills on revenue sharing were introduced,
while 101 were introduced in the 90th Congress.3 7  In 1967 the
Joint Economic Committee responded to the surge of interest by
publishing three volumes of study papers and two volumes of
hearings on revenue sharing. s
Although revenue shaing had become an increasingly at-
tractive alternative to alleviate the financial crises of state and
local governments, it was by no means the only one proposed.
A second major alternative was a credit against federal personal
income tax for state income taxes paid.39 However, critics cited
several shortcomings of this approach. First, the direct benefits
would only accrue to individual taxpayers, rather than to state
and local governments. Second, only states with income taxes
would benefit Third, the greatest benefits would flow to the
wealthy states under most of the credit proposals. Fourth, since
few localities have an income tax, only minimal assistance would
be provided at the local level. Nonetheless, tax credits received
significant consideration. In 1965, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations proposed a tax credit scheme.' 0
Two years later, the Committee for Economic Development pro-
posed a 25 percent income tax credit for net payments of state in-
come taxes after deductions had been made.41 Several of the
revenue sharing bills also contained tax credit provisions.'2
36. Id.
37. 113 CONG. REC. 3444-3463 (1967) (remarks of Representative
Laird); AL McBREEN, FEDERAL TAx SHARING: Hxs' TocAL DEVELoPMENT
AND ARGuImNTS FOR Am AGAINST REcE T PROPOsALS (Legislative Ref-
erence Service, Library of Congress 1967).
38. JEC PAPERs, supra note 18.
39. For a survey of tax credits, see J. MAXWELL, TAX CREDrrs A
INRGOvERNMENL FISCAL RELATIONS (1962). Also under considera-
tion were various proposals to federalize the cost of welfare. See
Statement of Richard A. Musgrave, Hearings on the Subject of General
Revenue Sharing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-8, at 348-49 (1971); Statement of John B. Con-
nally, id. at 46-50.
40. ADv-,soY CoMMIsSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FzDERAL-STATE COORDINATION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAXES (1965).
41. CoMarr FOR ECONOzMC D=moPmENT, A FISCAL PoeRAM
FOR A BALANCED FEDERALISM (1967).
42. See, e.g., Representative Laird's Bill, -LR. 5450, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967). The complete text of the bill appears in 113 CONG. Rf, .
3451 (1967).
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Despite the concentration on categorical grants-in-aid dur-
ing the Johnson Administration, a movement toward a block
grant approach to state and local aid did occur with the creation
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (L.E.A.A.)
under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.43 In this Act, Congress recognized that "crime is es-
sentially a local problem that must be dealt with by State and
local governments if it is to be controlled effectively."' 44 Reflect-
ing congressional doubts over the effectiveness and manageabil-
ity of large scale federal aid programs administering direct aid
to countless local units, the Act placed the states in a central
role as the "planner (s), architect (s), and coordinator (s) of the
Nation's efforts against crime."' 4" Each state was required to
establish as an arm of the state executive branch a state plan-
ning agency (SPA) which would be "representative of law en-
forcement agencies of the State and of units of general local gov-
ernments ... .-"46 The SPA in turn had the responsibility of
establishing priorities and developing comprehensive statewide
plans for the improvement of law enforcement. 47 Through the
L.E.A.A. the federal government would finance 90 percent of the
state planning grants48 with the stipulation that 40 percent of
the federal funds would be passed through to local planning
units. 49
Although the states were given the responsibility for coor-
dinating the program, their control over expenditures was sig-
nificantly limited by the requirement that a state plan receive
prior approval by the L.E.A.A. before funds would be distrib-
uted. This was especially important since the program empha-
sized block action grants.50 Of all the monies awarded for law
43. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3701
et seq. (1970).
44. Id. § 3701.
45. Skoler, State Implementation of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act, in THE BooK OF STATES 1970-71, 412 (The Council of State Govern-
ments, 1971).
46. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, supra note 43,
at § 203 (a).
47. Id. § 3723(b).
48. Id. § 3724.
49. Id. § 3723(c).
50. In fiscal year 1969, of the $63 million totally allocated to
L.E.A.A., $25 million were block grants; in 1971 it had risen to a $529
million total, of which $340 million were block grants; in 1973 the total
rose to $850 million of which $536.7 million were block grants. ATToR-
NEY GENERAL's FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, FEmERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIVINAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE ACTIvrIEs 42 (1972); L.E.A.A. NEws-
LurrER, vol. 2, at 1 (Nov. 1972).
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enforcement program implementation, called Action Grants, 85
percent were to be "allocated among the states according to their
respective populations," 51 and 15 percent were to be given at the
L.EAA.'s discretion. To qualify for the block action grant, each
SPA had to submit an annual plan for prior L.E.A.A. approval
This forced the SPA's to work closely with the regional L.E.A..
representatives in formulating plans acceptable to the federal
bureaucracy. In addition, the Act laid down 12 requirements
with which each state plan must comply. 52
State and local decision making was also materially re-
strained by the different percentum contributions made by the
L.EA.A. for different types of programs. Since organized crime
and civil disorders were priority concerns, the L.E.A.A. was to
pay 75 percent of any program in those areas. On the other
hand, the L.EAA. contribution was limited to 50 percent of the
costs for construction of facilities and 60 percent of the costs of
other programs such as recruiting and training or public pro-
tection 53
Despite these limitations, the Act created state planning agen-
cies to formulate law enforcement programs and to oversee their
implementation, thus taking an initial step toward the transfer
of responsibility in program planning and implementation from
the federal level to state and local governments. However, the
growth of a sizable federal bureaucracy to administer the pro-
gram coupled with the restraints on state and local decision
making arguably combined many of the worst elements of both
the categorical and the block-grant approaches.54
President Nixon's plan to convert L.E.A.A. into a special
51. Omnibus Crime' Control and Safe Streets Act, supra note 43,
§ 3736 (a).
52. Id. § 3733.
53. Id. § 3731(c).
54. President Nixon's plan to convert the L.E.AA into a special
revenue sharing proposal for law enforcement was introduced in the
92ndCongress. See President's Message of March 2, 1971, 29 CoNG. Q.
539 (1971). S. 1087 and H.R. 5408 were subsequently introduced. A
revised proposal was introduced in the next Congress. The Bill, intro-
duced by Senator Hruska, included provisions designed to achieve pub-
lic accountability: (1) The comprehensive plan must be developed
"after appropriate hearings and consultation with elected representa-
tives of units of general local government, representatives of law en-
forcement agencies, and of public agencies maintaining programs to re-
duce and control crime and delinquency" (§ 203(1) ); (2) the state
must "adopt measures designed to bring to the attention of the citizens
of the state the contents of the comprehensive statewide plan" (§ 203(4)); (3) the funds must be expended in accordance with the laws and
procedures applicable to the recipient's own revenues (§ 203 (5)).
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revenue sharing program for law enforcement was introduced
in the 92d Congress, and a revised proposal was introduced in
the 93d Congress. 55 Unfortunately, the bill adopted by Con-
gress to extend L.E.A.A. for three years at an aggregate au-
thorization level of $3.2 billion rejected most of the Administra-
tion's special revenue sharing proposals and further tightened
the requirements for block grants.50
III. THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1972
In a message to Congress on February 4, 1971, President
Nixon presented his Administration's original revenue sharing
proposal as "an idea whose time has already come."5 7 Bills re-
flecting the proposals were introduced in the House and Sen-
ate5s and extensive hearings on the subject were held by the
House Ways and Means Committee in June, 1971. 59 However, the
strongly expressed opposition of Chairman Wilbur Mills resulted
in no action being taken at that time.60
As a result of tremendous political pressure by state and
local officials, and perhaps because of his aspirations for the
55. H.R. 8021, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
56. Act of August 6, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197.
57. President's Message on Revenue Sharing, 29 CONG. Q. 392
(1971).
58. S. 680, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator
Baker); H.R. 4187, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Congress-
man Betts).
59. Hearings on the Subject of General Revenue Sharing Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-8
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
60. In a speech before the Oklahoma Legislature on June 4, 1971,
Chairman Wilbur Mills made the following statement:
How anyone can suggest general revenue sharing, with a
straight face, in full view of Federal deficits of that magnitude
and the chronic string of deficits over the past forty years is
beyond me.
Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 92-1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 94 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. For additional statements of
Chairman Mills in opposition to the concept of revenue sharing, see
118 CONG. REc. H5884-85 (daily ed. June 21, 1972) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Byrnes).
At the time Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally completed
his testimony on the Administration's proposal the following discus-
sion ensued:
The Chairman (Mr. Mills) . .. I want to congratulate you
on making a very fine statement in behalf of a very weak
cause.
Secretary Connally. I understand, Mr. Chairman, that it
was not your favorite subject.
The Chairman. No sir, it is not.
Hearings, supra note 59, at 51.
REVENUE SHARING
Democratic Vice-Presidential nomination, Chairman Mills finally
agreed in the latter part of 1971 to introduce and support a reve-
nue sharing bill if it would receive strong support from all the
national organizations representing states and localities. The
staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
worked with state and local representatives to draft a bill which
Mr. Mills could support as distinguishable from the Nixon Ad-
ministration's proposal which he had so widely criticized. The
result was H.R. 11950, introduced in the House of Representatives
on November 30, 1971.61 This bill provided the basic framework
for the congressional deliberations which ultimately led to the
enacted legislation.
A. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REVENUE SHARING
"Few programs in recent years have been advocated as a
remedy for so many diverse and conflicting ills as Revenue Shar-
ing. '62 The justification adopted by the congressional commit-
tees and repeatedly espoused during the congressional delibera-
tions was the necessity to relieve the fiscal crisis of state and
local governments. 63 In response, the argument was presented
61. H.R. 11950, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
62. Reischauer, Revenue Shuring: Matching the Money and the
Needs, Washington Post, May 11, 1972, § A, at 22, col. 3; see Testimony of
John B. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings, supra note 59, at
36-50; Testimony of Walter W. Heller, id. at 1025-31. In 1968 Walter
Heller had stated:
Looking beyond current rising Vietnam costs, big deficits,
and contingent tax increases, one can visualize an $8 billion
annual automatic growth in federal revenues generating new
leeway for fiscal dividends-tax cuts, tax sharing, program in-
creases-if Vietnam demands level off. If rising revenues are
not to hold the economy back under such circumstances, we
need to get our bets down promptly on the competing entrants
in the fiscal drag race.
HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 94. However, by 1971, Mr. Heller was
justifying Revenue Sharing on the basis of its efficiency and income
redistribution effect. See Hearings on S. *1770 and S. 241 Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 68, 71 (1971).
63. See, STAFF oF THE Jonrr CoMmuTTE1 ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAxATIoN, 92d CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPwLANATIONS OF THE STATE AND
LocAL FIscAL ASsIsTANcE AcT AND THE FEDERAL-STATE TAX CoLLECT*oN
AcT OF 1972, 6-7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GENERL. EXPLANATION];
118 Cong. Rec. 13,998-99 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1972) (remarks of Senator
Long).
In considering the financial problems of local govern-
ments, your committee came to the conclusion that many locali-
ties face most severe financial crises. In part, this stems
from the increasing demand for public services resulting from
the substantial increase in urbanization occurring in recent
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ad nauseum on the floor of the House and Senate that the fed-
eral government did not have any revenue to share.0 4 That is,
given a projected unified budget deficit of $23 billion for fiscal
year 1973, the federal government's fiscal crisis was far worse
than that of state and local governments. However, this coun-
ter-argument failed to recognize that, assuming the federal gov-
ernment would make some expenditures, there would be federal
revenue to share. The appropriate question was whether fed-
eral aid to states and localities in the form of Revenue Sharing
occupied a lower priority than other existing or proposed federal
expenditures. 5 If it did not, the reductions necessary to achieve
years. Closely related to this is the problem arising from the
limited jurisdictions of many local governments: they often
are called upon to provide many services for persons who do
not live in their taxing jurisdictions. At the same time, those
within their taxing jurisdictions often are poor and unable to
pay for their share of the services demanded. This financial
problem for local governments has been significantly wors-
ened by the twin problems of rising costs resulting from in-
flation and the lower than normal increase in revenues because
of the stagnant condition of the economy.
Your committee concluded that States also have financial
problems but that their problems are less severe than those
of the localities and also of a different nature .... Neverthe-
less the difficulty in obtaining adequate financing, in part be-
cause of the nature of their tax structures, has presented the
States with problems not only in meeting their own financing
needs but also in their increasing role in assisting local govern-
ments. Your committee concluded that in the case of States the
primary emphasis should be on encouraging them to help
themselves-by making more extensive use of their own tax
resources.
HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 1-2.
The President's Message to Congress on February 4, 1971 also em-
phasized the "fiscal crises" of states and localities:
The growing fiscal crisis in our States and communities
is the result in large measure of a fiscal mismatch; needs
grow fastest at one level while revenues grow fastest at an-
other. This fiscal mismatch is accompanied, in turn, by an
"efficiency mismatch;" taxes are collected most efficiently by
the highly centralized Federal tax system while public funds
are often spent most efficiently when decisions are made by
State and local authorities.
President's Message on Revenue Sharing, supra note 57, at 393.
The general explanation for the fiscal crisis is the so-called fiscal
mismatch. That is, the federal government has made great use of the
highly productive and growth-responsive income tax. At the same
time, the pressure on expenditures has been relatively greater at the
local level. See, e.g., Statement of John Connally, Secretary of the
Treasury, Hearings, supra note 59, at 40-44; Walter W. Heller, supra
note 60, at 1026.
64. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 5849-50 (daily ed. June 20, 1972) (re-
marks of Representative Holifield); id. at 18,091 (daily ed. Oct. 13,
1972) (remarks of Senator Stevenson).
65. See 118 CONG. REC. 9748 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972) (remarks of
Representative Betts); id. at 9751 (remarks of Representative Mills);
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a balanced budget should be made in the areas of lower priority.
A more fundamental response to the "fiscal crisis" argu-
ment was that the level of aggregate federal aid to states and
localities was already adequate, if not excessive, given the sig-
nificant federal budgetary deficits.0 6 In fiscal year 1955 federal
aid to state and local governments amounted to $3.1 billion. For
fiscal year 1974 it is estimated that this figure will climb to $45.0
billion. 67 The Office of Management and Budget estimates that
federal aid programs (including General Revenue Sharing) will
finance about 21.3 percent of state and local expenditures in 1974,
as compared to 8.0 percent in 1955.08 However, direct federal
grants do not present the entire picture of assistance. Indirect aid
to state and local governments through the deductibility of state
and local taxes and the exemption of interest on state and local
bonds for federal income tax purposes amounted to approxi-
mately $11 billion in fiscal year 1972.69 Therefore, it is not un-
reasonable to estimate the total direct and indirect aid to state
and local governments (including General Revenue Sharing) at
$55 billion for fiscal year 1974.
Moreover, if a fiscal crisis existed for state and local govern-
ments, it was a short term phenomenon resulting from a simul-
taneous rapid expansion of services, "catch up" wage inflation
in the local public sector and the impact of the economic slow-
SENATE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 10 ("The Committee ... questions
whether the presence of large deficits in the Federal budget should in
itself preclude Federal aid to State and local governments in view of
the vital need for such aid. To do so would imply that State and local
fiscal assistance has a lower priority than all other present expendi-
tures, a position the committee does not accept.").
66. See SPECIAL AxALYsES, supra note 3, at 213 ("In some respects,
the Federal Government now faces a situation where it is under more
fiscal pressure than State and local governments as a whole.").
67. See id. at 211. Also, it is interesting to note the shifts of
priorities within the aggregate federal aid to state and local governments:
The functions comprising human resource programs--edu-
cation and manpower, health and income security-show a
rapid growth during the 1960-74 period, rising from 47% of
Federal aid in 1960 to an expected 55% in 1974. On the other
hand, physical resource programs (mainly in the commerce and
transportation function) declined from 52% of the total in 1960
to 28% in 1974, largely because of the dominance of highway
grants in the earlier period.
Id. at 212.
68. See id. at 211.
69. See id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 10. The Office of
Management and Budget has indicated that in 1972 the interest exemp-
tion on state and local bonds resulted in reduced interest costs of ap-
proximately $2.0 billion and resulted in a revenue loss to the U.S.
Treasury of approximately $3.0 billion. SPECIAL ANALYsEs, supra note
3, at 211.
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down in 1969-1971 on local revenues. 70 State and local govern-
ments appear able to increase revenues from their own sources
at approximately the same rate as they increase expenditures.
It has been estimated that for the period 1955-1969 state and
local expenditures increased approximately 244 percent, while
revenues from their own sources (excluding federal grants-in-aid
and new debt issued) increased approximately 241 percent.7 '
Furthermore, state and local revenues (excluding federal grants-
in-aid) increased from 1946-1970 at an average annual rate of
9.7 percent which is substantially above the increases which oc-
curred in most other major economic areas, including personal
income (6.6 percent increase), profits after taxes (4.5 percent in-
crease) and gross private domestic fixed investment (6.5 percent
increase) .72
Any fiscal crisis that exists for states and localities"8 ap-
pears to be limited to selected entities. 74 The national income
accounts budget showed states and localities with a record $14.8
billion surplus (on an annualized basis) for the second quarter
of 1972.75 For those cities with a significant "crisis, ' 70 Revenue
70. See Reischauer, supra note 62; C. SCHULTZE, SETTING NATIONAL
PRIoaRiES: THa 1972 BUDGET 136-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NA-
TIONAL PRioRrIs-1972] ("The recession has had a double effect. It has
slowed the expansion of tax revenues and increased the demand for
certain State and local services.").
71. See NATIONAL PRioRiTIEs-1972, supra note 70, at 139, 141.
72. See Banfield, supra note 15.
73. See GENERAL EXPLANATiON, supra note 63, at 1.
This legislation is designed to help our sorely pressed State
and local governments to meet their heavy financial problems
and to keep them financially sound .... [A]fter extensive
study, the Congress concluded that many localities face severe
financial crises .... Although their financial problems gen-
erally are less grave than those of local governments, the States
also face severe financial problems.
Id.
74. See, e.g., Banfield, supra note 15.
75. See U.S. DEPARTmENT OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BusINEss; SPECIAL ANALYSES at 213 ("In some respects the Federal
Government now faces a situation where it is under more fiscal pres-
sure than State and local governments as a whole."). States and
localities have experienced a surplus on the national income account
basis in 7 out of the last 9 years; only in calendar years 1967 and 1968
did a deficit exist.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)
believes that the 2nd quarter 1972 surplus figures are misleading since
they include substantial surpluses in the social insurance funds. In
addition, the second quarter of 1972 included two major nonrecurring
items-a $4.0 billion advance payment of public assistance grants and
$0.8 billion of unusually high income tax settlements in Pennsylvania.
ADVISORY COmIIssIoN ON INTERGOVERNIENTAL RELATIONS, THE 1972
STATE-LOcAL SURPLUS (A.C.I.R. Information Interchange Service, No.
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Sharing will be such a small percentage of their budgets that
relief will be minimal at best.77 For example, the 1972-1973 bud-
get for New York City is approximately $9.4 billion.78 The sum of
the first two checks to New York City, covering a 12 month pe-
riod, was $198,108,726.7 9 This represented slightly over two per-
cent of a budget which increased from $3.9 billion in fiscal year
1965 (with deficit financing of $256 million) to $9.4 billion in
1973.80 Thus, Revenue Sharing will not even cover the inflation-
ary cost increases for the city.8 '
In a radio address on March 4, 1973, President Nixon indi-
cated that the 'hour of crisis has passed" for the nation's cities
and towns.8 2 This conclusion concerning the aggregate situa-
73-1, Jan. 1973). After adjusting out social insurance surpluses the
ACIR concluded that states and localities experienced a deficit for
every calendar year from 1963-71, and the 2nd quarter 1972 annualized
surplus was a modest $1.6 billion. It is concluded that "the 1972 State-
local surplus may have resulted largely from special circumstances, not
necessarily to be repeated in the near future." Id.
North Carolina is estimated to have a $250 million surplus for
fiscal year 1973, without considering the $135 million of Revenue Shar-
ing funds the state is projected to receive. California projects an $850
million surplus for fiscal year 1973. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1973, at 6,
col 3. Arthur Levitt, Controller of the State of New York, has estimated
that state's surplus for fiscal year 1972-73 at $200-300 million, compared
to Governor Rockefeller's statement of a $28 million surplus "on a cash
basis." N.Y. Times, April 1, 1973, at 45, col 1.
It is reported that governors of 35 states have proposed tax relief
in their budgetary messages to the state legislatures. See Christian
Science Monitor, May 11, 1973, at 5, col 2.
76. See C. SCHLTZ , SETTING NATIONAL Paloarms: Tas 1973 Bun-
GET 291 (1972) ("[T]he overriding urban problem of the coming decade
may well be the general inability of large city governments to make
ends meet.") [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL PsIourrms-1973].
77. A Brookings Institution study has concluded:
Although total federal aid to state and local governments
has expanded dramatically in the past ten years-from $8.8
billion in 1963 to the $43.5 billion proposed in the 1973 federal
budget-it has not been sufficiently concentrated in the central
cities to deal effectively with their fiscal problems. As a con-
sequenc pressure has mounted for some form of increased
federal commitment to beleaguered urban governments. Reve-
nue sharing, if enacted, will help, but will not channel sub-
stantial amounts of funds into central cities.
Id.
78. See Adams, supra note 4.
79. DEPAnTmENT OF THE TREAsURY, INTIAL PAYmENT-ENTITLE-
m PRaIoD 1 263 (1972) ($100,847,538); DEPARTIENT OF THE TREAs-
uRY, 2ND PAYmInAr-ENTITLEMENT PERIOD 2 121 (1973) ($97,261,188).
80. See Adams, supra note 4.
81. Id. It is interesting to note that during the period from 1962-
63 to 1971-72 direct federal aid to New York City increased from $166
million to $1.5 billion.
82. N.Y. Times, March 5, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
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tion does not dispute the fact that many individual cities such as
Newark, Cleveland and Detroit have continuing problems of ma-
jor proportions. However, as Wilbur Mills said prior to his very
brief conversion to the "faith" of Revenue Sharing: 83
If the purpose of revenue sharing is to meet the needs of
our economy today, then revenue sharing is a poor and waste-
ful means of attaining these ends. Why do I say that it is
wasteful? Because under any of the formulas that have been
developed so far, substantial funds are given to States and lo-
calities where there is little or no need, as well as to those
where there is need.
Several studies have reached the conclusion that a limited
number of localities certainly have serious fiscal problems which
are likely to increase. However, the aggregate picture for all
state and local governments is not at present nor in the foresee-
able future one of an impending fiscal crisis. Richard A. Mus-
grave and A. Mitchell Polinsky84 estimated that in 1975 state
and local expenditures will exceed receipts, including federal
aid and normal borrowings, by $6 billion without Revenue Shar-
ing. They indicated that a 5 percent tax increase would meet
this deficiency. Similarly, the Brookings Institution concluded
that in 1976 state and local expenditures less revenues will
amount to a $9.5 billion deficit or approximately 4 percent of
total expenditures of $261 billion. s This does not amount to a
"1crisis."
83. Reischauer, supra note 62, quoting, Statement of Congressman
Wilbur Mills; see Statement of Richard A. Musgrave, in Hearings, supra
note 59, at 347 ("[A] large part of the funds will accrue to jurisdictions
which are not in dire need of support, while those which are will not
be helped sufficiently.").
84. Musgrave & Polinsky, Revenue Sharing-A Critical View, in
FRTANCING STATE ANm LOCAL GOVERNMENTS--MONETARY CONFERENCE
(The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970); see Statement of Richard
A, Musgrave, Hearings, supra note 59, at 346. See Banfield, supra
note 15.
85. NATIONAL Pniosrrxs-1972, supra note 70, at 141.
This gap [$9.4 billion] is not of huge proportions. It repre-
sents less than 4 percent of anticipated state and local expendi-
tures in 1976. The gap could be filled by any one of the fol-
lowing alternatives or by some combination of them:
-An average annual increase of 1.2 percent in state and
local tax rates.
-An increase of 21 percent in the size of established fed-
eral grants, over and above the level they would reach in
1976 as a result only of price and workload increases. This
would imply a considerably smaller rate of growth over this
period than in the past five years.
-A general revenue sharing program of $9.4 billion, .
-Assumption by the federal government of 40 percent of the
current state and local welfare burden, coupled with a fed-
eral program that financed all future increases in welfare
costs.
Id. at 141-42.
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It has been estimated that during the period 1955-1969 price
increases were the single most important factor responsible for
the 244 percent increase in expenditures, accounting for an esti-
mated 43.8 percent of the total rise in general expenditures of
state and local governments.8 6 The balance was estimated as
comprised of a 26.2 percent increase in workload (for example,
costs attributable to increases in the number of residents, school-
age children and automobiles) and a 30 percent increase attrib-
utable to an enlargement in the scope and improvement in the
quality of public services.8 7 The rate of increase in the price in-
dex for the goods and services purchased by local governments
was twice that of consumer expenditures between 1960 and
1971.88 Thus, for state and local governments, and especially
for the large urban cities, inflation was the most important factor
in the dramatic increase in expenditures during the past decade.89
It can be argued, therefore, that the most effective form of state
and local assistance is for the federal government to curb infla-
tion and simultaneously adopt policies and programs which will
significantly improve the scope and quality of local services.
In this light, Revenue Sharing must be justified primarily as a
method of improving the efficiency of existing federal aid levels
in delivering federally financed goods and services at the state
and local levels.
A conclusion that Revenue Sharing will result in an increase
in relative efficiency must be based, in part, on an examination
of the defects in previously existing programs. The categorical
aid programs encouraged state and local governments to sig-
nificantly increase their expenditures in specified program areas
which were rigidly and narrowly defined.90 The matching fea-
86. Id: at 139.
87. Id.
88. NATiONAL PaiorTms-1973, supra note 76, at 296.
89. Id. It has been estimated that since the beginning of 1966,
prices paid by state and local governments for goods and services have
risen 32 percent, one-third faster than consumer prices. NATiONAL
PRioaIzxs-1972, supra note 70, at 137.
90. This view is certainly strongly supported in the SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 16:
To a considerable extent, the adoption of the revenue-sharing
program stems from the need to avoid the problems inherent in
many categorical programs which specify how the recipient
governmental unit is to spend the funds. Such categorical aid
programs may result in forcing the recipient governmental unit
to spend the funds for the specified purpose even though the
governmental unit may have other more urgent needs to fi-
nance.
See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. S14184 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1972) (remarks of
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ture of many of these programs, which is frequently $3 of fed-
eral assistance for every $1 contributed by the state or local
government, caused distortions in expenditure patternsY' For
example, Mississippi projected an increase in its social services
program between fiscal years 1971 and 1973 which would have
increased the federal matching share from $1,098 to $463,572, or
a 42,118 percent increase in two years. 2 Although the objective
of the matching grant programs was to decentralize the federal
system, the paper work and bureaucratic decision making sig-
nificantly restricted any true exercise of local initiative. In fact,
many cities were totally unaware of the aggregate extent to
which the matching commitments made by various city agencies
were obligating the city to local matching requirements. 3
Senator Ribicoff); id. at S14389 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972) (remarks of
Senator Buckley).
In response to the criticism of the categorical grant programs, the
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1973, S.834, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), was introduced by Senator Muskie. The objective of the bill is
to counter some of the criticism by improving the management of the
programs through the following provisions:
-Permit the President to seek congressional approval to con-
solidate federal grant-in-aid programs within the same func-
tional areas through a procedure similar to executive reor-
ganization plans;
-Permit states and local governments to submit combined ap-
plications for joint projects which require funding from two or
more federal programs;
-Permit greater reliance by federal agencies on state and local
auditing and accounting systems that meet certain standards;
-Establish a new procedure for congressional oversight of
federal grant-in-aid programs through new revenue specialist
positions on each standing committee of the House and Sen-
ate;
-Insure that state governments obtain full and complete in-
formation on the amount and purpose of all federal aid dollars
spent in their respective states; and
-Amend the Intergovernmental Personnel Act to permit a new
program of federal-state fellows and federal-urban fellows.
91. See SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note 3, at 217 ("In the last few
years, State and local governments have had to allocate about 10% of
their own revenue to match Federal grant moneys."); Hearings on
S.1770 and S.241, supra note 62, at 74 (Governor Bartlett: "[T]he cate-
gorical grant competes more effectively for local and State moneys than
do the priority needs of local and State."). Walter Heller stated: "The
matching requirements have this disadvantage of siphoning funds from
other sources and putting pressures that may cause misallocation of the
funds." Id. at 75.
92. Staff data from Senate Finance Committee; see SENATE Rz-
PORT, supra note 9, at 65.
93. See Clark, Iglehart & Lilley, New Federalism II: Philosophy,
4 NAT'L J. 1913 (1972). Mayor Norman Mineta of San Jose, California
indicated that a $200,000 grant under the Planned Variations Program to
review and comment on all federal grants impacting on the city had to
be redirected since the city did not know the extent and nature of fed-
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The defects in the categorical grant programs were demon-
strated by a federal study of the operation of federal grant-in-
aid programs in Richmond, Virginia, which reached the following
conclusion:9 4
eral aid to city departments. The city suddenly discovered it was
committing $20 million of its funds to obtain $56.4 million of federal
matching funds for urban renewal A San Jose official is quoted:
[W e had no idea that we were so heavily committed, or
in what areas we had agreed to put up matching money. City
agencies were applying right and left for money, and the
Mayor's office never knew what the extent of the city's match-
ing commitments were. And of course we never had the chance
to weigh the individual commitments against any kind of over-
all needs assessment
You have to conclude that the city might well have
wanted to put its money into other areas.
Id. The Office of Management and Budget in its study of the impact of
federal grants-in-aid in Richmond, Virginia concluded that there was
no single official or agency in the City of Richmond which had avail-
able an accurate figure for the number, amount and matching require-
ments of federal programs in which they were engaged.
94. Office of Management and Budget, RlcmoND STuDY Tss
FoRCE REPoRT (1971), quoted id. at 1914. The Report reached the fol-
lowing additional detailed conclusions:
-There is ample evidence that federal assistance which has the
potential of shoring up existing, financially weak state and
local activities and stimulating the development of new ap-
proaches has eroded the decision-making capacity of state and
local chief executives to coordinate and direct resources to meet
emerging problems. Many federal programs have created new
and frequently competitive state and local institutions.
-The delivery of federal assistance through functional grant-
in-aid channels has resulted in the development of working re-
lationships whereby special purpose functional bureaucracies at
all levels of government tightly administer the program for
limited purposes. There are few incentives to move beyond the
established functional boundaries to develop integrated ap-
proaches to common problems. Programs too narrowly con-
ceived deal with pieces of a problem and even then usually
with the symptoms and not basic causes.
-The excessive number of categorical grant programs has cre-
ated a morass of administrative requirements which are incon-
sistent, excessively complicated, and costly to administer. These
requirements have generated significant disillusionment and
distaste among recipient state and local officials. Many localgovernments do not participate in grant programs because they
do not know of the programs' availability or they find the red
tape too confusing and enervating. State and local officials
are faced with so many grant processes they do not have the
time or staff to manage them.
-There is no single line of authority with which state and lo-
cal officials can deal to apply for and receive federal funds.
Communities in need of resources cannot turn to a singly ac-
countable federal entity in order to press their demands. Simi-
larly, the- federal government is not in a position to resolve
competing demands, balancing such demands with resources
available.
-Coordination of grant programs among federal agencies as
well as with state and local governments is generally very
weak There is no effective point of cgordination at the local
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We now find, according to most governmental observers,
that this haphazard growth of the grant-in-aid system has re-
sulted in resources being delivered in uncoordinated and frag-
mented fashion through dozens of single-purpose categorical
programs. Many of these programs are beyond the direct in-
fluence of general-purpose government. The sheer magnitude
of the number of programs and the concomitant bureaucratic
processes in order to obtain them has inevitably made it clear
that the difficulties in managing Federal aid have become im-
mense and in many respects impossible. In fact, the growth
of the grant-in-aid system instead of encouraging broad, in-
terrelated, and flexible plans of attack on social and economic
problems is designed more to thwart this objective rather than
promote it.
The Nixon Administration has highlighted the following prob-
lems which accompanied the dramatic increase in federal grant
programs during the last two decades: 5
level and the federal level which permits a comprehensive
plan for the use of federal funds to be developed and imple-
mented. Without a strong coordination point, programs are too
often developed without cognizance of political, budgetary, and
operational constraints, frequently resulting in duplication and
delay.
95. SPECIAL ANALYSES, supra note 3, at 212-13. In the President's
message to Congress on February 4, 1971, the following criticism of the
categorical grant programs was presented:
The major difficulty is that States and localities are not
free to spend these funds on their own needs as they see them.
The money is spent instead for the things Washington wants
and in the way Washington orders. Because the categories for
which the money is given are often extremely narrow, it is
difficult to adjust spending to local requirements. And because
these categories are extremely resistant to change, large sums
are often spent on outdated projects. Pressing needs often go
unmet, therefore, while countless dollars are wasted on low
priority expenditures.
This system of categorical grants has grown up over the
years in piecemeal fashion, with little concern for how each
new program would fit in with existing old ones. The result
has been a great deal of overlap and very little coordination.
A dozen or more manpower programs, for example, may exist
side by side in the same urban neighborhood-each one sep-
arately funded and separately managed.
All of these problems are compounded by the frequent re-
quirement that Federal dollars must be matched by State and
local money. This requirement often has a major distorting ef-
fect on State and local budgets. It guarantees that many
Federal errors will be reproduced at the State and local level.
And it leaves hard pressed governments at the lower levels
with less money to finance their own priorities.
The administrative burdens associated with Federal grants
can also be prohibitive. The application process alone can in-
volve volumes of paperwork and delays of many months. There
are so many of these programs that they have to be listed in
large catalogs and there are so many catalogs that a special
catalog of catalogs had to be published. The guidelines which
are attached to these grants are so complicated that the govern-
ment has had to issue special guidelines on how the guidelines
should be interpreted. The result of all this has been described
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-Program delays and uncertainty caused by unnecessarily de-
tailed and costly application requirements;
-Unnecessary limitations on the authority and responsibilities
of governors, mayors, county executives, and city managers;
-The creation of competitive and duplicative state and local
governmental institutions;
-Rigid funding and organizational arrangements which were
unable to adjust to changes in priorities over time, such as
matching funds requirements....
Finally, the Brookings Institution concluded that an expansion
of the existing grant programs would not alleviate the problems
of urban core cities:
[M]any of the programs that are intended to assist local
governments in providing services are encumbered by stringent
regulations that preclude their use for the support of basic serv-
ices .... [I]n many cases, they require that the recipient gov-
ernment match some fraction of the federal contribution. Hence,
rather than providing relief from the fiscal burden of running
basic city services, they tend to add to that burden .... 00
If these conclusions as to the defects in the existing programs
are accurate, Revenue Sharing, both General and Special, should
be seen primarily as an alternative delivery vehicle intended to
avoid the substantial problems generated by the categorical
grant programs. However, it is first necessary to determine
whether Revenue Sharing presents potential difficulties of a dif-
ferent sort which may be of a greater magnitude.
The opposition to Revenue Sharing argues that it will not
result in an efficient delivery of services because local govern-
ments lack the expertise and capability to manage resource allo-
cation and because a higher level of corruption exists at the
local level 97 This view is supported by the widely publicized
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations as
"managerial apoplexy" on the State and local level.
President's Message on Revenue Sharing, supra note 57, at 393 (empha-
sis added).
96. NAroNAL Paiors-1973, supra note 76, at 311.
97. Wilbur Cohen, former Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, has been quoted as opining that city govern-
ments are "run by political machines which do not allow competent
people to be administrators. Instead they are shackled to a lot of
political hacks." Furthermore, he states "the bulk of local government
people are not the most competent. They have little or no inservice
training, and the good people leave because there is no career service.
The only good people at the state and local level are in budget and
finance, and not in the substantive programs. That's one of the biggest
weaknesses with the special revenue-sharing proposals; the local com-
petence just is not there to handle them." Clark, Iglehart & Lilley,
New Federalism III: The Opposition, 4 NAT'L J. 1920, 1925 (1972).
Walter Heller has expressed the view that state and local officials
must be given an opportunity to restructure their organization and
personnel:
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report of the investigation by the Government Operations Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives, dated May 18, 1972, on
operations under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion. The report stated:
The instances of misuse and misapplication [are a matter
of great concern] .... Too large a portion of those funds has
been wasted on diversion for partisan political purposes, on ex-
orbitant consultants' fees, on equipment and vehicles which are
misused or not needed, on excessive payments to equipment
suppliers resulting from widespread absence of competitive bid-
ding and unethical relationships between state and local offi-
cials and suppliers' representatives.
In response to this criticism, the Nixon Administration has pro-
posed the Responsive Governments Act 98 to develop the neces-
sary planning and management capability at the local level. In
the atmosphere created by Watergate, the Ellsberg Affair and
the allegations against former Vice President Agnew, arguments
based on higher levels of local corruption are not very convincing.
Further, it has been argued that the handicapped, disad-
vantaged and poor who are now the beneficiaries of many cate-
gorical programs will not be able to effectively compete for their
share of the Revenue Sharing funds at the local level.99 In fact,
the very purpose of the much maligned extensive regulations
and paper work involved in the categorical grants was to en-
[O]ne constantly hears that state and local units are inefficient
and wasteful. In effect, what they are told is, shape up and
then we will ship out the money. But I say, ship it out to help
you shape up. It's a chicken and egg proposition. The argu-
ment that somehow or other you have to become a paragon of
perfection before the federal government should share its reve-
nues just won't hold water.
Hearings on S. 1770 and S. 241, supra note 62, at 64.
98. See President Nixon's State of the Union Message on Com-
munity Development (Mar. 8, 1973), 119 CONG. REc. S4121 (daily ed.
Mar. 8, 1973), reprinted 31 CONG. Q. 508 (1973).
William Safire, former staff assistant to President Nixon, made the
following statement in an article on the Watergate scandal comparing
federal and local levels of corruption as they relate to Revenue Shar-
ing:
The argument most frequently advanced against the Pres-
ident's New Federalism by liberal critics went this way: "If
the power to decide national priorities, presently located in
scandal-free Washington, were to be transferred out to states,
cities and local communities-then that power would be abused
by the well-known venality, greed and irresponsibility of the
political hacks who work at the local level."
At some expense to the reputation of several of its offi-
cials, the Nixon Administration has finally made the point it
had hitherto failed to communicate: No level of government
has a monopoly on virtue.
N.Y. Times, May 10, 1973, § C, at 45, col. 5.
99. See Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1973, § A, at 2, col. 1.
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sure that the grants benefited the designated disadvantaged
groups. Former H.E.W. Secretary Wilbur J. Cohen bluntly de-
fended the categorical grants as follows:
We have to have federal programs with strings attached be-
cause it is the only way that the disadvantaged, the poor
whites and the poor blacks will get their fair share. If there are
not federally regulated programs to disburse money and instead
it is handled by local city governments, then they won't get
their fair share.
Unlike the federal government, city councils are controlled
by the real estate and industrial development interests and they
will divert the money to their ends. We have to have federal
strings because there is no other political means to reconcile
the interests of local real estate people with the broader na-
tional interests.10 0
Even strong proponents of Revenue Sharing such as Walter
Heller and Joseph Pechman argue that Revenue Sharing cannot
be a substitute for categorical grants but rather is a necessary
supplement.10 1 They suggest that categorical grants are neces-
sary to coerce the state and local governments to act in a manner
dictated by the national government and the matching require-
ments are intended to reflect that portion of the benefits in the
program which are local rather than national.
This very negative view of the quality of local decision mak-
ing and the responsiveness of the local democratic processes will
certainly be tested by Revenue Sharing.10 2 The ever-increasing
political awareness and impact of minority groups at the local
level may be accelerated by a program of the dramatic propor-
tions of Revenue Sharing. 0 3 A recognition of the need to com-
100. Clark, Iglehart & Lilley, supra note 97.
101. Hearings on S. 1770 and S. 241, supra note 62, at 89.
102. Many commentators support an optimistic view of the foresee-
able performance of state and local officials under Revenue Sharing.
See, e.g., Elazar, Revenue Sharing: Are the States and Localities Re-
sponsible?, id. at 322. At a minimum, it can be argued that states
and localities should be given an opportunity to demonstrate their
ability without the restraints of the categorical programs. See id. at
64, 76, 98.
103. The generally accepted view is that minority and other special
interest groups are far more effective influencing Congress than the
state and local decision-making apparatus. See, e.g., Banfield, supra
note 15 ("From the standpoint of organized interests, dealing with
Congress and the Washington bureaucracies . . . is vastly easier and
more likely to succeed than dealing with the legislatures and governors
of 50 States, not to mention the officials of countless cities, counties,
and special districts.").
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Executive Director of the National Urban
League, has made the following statement:
The effect of revenue sharing on white people is likely to
be harmful; for black people it promises to be devastating.
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pete for the funds at the local level may in fact result in a "New
American Revolution" in a totally unexpected manner. The same
coalition of minority groups which was effective at the national
level in influencing congressional decisions may now be forced
to concentrate on the local decision making process with far
greater impact than generally anticipated.
In conclusion, although potential difficulties certainly exist,
it is the thesis of this Article that the major long term contribu-
tion of Revenue Sharing must be evaluated in terms of the rela-
tive efficiency with which it delivers goods and services at the
state and local levels. Initially, the reduction in "red tape" and
the elimination of spending constraints, matching requirements
and uncertainty in the current grant system should result in
some improvement. However, the long term impact of Revenue
Sharing must be judged by the ability of local decision making,
responsibility and accountability to produce more efficient per-
formance. If the same dollars do not deliver more goods and
services to meet the highest priority needs of the recipient gov-
ernments, Revenue Sharing will have failed the "New Federal-
ism" and presumably will be subject to President Nixon's stand-
ard that "Federal programs must meet their objectives and costs
must be related to achievements.' 10 4  It is General Revenue
Sharing that must be the driving force to improve the general
efficiency of state and local governments in meeting the broad
range of priorities they have established. Special Revenue Shar-
ing should follow in broad areas of concentration selected on a
national basis, with decisions made at the state and local levels
regarding the priorities and particular projects within those se-
lected areas.
B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REVENuE SHARING LEGISLATION
An analysis of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
The federal government has historically been the protector of
minority citizens. While it has often been the frailest of reeds
historically it has been more responsive than state or local
governments.
Now, just as it has come to be black people's time to bene-
fit from federal actions, it is proposed that the Rule of the game
be changed and we rely on some magical mixture of local good-
will along with a heavy dose of individual initiative....
I have little faith in the competence and record of 50
state governments and thousands of local governments to make
humane judgements and institute responsible programs.
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 1973, at 16, col. 3.
104. President's Budget Message, N.Y. Times, January 30, 1973, § 1,
at 21, col. 5.
[Vol. 58:1
REVENUE SHARING
(Public Law 92-512) requires study of its legislative history in
order to interpret and explain the statutory provisions and eval-
uate the administrative implementation and regulation. Due
to the highly political nature of this legislation and the many
compromises involved, the legislative history performs a far more
substantial role than is generally the situation. The significance
of many of the provisions is evident only upon a careful reading
of the Committee and Conference Reports and the Congressional
debates. Furthermore, the desire of Chairman Wilbur Mills to
distinguish his legislative proposals from the Nixon Administra-
tion's proposals0 5 resulted in provisions which either lacked
substance initially or will become without substance as a result
of the administrative implementation and regulation.
The Act basically provides for the distribution of $30.2 bil-
lion directly to all state governments and to most units of local
government pursuant to fixed formulas over a five year period
commencing January 1, 1972. The Act was made retroactive to
January 1 because many states and localities, especially New
York State, had included the grants in their budgets based on
commitments from the Nixon Administration and various pow-
erful Congressmen.
The legislation may be analyzed as a framework composed
of the following parts:
1. Mechanics of federal authorization and payment;
2. Identification of qualified recipients;
3. Allocation formulas and applicable limitations;
105. See House REPoRT, supra note 60, at 88.
The "priorities" to which local expenditures are limited
were not selected after careful analysis of the needs of the
39,000 units of local government involved. * * * The "priori-
ties" were plucked out of thin air for the whole purpose of
distinguishing the Committee bill from the Administration's
"no strings attached" revenue sharing proposal which had been
consistently denounced by some members of the Committee.
Id.
Chairman Wilbur Mills made the following statement:
Finally, I would like to emphasize that ... there are a
series of differences between the fiscal assistance provided by
this bill and the revenue-sharing proposal initially presented
to us which in my mind are absolutely fundamental.
Third, under the bill, the Federal Government-which is
the Government raising the revenues-provides controls on
how the local governments will spend the funds distributed to
them.
118 CONG. REc. H5880-81 (daily ed. June 21, 1972).
The "General Revenue Sharing Act of 1971" was introduced in the
Senate by Senator Baker (S.680) and in the House of Representatives
by Congressman Betts (H.R. 4187).
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4. Data base for the allocation formulas;
5. Restrictions on expenditures of the funds;
6. Accountability for decision making, including the require-
ments on procedures, reporting and accounting.
Although the allocation formulas received most of the congres-
sional and public attention for obvious reasons, the success of the
program may well be determined by the effectiveness of the pro-
visions in the Act governing expenditure of the funds, adminis-
tration of the program, and the implementation and regulation
thereof. This Article will present a detailed analysis of these
provisions in an attempt to explain their purpose and evaluate
their impact.
In order to achieve a unified structure of federal assistance
to states and localities, the basic framework of the Act should be
utilized in the Special Revenue Sharing programs, provided one
concludes that the provisions in the Act are adequate for their
purpose. A consistent scheme of administration and regulation
would facilitate operations at the federal level and certainly
would provide a simplified and consistent set of compliance, re-
porting and performance requirements for recipient govern-
ments. 10 , In fact, it is possible to envision federal administra-
tion of all revenue sharing programs from one centralized office.
However, because different congressional committees will con-
sider each of the Special Revenue Sharing proposals, it is un-
likely that any consistent framework will result.
1. Identification of Qualified Recipients
a. Identified Recipients
The Act identifies the following categories of entities enti-
tled to receive funds:
1. State governments;
2. Units of local government-defined as the government of a
county, municipality, township, 107 or other unit of general
106. In recognition of the unique nature of the legislation, the Act
grants broad regulatory authority to the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Secretary has established the Office of Revenue Sharing to ad-
minister the program and has delegated to the Director of that Office
all the Secretary's authority under the Act. 31 C.F.R. §§ 51.0-.75 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Final Regulations]. For the purpose of interpret-
ing the Final Regulations reference will be made to the Proposed Regu-
lations which appeared in the Federal Register, on February 22, 1973,
at 4917-28 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Regulations].
Interim regulations applicable to the Entitlement Period January 1
to June 30, 1972 were published in the Federal Register, on October 28,
1972 at 23,100 to 04; and amendments thereto for the Entitlement Period
July 1 to December 31, 1972 were published in the Federal Register, on
December 27, 1972 at 28507 to 508 [hereinafter cited as Interim Regu-
lations].
107. Townships include equivalent subdivisions of government hay-
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government determined on the basis of the same principles
as are used by the Bureau of the Census for general sta-
tistical purposes;10s
3. Indian tribes and Alaskan native villages-defined as the
recognized governing body of an Indian tribe or Alaskan
native village which performs substantial governmental
functions; 109 and
4. The District of Columbia.110
A major unanticipated problem has arisen from that portion
of the definition of units of local government which requires
that they be a "unit of general government." This provision was
added because special districts such as school districts, library
districts, fire districts and sewage districts were not intended to
be recipient entities. 1 .' The provision was also intended to dis-
qualify entities such as election districts, magisterial districts
and congressional districts which were not legally empowered to
render any services to their citizens but rather were established
for administrative, ministerial or political purposes.11
2
Particularly in connection with townships in the Midwest
and counties in Massachusetts,1 3 there is a question as to the
status of entities which satisfy the Census criteria for a unit of
local government but perform extremely limited functions. The
House Report indicates that the definition of qualified recipients
is to include any general government "even though it might not
ing different designations (such as "towns"). ACT § 108(d) (3), 31
U.S.C.A. § 1227 (d) (3) (1973).
108. Id. § 108 (d) (1), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227(d) (1) (1973).
109. Id.
110. For the purposes of the allocation formulas the District of
Columbia is treated both as a state and as a county area which has no
units of local government (other than itself) within its geographic
area. ACT § 141(c) (1), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1261(c) (1) (1973).
111. See HousE REPoRT, supra note 60, at 31; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 28. The 1967 Census of Governments indicates that there was
a 16 percent increase in special districts between 1962 and 1967, includ-
ing the following special districts, among others: fire protection (13.5
percent increase), housing and urban renewal (42.4 percent increase),
sewerage (31.6 percent increase) and urban water supply (42.5 percent
increase). U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1 Gov-
EENMENTAL ORGANIZATION 4-5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GovrnN-
IENTAL ORGOANZATION].
112. See HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 30-31; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 9, at 28.
113. See Havemann, Revenue Sharing Report/Problems snag Nixon
plan as complaints from local areas mount, 5 NATL J. 389 (1973);
Washington Post, April 20, 1973, at 1, col 2. It appears that the main
function of counties in Massachusetts is to operate sheriffs' offices and
jails:
In Massachusetts, county governments fulfill only limited func-
tions, chiefly providing jails and other correctional institutions
and tuberculosis hospitals. The counties may also maintain
agricultural schools.
GovzwtNAI. O1AGA.IZATioN supra note 111, at 368,
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
perform all of the functions that might be regarded as municipal
functions or might contract to have some of those functions per-
formed by other entities." 1 4 The General Explanation of the
Act states that "[a] unit must have a government (i.e., it must
exist as an organized entity, have governmental characteristics
and have substantial autonomy)-it is not enough that it have
a political boundary."" 15 In general, the principles used by the
Bureau of the Census for general statistical purposes will be de-
terminative in resolving these questions." 0
The Bureau of the Census defines a governmental unit as
"an organized entity having governmental attributes and having
sufficient discretion in the management of its own affairs to
distinguish it as separate from the administrative structure of
any other governmental unit."'" 7 The Census looks at the fol-
lowing characteristics as evidence of each of the three attri-
butes:" 8
1. Existence as an organized entity
Some form of organization must exist. In addition, the
entity must have some corporate powers such as perpetual
succession, the right to sue and be sued, and the right to
make contracts, acquire and dispose of property. Merely
having the right of existence is not adequate.
Where a former governmental unit has ceased to oper-
ate-e.g., receives no revenue, conducts no activities, and
has no officers currently-it is not counted as an existing
government.' 19
2. Governmental character
Officers must be popularly elected or appointed by public
officials and the entity must be subject to requirements of
public accountability such as public reporting or public in-
spection of records.
Governmental character is attributed to any units hav-
ing power to levy property taxes, power to issue debt
exempt from taxation, or responsibility for performing a
recognized governmental function. However, a lack of
With respect to townships in Illinois, the Census states:
Eighty-five of the 102 counties in Illinois have organized
township governments .... In addition to the assessment of
property for taxing purposes, Illinois townships have two main
functions-maintenance of local roads and support of indigents.
Certain of the township governments also operate libraries,
cemeteries, and hospitals.
Id. at 338.
114. HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 31; see SENATE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 28.
115. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 36.
116. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, CLASSIFICATION MANUAL, Gov-
EMNMENTAL FINANcEs 6-10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS CLASSIF-
ICATION MANUAL].
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id.
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these attributes or of evidence concerning them does not
preclude a class of units being recognized as govern-
mental in character, if it meets the indicated require-
ments as to officers or public accountability.
3. Substantial autonomy
In general, the entity must have the power to raise a sub-
stantial portion of its revenue from sources it controls and
its officers must be independent of external administrative
control in the actual operation of the unit's activities. 2 0
However, the Census definition of unit of government includes
independent school districts and special districts,1 21 both of which
Congress intended to exclude from the definition of "unit of
local government."'
22
With the exception of Indian tribes and Alaskan native vil-
lages 12s units of local government are effectively disqualified as
recipients for any entitlement period if their allocation would
amount to less than $200 for any 12 month period. -1 2 4 The con-
gressional committees considered various population-related
iri~inu ' 25 and other revenue qualifications in order to sim-
plify the administrative problems and reduce uneconomical and
inefficient fragmentation of political units. Small communities
in densely populated areas often provide a minimum amount of
general governmental services and rely instead upon county and
state governments or contract with other communities for serv-
ices. However, in a sparsely settled state, a community of 1500
might provide many community services and constitute a sig-
nificant viable entity. This dilemma made agreement on popu-
lation minimums or revenue qualifications impossible.
In 1967, a Bureau of the Census report on governmental
organizations indicated the following:
12 6
Population size Municipalities Township governments
group Number Percent Number Percent
Total 18,048 100.0 17,105 100.0
Over 5,000 2,964 16.4 2,793 8.5
2,500 to 4,999 1,791 9.9 1,338 7.8
1,000 to 2,499 3,554 19.7 3,708 21.7
Less than 1,000 9,739 54.0 10,004 62.0
Thus, a minimum population standard of 2500, which was se-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 10.
122. GEmmAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 36 ("This definition
of general government excludes school districts, special utility districts,
library districts,....").
123. AcT § 108(d) (1), 31U.S.C.A. § 1227(d) (1) (1973).
124. AcT § 108(b) (6) (D), 31U.S.C.A. § 1227(b) (6) (D) (1973).
125. The original Mills Bill § 103(e) (9) had a minimum quali-
fication requirement of 2,500 population and $10,000 adjusted revenues.
HLR. 11950, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
126. GovRsiuNxAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 111, at 2-3.
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riously discussed, would have eliminated approximately 74 per-
cent of all municipalities and 84 percent of all townships.' 2 7 This
result was unacceptable to many Congressmen, particularly
Southern Representatives on the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee.
b. Boundary Changes and Governmental Reorganizations
The Act recognizes that structural changes such as annex-
ations, new incorporations, relinquishments of charters and merg-
ers of governmental units occur constantly and often involve sig-
nificant numbers of people. 1 2 8 In general, the Act provides that
any boundary change, governmental reorganization, or change
in state statutes or constitutions relevant to the computation of
the entitlement of a unit of local government will be reflected
in the allocation amount for that unit for the next Entitlement
Period.1 29 However, the Regulations provide certain de mini-
mis rules to reduce the administrative burden. 30
The most significant problem caused by this provision is the
necessity to construct comparable data for the data base period
for the comparable units. For example, if Municipality A were
incorporated on May 1, 1973, it would be entitled to receive
funds for the Entitlement Period commencing July 1, 1973. How-
127. See Letter from Graham W. Watt to General Revenue Sharing
Recipients, April 6, 1973 ("the 26,000 places we serve that have fewer
than 2,500 people").
128. ACT § 108(d) (6), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227 (d) (6) (1973).
129. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.23(a) (1). The Final
Regulations require that the Bureau of the Census be notified of a
change within 60 days after the beginning of an Entitlement Period in
order to affect the allocation for that period.
We [the Census Bureau] learn about 90 to 95 percent of all
geographic changes from our annual Boundary and Annexation
Survey. This is a year-end survey in which we send out a list
reflecting our latest geographic information to every county
government and maps to every municipality of 2500 or more
persons. We ask them to post all changes within their juris-
diction on the map and to provide us with a copy of the legal
documentation to support those changes. The result of this
survey is the notification to Treasury of official and qualify-
ing changes in eligibility status and necessary basic data ele-
ments for new units of government.
Rubin, Problem Areas in the Revenue Sharing Allocation Data Base,
1 PuBLic DATA USE 5 (1973).
130. Annexations will not affect the entitlements if the annexing
entity had an original population of less than 5,000 on April 1, 1970 or
the annexed area had a population of less than 250, or less than 5 per-
cent of the population of the annexing entity. Final Regulations, supra
note 106, § 51.23 (d). However, the Secretary reserves the right to ad-
just for an annexation when he "determines that adjustments pursuant
to such annexations would be equitable and would not be unnecessar-
ily burdensome, expensive, or otherwise impracticable." Id.; see HousE
REPORT, supra note 60, at 32; SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 29.
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ever, the population and income data in the local allocation for-
mula used for all other municipalities in the county for that En-
titlement Period are derived from the 1970 Decennial Census.
Therefore, the requirement of using uniform comparable data
precludes using 1973 special census data for Municipality A for
these data elements. Rather, the Bureau of the Census must re-
construct 1970 data elements on population and income for Mu-
nicipality A using the 1970 Decennial Census information.'
3
'
Also, for the Entitlement Period commencing July 1, 1973, the
Treasury would normally use the Special Survey of Adjusted
Taxes for fiscal year 1973, a period during which Municipality
A did not levy any taxes. Therefore, the Bureau of the Census
must also construct adjusted tax data for Municipality A if it
is to receive any allocation for that Entitlement Period.
2. Allocation Formulas and Applicable Limitations
a. Description of Allocation Formulas
Although most members of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, the Senate Finance Committee and the Congress as a
whole voted on the basis of relative dollar allocations rather than
technical forumulas, the Act as adopted makes the formulas,
subject to specified limitations, the sole and final determiner of
the allocations.132 In fact, the allocations determined by the
Department of the Treasury for distribution vary significantly
from the dollar amounts considered by Congress.
The House Ways and Means Committee deliberated in execu-
tive session for 35 days using as its reference points the alloca-
tion formulas in the original Administration proposal and in the
bill introduced by Chairman Mills. Under great political pres-
sure during a period of national political campaigns, Chairman
Mills finally agreed to take the bill to the floor in late June,
1972. As a result of its "Closed Rule," the House of Representa-
tives as a body had no alternative to the Ways and Means pro-
posal' 33 Pressure from an effective coalition of governors, may-
ors, and county commissioners forced House passage of the bill.
131. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 60, at 32; SENATE REPORT, supra note
9, at 29. ("It is understood that reasonable efforts will be made to
determine the population and per capita income of new or expanded
units using the 1970 census data (rather than conducting a new partial
census).")
132. See '"Lmitations on Allocations," § 2(c), p. 45 infra.
133. In general, a Closed Rule is a parliamentary determination
which prohibits all amendments to the pending proposal. It is inter-
esting to speculate as to whether in the future Chairman Mills will be
able to obtain a Closed Rule on other revenue sharing proposals. Chair-
man Mills has indicated that he would support the request of Charles A.
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Thereafter, the Senate Finance Committee, under the lead-
ership of Chairman Russell Long, played a very creative "num-
bers game." The Committee requested a spread sheet indicating
total state allocations according to every available variable and
then considered various combinations of these variables in order
to achieve the relative dollar allocations desired.1 4 Since the
Senate Finance Committee was dominated by representatives of
the poorer, less urban states of the South and West, the relative
shifts from the allocations adopted by the House Ways and
Means Committee, dominated by representatives of the wealthier
urban states, were readily understandable. 3 Once the broad
relative dollar allocations were decided, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee refined the formula to achieve the very practical political
objective of producing more "winners"-i.e., states receiving more
funds under the Finance Committee proposal than under the
House bill-than "losers.' 13 6
The Conference Committee adopted a "best of both worlds"
Vanik, D-Ohio, to seek an Open Rule on the bill to extend the interest
equalization tax. See Tax Analysts and Advocates, February 12, 1973.
The new chairman of the Rules Committee, Ray J. Madden, D-Ind., has
been a vocal supporter of Open Rules and voted for an Open Rule on
Revenue Sharing. The House Democratic Caucus voted to establish a
new mechanism significantly reducing the scope of the Closed Rule.
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 22, 1973, at 2, cols. 3-4. An Open Rule
would result in a significant number of proposed changes in the alloca-
tion formula, which would greatly increase the difficulty of House
passage.
134. The starting point of the analysis was a "spread sheet" show-
ing total and per capita distributions for each state based on the fac-
tors of population, urbanized population, relative income, income tax
collections and general tax effort.
135. See 118 CONG. REC. § 14003 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Long); id. at § 14565-66 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Long). The Ways and Means Committee has a total of 13
members representing 52% of the membership from the states of New
York (2), California (2), Pennsylvania (2), Michigan (2), Massachu-
setts (1), Illinois (2) and Ohio (2). In addition, many of the major
urban cities of the country were represented on the Committee: Detroit
(Martha W. Griffiths), Boston (James A. Burke), Philadelphia (Wil-
liam J. Green), New York (Hugh L. Carey), Cleveland (Charles A.
Vanik) and Chicago (Dan Rostenkowski).
The Senate Finance Committee with a total of 16 members had 8
Senators from rural western states-Utah (Bennett), Nebraska (Cur-
tis), Iowa (Miller), Idaho (Jordan), Arizona (Fannin), Wyoming (Han-
sen), Oklahoma (Harris), New Mexico (Anderson)-and 4 from rural
southern states-Louisiana (Long), Georgia (Talmadge), Arkansas (Ful-
bright) and Virginia (Byrd).
136. Senator Russell Long very creatively combined a supplemen-
tal $1 billion as a substitute for the Social Services program with the
basic $5.3 billion of Revenue Sharing which resulted in allocations
where all but four states and the District of Columbia received more
funds under the Senate Finance Committee Bill than under the House-
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approach. Each state would receive an aggregate allocation on
the basis of whichever formula, either House or Senate, resulted
in the largest amount for that state. In fact, serious considera-
tion was given to an allocation method which would have taken
the average of the House and Senate allocations.
Development of the formulas and calculation of the alloca-
tions was complicated by the geographical diversity of the coun-
try. For example, in 10 states (Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Ver-
mont) municipal governments are in townships as well as in
counties. This problem of geographically overlapping jurisdic-
tions is highlighted by Cook County, Illinois, which in 1970 had
113 municipalities with populations over 2,500, of which 15 over-
lapped into another county while 43 were in more than one town-
ship within Cook County. Some were in as many as four town-
ships.
In recognition of the problem posed by geographic diversity,
the Administration Bill attempted to distribute funds directly
among all local governmental units without regard to their geo-
graphic locations. In contrast, the allocation formulas in the
original Mills Bill and the final Act deal with the problem
through the concept of various levels of all-inclusive geographic
areas, one within the other. Thus, allocations are made first to
state areas, then to county areas, and finally to each local gov-
ernmental unit (including the county government) within the
county area. This method of calculation could cause two identi-
cal municipalities on either side of a county line to receive sub-
stantially different allocations since allocations are based on a
municipality's characteristics relative to those of the other mu-
nicipalities in the same county.
If a unit overlaps into another geographic area it is treated
separately and receives an allocation from each geographic area.
For example, Atlanta, Georgia, is located in DeKalb and Fulton
Counties. The part located in DeKalb County is considered a
separate city for purposes of sharing in the DeKalb County area
allocation, and the part located in Fulton County is considered
a separate city for the Fulton County area allocation.
The following formula descriptions indicate the calculations
and allocations for State X, which includes County X1, having
a Municipality Xa.137
passed Bill. See 118 CONG. REc. § 14000 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1972)
(remarks of Senator Long).
137. These formulas do not indicate the difficulties caused by the
presence of townships or Indian tribes. See AcT §§ 108(b) (3) and
(4), 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1227(b) (3) and (4) (1973).
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The allocation to each state area is on the basis of which-
ever of two formulas-the "Three Factor Formula" taken from
the Senate Bill or the "Five Factor Formula" taken from the
House Bill-yields the greater amount for that state area for
the particular Entitlement Period. Although the principle was
the "best of both worlds," some states, including Colorado, Flor-
ida, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin, received less than under
either the House or Senate formulation because the Administra-
tion insisted upon limiting the aggregate allocation to $5.3 billion
in the first year although the sum of the "best of both worlds"
approach was $5.8 billion. The Act provides that each state
area's initial allocation would be proportionally reduced to ar-
rive at a total allocation of $5.3 billion. 138
The Act's basic local allocation formula for county areas and
units of local government other than county governments is
presented as Population multiplied by the General Tax Effort
Factor multiplied by the Relative Income Factor. However, the
formula reduces to Adjusted Taxes divided by the square of Per
Capita Income.13 9 Thus, population is not an operative element
in the local allocation formula among county areas nor among
units of local government other than county governments. 1 0)
This result was not understood by members of Congress at the
time of enactment. Undoubtedly, those who expressed a strong
preference for per capita equality at the local level will be
troubled by this result.
The selection of the variables used in the final allocation for-
mulas is largely attributable to the fact that data on these vari-
138. See note 146 infra.
139. The local formula derivation is as follows:
Per Capita
Population (x) Adjusted Taxes of Ma (x) Income Ca
of Ma Population of Ma (x) Per Per Capita
Capita Income of Ma Income Ma
Sum of Numerators for all Municipalities
in County
Ma: Municipality A
Ca: County X Area
The formula reduces to:
Adjusted Taxes of Ma
(Per Capita Income of Ma) 2
Sum of Numerators for all Municipalities in County
140. However, for those localities at either the 145 percent or 20
percent limitation, population will continue to have a significant im-
pact. See "Limitations on Allocations," § 2(c), p. 45 infra.
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ables are readily available and the fact that their use resulted in
a distribution which met the political needs of Congress. There is
some question whether the variables have a theoretical justifica-
tion in addition to these practical considerations that led to their
adoption.
Population is a justifiable variable because some portion of
every community's financial need is a function of the population
of that community. There is also the fundamental notion of na-
tionwide per capita equity which requires that every active
community receive some funds under the Act. The use of "ur-
banized population" is theoretically justifiable because highly
urbanized areas have greater needs and higher costs.14 1 These
areas have much greater concentrations of people with higher
levels of need for governmental services, especially services for
the poor and aged. Also, the greater population density often
results in higher crime rates, dirtier streets and more congested
traffic. Services cost more in the major urbanized centers be-
cause wage rates are higher and because the higher density
makes the delivery of many services more difficult. However,
"urbanized population" is defined by the Bureau of the Census
as the population of any area consisting of cities with a popula-
tion of 50,000 or more plus the population of the surrounding
closely settled area. The inability of this factor to reflect the
increased problems of core cities is indicated by the fact that in
1970 approximately 58 percent of the population of the nation
was "urbanized."
Use of inverse per capita income can be justified simply on
the basis that areas with relatively poorer people should receive
more money. This is true if only because it is more difficult to
raise funds for public services in poorer areas.
The state income tax collection variable was intended to be
an incentive factor to induce more states to adopt an income tax
and to encourage an increase in the rate of existing income taxes.
This was based on the belief that the income tax is more re-
sponsive to changes in income levels and also is a more progres-
sive tax than the property tax which currently produces approx-
imately 75 percent of all state and local tax revenue.
The general tax effort variable was included so that those
entities which were already making the greatest demands on
their tax bases would receive more assistance. 142  Use of this
variable embodies the simplistic notion that greater assistance
141. See NATIONAL PmoRIrs-1973, supra note 76, at 291-302.
142. See GEimAL EXPLAnATION, supra note 63, at 24.
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should be given those who "make a greater effort to help them-
selves.' 43 It has been frequently stated that if all states and
their localities made the same revenue effort as is made by the
average of the 10 states with the highest revenue effort, states
and local governments would have raised an additional $21 bil-
lion of revenue in 1970.'4 However, the use of a general tax
effort factor may be criticized for its failure to distinguish be-
tween a highly inefficient government with high taxes and low
services and a highly efficient government with relatively lower
taxes but a higher level of services.
The use of population, tax effort, and inverse per capita
income for the final local distribution was intended "to grant
proportionally larger assistance to poorer communities which
have relatively small tax bases and high needs.' 4  At the
same time, the formulas using these variables were designed to
grant proportionately larger assistance to governmental units
that made relatively greater efforts to help themselves out of
their own tax resources. 1 46
A
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C
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143. Id.
144. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 60, at 92.
145. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 10.
146. TOTAL ALLOCATIONS TO STATE AREAS
(millions of dollars)
Actual Totals Act
Originally 0
Allocated By All
Treasury
labama 90.6 Missouri
laska 6.6 Montana
xizona 50.2 Nebraska
rkansas 54.5 Nevada
alifornia 560.3 New Hampshire
olorado 54.5 New Jersey
onnecticut 67.2 New Mexico
elaware 16.1 New York)istrict of North Carolina
Columbia 23.9 North Dakota
lorida 146.7 Ohio
reorgia 109.6 Oklahoma
[awaii 23.7 Oregon
daho 21.3 Pennsylvania
llinois 274.0 Rhode Island
ndiana 113.8 South Carolina
owa 75.5 South Dakota
.ansas 52.4 Tennessee
.entucky 87.0 Texas
ouisiana 122.5 Utah
aine 31.0 Vermont
laryland 107.1 Virginia
assachusetts 165.1 Washington
fichigan 224.4 West Virginia
linnesota 106.4 Wisconsin
lississippi 88.4 Wyoming
partment of the Treasury, Initial Payment-Entitleme
972).
ual Totals
riginally
ocated By
'reasury
98.2
20.5
38.9
11.5
16.6
166.6
33.0
589.0
136.0
22.2
213.9
58.9
53.0
278.0
24.2
72.1
24.1
98.9
247.9
30.6
14.7
106.3
78.0
52.0
133.3
10.0
nt Period 1
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b. Optional Local Formula
The Act provides that once during the five year life of the
program, beginning with the January-June 1973 Entitlement Pe-
riod, a state legislature may alter the allocation formula within
the state, subject to certain constraints, by enacting a law of
general application within the state. The primary justification
for this provision is "to permit State governments to employ
their more intimate knowledge of the needs and requirements
of the State for efficient and equitable allocation of funds."
14 7
In addition, this provision allowed many Congressmen to support
the bill and yet criticize the allocation to particular areas within
their districts. If the citizens of a locality complained that their
allocation was too small, particularly when compared with that
of a neighboring locality, the Congressman could express his
sympathy with their position and explain the difficulty in ar-
riving at a formula of nationwide application. He could then
state that, notwithstanding the obvious injustice to the com-
plaining locality, he supported the legislation because the state
legislature could rectify the situation. In essence, this provision
attempts to shift some of the political burden of the allocation
formulas to the state legislatures. Based on the tremendous dif-
ficulty Congress experienced in arriving at a formula, it will be
interesting to see how the state legislatures fare in their attempts
to alter the existing formulas.
Actually, the flexibility that the Act gives the state legisla-
tures is severely limited. There was some sentiment for giving
the state legislatures the absolute right to change the formula
in any manner which they determined best reflected local needs
and conditions. In the end, however, Congress was not willing to
delegate that much power to the state legislatures. Also, Con-
gress could not permit the states complete freedom in choosing
variables because the data collection and computer program-
ming problems would have become unmanageable. Therefore,
the option found in Section 108 (c) provides that the state legis-
lature may only affect the allocation among county areas or
among localities within county areas. No change may be made
in the one-third-two-thirds split between the state and local
governments or in the method of allocation between the county
On July 19, 1973, the Department of the Treasury announced mas-
sive reallocations attributable to the initial four Entitlement Periods.
See Washington Post, July 20, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-3. Adjusted figures for
the first Entitlement Period have not yet been released.
147. GENERAL EXPLAxATION, supra note 63, at 35.
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government and other units of local government within a county
area. Furthermore, no alteration is permitted which changes
the limitations on allocations.1 48  Only the basic intrastate allo-
cation formula, Population times the General Tax Effort Factor
times the Relative Income Factor, may be altered. For the pur-
pose of allocating among county areas, or among units of local
government (other than county governments), the basic for-
mula can be changed to:
K. times Population times General Tax Effort Factor plus
K2 times Population times Relative Income Factor.
The constants in the optional formulas may be any numbers
which make the formulas produce the total amount of money to
be distributed at the affected level. 1 9 For example, each of the
following is an acceptable alternative to the allocation method
provided by Section 108 (a) and (b) (2) and (3):
Allocation to county areas = $100,000.
Allocation to units of local government = $500,000
1) Among county areas: Population x General Tax Effort Fac-
tor x $100,000.
Among units of local government (other than county gov-
ernments): Population x Relative Income Factor x $500,000.
2) Among county areas: [Population x General Tax Effort Fac-
tor x $40,000] + [Population x Relative Income Factor x
$60,000].
Among units of local government (other than county gov-
ernments): Population x General Tax Effort Factor x
$500,000.
3) Among county areas: [Population x Relative Income Factor
x $30,000] + [Population x General Tax Effort Factor x
$70,000].
Among units of local government (other than county gov-
ernments): [Population x Relative Income Factor x $200,000]
+ [Population x General Tax Effort Factor x $300,000].
In addition to the foregoing limitations, any legislative ac-
tion to adopt an alternative formula is subject to the restriction
that it must' 50 (1) provide for allocation of 100 percent of the
148. See "Limitations on Allocations," § 2(c), p. 45 infra.
149. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 35-36.
In adopting its formula, the State may weigh these two
factors equally or it may vary the weights for each of these
factors between zero and 100 percent. Where both factors are
employed in the optional formula, they will be used additively
and each will affect a different sum of money; that is, if the
two factors are weighted equally, one-half of the amount avail-
able for allocation will be distributed on the basis of popula-
tion multiplied by the general tax effort factor and the other
half will be allocated on the basis of population multiplied by
the relative per capita income factor.
Id.
150. ACT § 108(c)(1), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227(c)(1) (1973); Final Regi-
ulations, supra note 106, § 51.27 (a) and (b).
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amount to be allocated under the altered formula, (2) apply uni-
formly throughout the state and (3) apply from the first day
of an Entitlement Period through December 31, 1976. The first
restriction prohibits any alteration in the formulas other than
the two alternatives previously discussed. Although the factors
may be weighted so as to dramatically affect certain areas within
the state which possess certain characteristics, the second re-
striction provides that the discrimination may not be more spe-
cific. For example, provision for a zero weight to the General
Tax Effort Factor and full weight to the Relative Income Factor
would generally result in a dramatic shift of funds from large
commercial cities to rural areas. However, it would not be per-
missible to make this discrimination more specific by provid-
ing that for cities with more than 200,000 population the allo-
cation will be based on the Inverse Income Factor and for all
other localities it will be on a different basis. The last restric-
tion provides that only one change is allowed during the five
year life of the progranL
c. Limitations on Allocations
In recognition of the fact that the great diversity of local
governments prevents any single formula from providing uni-
versal equity, the Act provides the following limitations which
will adjust local allocations so as to avoid some possible gross
inequities and anomalies:
1. The per capita amount allocated to any county area or
any unit of local government (other than a county govern-
ment) shall not be less than 20 percent, nor more than 145
percent, of the aggregate state-wide per capita local
grants;151
2. The amount allocated to any unit of local government shall
not exceed 50 percent of such government's adjusted taxes
plus the intergovernmental transfers of revenue to such
government (other than transfers of Revenue Sharing
funds); 152 and
3. Any entitlement of a unit of local government below the
level of the county government of less than $200 for a 12
month entitlement period is added to the entitlement of the
county government of the county area in which such unit
is located.1 53
In many areas of the country the foregoing limitations,
rather than the allocation formulas, determine the amount which
will be allocated. For example, in West Virginia 45 of the 55
151. ACT § 108(b) (6) (B), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227(b) (6) (B) (1973).
152. Id. at (C).
153. Id. at (D).
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county governments are at the 50 percent limitation and many
major cities, including Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Philadel-
phia and Pittsburgh, are at the 145 percent limitation.
An example of the distortions which the limitations are de-
signed to prevent is presented by municipalities which are "in-
dustrial enclaves," such as City of Commerce, California and
River Rouge, Michigan. City of Commerce has a population of
10,536 and per capita income of $2,565, which is very low when
compared to a countywide per capita income of $3,864. However,
the adjusted taxes for City of Commerce equalled $5,429,293
which is significantly higher than many other cities in Los An-
geles County having populations as much as eight times as
great.'54 Absent the 145 percent limitation the extremely high
tax effort resulting from the high concentration of industry in
a locality with predominantly low income residents, would cause
City of Commerce to receive a per capita allocation of several
hundred dollars. Absent the 50 percent limitation, municipal-
ities in many of the Southern states with relatively large popula-
tions and low income levels, particularly in South Carolina and
West Virginia, would receive an allocation equal to between 100
and 150 percent of their own revenues (local taxes plus trans-
fers). This would result from their low tax rate due to a low
level of services or reliance on the county government for the
services.
The major issue surrounding the limitations was the man-
ner and sequence of their application. For example, if the $200
limitation was applied before the 20 percent limitation, many
small rural units which do not receive more than $200 under the
formulas because of a very low tax effort would nevertheless
receive sizable grants on the basis of the later application of the
20 percent limitation. The Act provides the following order for
applying the limitations: 155 20 and 145 percent limitations to
county areas, 150 20 and 145 percent limitations to units of local
government (excluding county governments), 50 percent limita-
tion to units of local government (including county govern-
ments) and $200 limitation to units of local government (ex-
cluding county governments). While the Act did not indicate
the internal order of the 20 and 145 percent limitations with
respect to each other,157 the Final Regulations specify that at
154. See Department of the Treasury, Data Elements-Entitlement
Period I (1972).
155. ACT § 108(b) (7) (A), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227(b) (7) (A) (1973).
156. Id. at (B).
157. See ACT § 108(b) (7), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227(b) (7) (1973).
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least for county areas, the 145 percent limitation is to be applied
prior to the 20 percent limitation 15 8 This is the only sequence
determination to be made pursuant to the Treasury regula-
tions.159
Although not expressly provided in the Act, the legislative
history160 indicates that the amount of any reduction in the allo-
cation to a county area or to a unit of local government caused
by the 145 percent limitation is to be proportionally allocated
among the other county areas within the state or among the
other units of local government within the same county, re-
spectively. Likewise, if the 20 percent limitation requires an in-
crease in an allocation, the amount of that increase is to be de-
rived proportionally from the other units at the same level In
the event the allocation to a unit of local government or to a
county government is reduced because of the operation of the
50 percent limitation, the amount of the reduction will be allo-
cated to the next higher level of government.' 0 ' This determi-
nation reflects the fact that the next higher level of govern-
ment generally bears the costs of furnishing services to the resi-
dents of the government incurring the limitation.
The methodology employed by the Treasury in applying
these crucial limitations is not clearly presented in the Final
Regulations. It has been suggested that the Treasury's sequence
of applying the adjustments is different from that provided in the
Act.' 62 The issues are subtly raised by Section 51.29 (b) (3)103
158. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.29(a) (1)-(3).
159. See GENERAL EXPLAxATiON, supra note 63, at 34; SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 26.
160. See GENERAL EXPLANATxON, supra note 63, at 34; SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 26:
In the event that the allocation to a county area or to a
unit of local government is reduced because it exceeds the 145
percent maximum limitation, the amount of the reduction may
be allocated among the other county areas within the State or
among the other units of local government within the same
county, respectively, as the government which had its alloca-
tion reduced.
161. ACT § 108(b) (7) (C), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1227(b) (7) (C) (1973). In
the case where the limitation is applied to a municipal or township
government, the excess goes to the county government. Application of
the limitation to a county government results in the excess being re-
distributed to the state government.
162. Letter from James E. Smith, Deputy Under Secretary of the
Treasury, to all members of Congress, Dec. 7, 1972:
In computing this [sic] entitlement payments we have
utilized a computational sequence which is somewhat different
than was used in the print-outs prepared during the period of
legislative consideration. This revised computational sequence
is designed to assure the full effect is given to the "20% floor"
requirement contained in the statute.
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and (4)164 of the Final Regulations. The Treasury Department's
present methodology simultaneously applies the 20 and 50 per-
cent limitations to units of local government with the objective
that "allocations to places below the 20 percent minimum will
not be made in those cases where the additional allocation could
not be retained by the local governments because its allocation
is in excess of the 50 percent limitation."'0 0 , According to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, this produces
some results which were not "originally intended."1 0 0  An ex-
ample illustrates the divergent results:
Municipality A in County X
Statewide local per capita grant- $ 15
Adjusted taxes plus intergovernmental transfers- 14,000
Initial allocation prior to imposition of limitations- 10,000
Population of Municipality A- 5,000
Sequence set forth in § 108(b) (7) (A) of the Act
1. (20% x Statewide local per capita grant x Popula-
tion of Municipality A) results in an increase in
the Initial Allocation to- $15,000
2. (50% x Adjusted taxes plus intergovernmental
transfers) results in a reduction in the adjusted
allocation from $15,000 to- 7,000
3. Thus, the allocation to Municipality A subject to
limitations is- $ 7,000
4. Allocations to all other municipalities in County X
are reduced by the amount of $5,000 which was
necessary to bring the Initial Allocation to the 20%
minimum ($15,000) in Step 1.
5. The allocation to the county government would be
increased by the amount of $8,000 which was the
163. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.29 (b) (3) specifies: "If
a unit of local government is allocated an amount less than the 20-
percent limit, its allocation shall be increased to the lower of the 20-
percent limit or 50 percent of the sum of that unit's adjusted taxes and
transfers."
164. If the amounts allocated to recipient governments of a
State do not total 100 percent of the amount allocated to that
State, the amount to be allocated to county areas shall be ad-justed appropriately, and the allocation process shall be re-
peated until the amounts allocated to recipient governments of
a State total 100 percent of the amount allocated to that State.
Id. § 51.29(c).
165. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 34 n.10; see Letter
from James E. Smith, supra note 162.
166. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 34 n.10 ("Since allo-
cations in excess of the 50-percent limit go to the next higher level of
government, not making the preliminary 50-percent test would result in
reducing the allocation to some local governments and passing some of
the funds from the reduction up to the next level of government rather
than retaining them at the level of government for which they were
originally intended.").
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amount of reduction resulting from imposition of
the 50% limitation ($15,000-$7,000).
Sequence set forth in Proposed Regulations § 51.29(b) (3)
1. Calculate the 20% limitation: 20% x Statewide
local per capita grant x Population of Municipality
A ($15,000).
2. Since Initial Allocation ($10,000) is less than the
20% limit ($15,000), adjust Initial Allocation to the
lower of the 20% limitation or 50% limitation.
(A) 50% x Adjusted taxes plus intergovern-
mental transfers ($7,000).
(B) Adjust the allocation to the lower of 1 or
2(A): Initial Allocation is adjusted to- $ 7,000
3. Since the lower figure was derived from the appli-
cation of the 50% limitation, the excess of Initial
Allocation less adjusted allocation ($3,000) will
increase the county government allocation.
The difference between the two methods in this example is
that the county government receives $5,000 less and the aggre-
gate of municipalities in County X (other than Municipality A)
receives $5,000 more under the Treasury Regulation than under
the Act. Thus, the result of the Treasury Regulations will be
an increase in the allocations to some municipalities. Since the
next higher level of government would otherwise be entitled to
the excess, the allocations to some county governments will be
correspondingly reduced.167
Unfortunately, the method of applying the 145 percent limi-
tation results in additional uncertainties. 1 8 The General Ex-
planation of the Act described the methodology utilized by the
Department of the Treasury as follows: 169
1. The 145 percent limitation is applied to county area with
amount of any reduction "set aside."
2. The amount so "set aside" is then used to proportionally
increase the allocations to all county areas which were not
at the 145 percent limitation.
3. All county areas are brought to the 20 percent limitation
through a proportionate reduction in the allocation to all
county areas which are neither at the 20 nor 145 percent
limitations.
4. The allocation is divided between the county government
and local governments.
5. The 20 and 50 percent limitations are applied to all units
of local government (other than county governments) as
described above. The total amount necessary to bring all
167. See id.
168. See GENERAL EXPLAwATION, supra note 63, at 34 n.l.
169. Id. It is understood that the Department of the Treasury ap-
proved the description provided in the General Explanation prior to
publication.
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localities to the lower of the 20 or 50 percent limitation is
recorded.
6. The 145 percent limitation is applied to all units of local
government (other than county governments). The total
amount of the reduction is recorded.
7. The 50 percent limitation is applied to all units of local
government (including the county governments), other than
those whose initial allocation was below the 20 percent lim-
itation.
8. The sum of the amounts recorded in steps 5 and 6 (which
may be either positive or negative) is then used to propor-
tionally adjust the amounts to all county areas.
9. Steps 1-8 are repeated until the recorded amounts bal-
ance.170
The effect of these procedures is to materially reduce the
amount of funds which go to the state governments. Lesser
amounts will be transmitted from the local governments to the
county governments as a result of the combination of the 20 and
50 percent limitations as applied to local governments. The
Treasury then applies the 50 percent limitation to the county
governments in the same manner, resulting in correspondingly
lower amounts being transferred from the county governments
to the state government, which is the next higher level of
government. Thus, the 20-50 percent limitation methodology
used in the Treasury Regulations indirectly acts to reduce
the amounts which should be transmitted to the state gov-
ernments. Furthermore, it appears possible that part of any re-
duction resulting from the application of the 145 percent limita-
tion to localities is indirectly distributed on a proportional basis
among the county areas rather than among the localities within
the same county as the reduced locality.1
7
'
Although it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from the
allocation amounts published by the Joint Committee on Inter-
nal Revenue Taxation as a Supplemental Report to the Confer-
ence Report, 72 the report provides some information as to the
170. See Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.29(c).
171. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
172. Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury James E. Smith made
the following comments on the Treasury's initial allocations:
In the main, I stress that, in the main these changes have
occurred because of the updating of the revenue data elements
in the program, using Fiscal Year 1971 revenue data versus the
Fiscal Year 1966 revenue data that was used for the purposes of
our Congressional computations. This five year updating has
resulted in many changes, and, indeed, in marked changes in
certain allocations.
I think it is important, though, that ... there are five
states and those are Alabama, Nebraska, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, and the State of Washington [where] . . . the downward
adjustments occurred primarily because of the correction of a
[Vol. 58:1
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impact of the limitations. Under the published figures, the fol-
lowing amounts would have been returned to the indicated states
(among others):
AMOUNT RETURNED TO STATE
State Conference Report Treasury's Initial
Allocations
Alabama $2,112,154 $ 27,250
Arkansas 4,655,035 1,452,160
Delaware 1,370,739 1,001,992
Florida 437,083 11,678
Georgia 330,475 29,544
Illinois 187,510 301,340
Kentucky 9,214,908 5,703,828
Louisiana 3,330,094 804,834
Maine 1,209,014 53,742
Massachusetts 275,226 8,776
Mississippi 4,194,492 320,418
Missouri 385,248 137,758
New Hampshire 127,679 29,577
New Mexico 2,018,972 1,015,876
North Dakota 24,802 181,002
Pennsylvania 606,927 243,620
South Carolina 11,245,740 551,092
South Dakota 13,428 196,196
Texas 2,555,141 129,302
West Virginia 8,914,183 5,880,744
Even adjusting for the aggregate reduction in state entitle-
ments between the Conference Report and Treasury's initial
allocations, it is interesting to note that while substantially
smaller amounts were returned to some states under the Trea-
sury allocations, other states actually received more-e.g., Illinois,
North Dakota and South Dakota. This is due to the fact that
the Conference Report figures do not reflect application of the
50 percent limitation to units below 2500 population, many of
which are subject to the limitation. Application of the 50 per-
cent limitation to these small units results in significant aggre-
gaie amounts being transmitted to county governments, and
thus indirectly to state governments. The Department of the
Treasury has indicated that it will release the allocation com-
puter program in the near future. At such time, the logic of
that program must be carefully examined to determine the ex-
tent of compliance with the provisions of the Act.
d. Data Base for the Allocation Formulas
The data to be used in the allocations and their sources are
as follows: 173
data error with respect to per capita income for those states.
Transcript of Press Conference, Department of the Treasury, Dec. 8.
1972, at 5.
173. See GENERAL EXPLA ATO N, supra note 63, at 40; SENATE RE-
PoRT, supra note 9, at 31.
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Source
Population and Urbanized
Population
Adjusted Taxes and Inter-
governmental Transfers
Per Capita Income
State and Local Taxes
(by State)
Personal Income
(by State)
State Individual Income
Tax Collections
Federal Individual Income Tax
Liability Attributed to a
State
Bureau of the Census, De-
cennial Census (1970)
Bureau of the Census,
Annual Special Survey
Bureau of the Census, De-
cennial Census (1970)
Bureau of the Census,
Governmental Finances
Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current
Business
Annual Reports by States
to the Bureau of
the Census
Internal Revenue Service,
Master File tabulations
In general, the Act provides that population, urbanized pop-
ulation, per capita income, intergovernmental transfers, and state
and local taxes shall be determined on the same basis as these
items are determined by the Bureau of the Census for general
statistical purposes. 174 However, in recognition of the fact that
census statistics were traditionally not accumulated pursuant to
procedures which reflect the rigorous demands of an allocation
program involving many billions of dollars, the Secretary of the
Treasury is given the authority by Section 109 (a) (7) (B) to use
such additional data (including data based on estimates) as he
determines is necessary when the census data are not sufficiently
current or comprehensive. Also, Section 142 of the Act provides
that the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe such regula-
tions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the Act.
The Senate Finance Committee Report indicated that this pro-
vision "would permit classifications or definitions somewhat dif-
ferent from those which the Census Bureau has formulated pri-
174. ACT § 109(a), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1228(a) (1973). The Treasury
Department is using data which represents an updated, corrected ver-
sion of the published Decennial Census data. See GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION, supra note 63, at 40 n.14.
This is a new dimension for the Bureau in government
statistics. Small volumes within a large universe which here-
tofore have had very little effect statistically on the summary
results now must be developed with pinpoint accuracy.
Rubin, supra note 129.
Data
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marily for other purposes when a modification would more
nearly meet the objectives of the bill' '175
Administrative or judicial challenges to the data used in
computing the allocations are severely circumscribed. The Reg-
ulations provide a "grace period" during which the Secretary
will adjust data and allocations if it is established to his satis-
faction by factual evidence and documentation that the data
used in the computations were erroneous. 176 A recipient could
argue that the data are inaccurate since they were not derived
in accordance with the procedure and definitions of the Bureau
of the Census for determining data for general statistical pur-
poses. However, this will be a very difficult argument to sup-
port when the recipient has the burden of proof since it is un-
likely that the particular method of derivation will be ascer-
tainable. A recipient could also argue that the Secretary of
the Treasury should exercise his authority pursuant to Section
109(a) (7) (B) or 142(a) to use additional or different data.
However, it would be necessary to show that the classifications,
definitions or methodology established by the Bureau of the
Census either were so unreasonable on their face or resulted in
such material variations from the actual data that the Secre-
tary had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in refusing
to use alternative data. This would be difficult to prove be-
cause there is a strong presumption favoring the Census deter-
minations. In connection with the population count of minori-
ties, however, the census figures have properly been ques-
tioned.177 The U.S. Civil Rights Commission has recommended
that the Treasury ascertain what steps have been taken by the
Bureau of the Census to validate counts of minorities and to
provide corrected figures where necessary. Several of the na-
tional civil rights organizations have indicated an intention to
litigate the issue if it is not satisfactorily resolved through ad-
ministrative action.178
175. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 29.
176. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.22 (b).
177. See SuBco1nmIL ON CENSUS AND STATISTICS OF THE COMAT. ON POST
OFFICE AND CIVIw SERVICE, REPORT ON ACCURACY OF THE 1970 CENSUS ENu-
MERATioN, HR. REP. No. 1777, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
The Bureau of the Census had indicated that its error in the 1970
population count for blacks was 7.7% compared to 1.9% for whites.
See Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1973, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April
29, 1973, § 4, at 3, coL 1.
178. See Letter from Stephen Horn, Vice Chairman of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, to George P. Shultz, Secretary of
the Treasury, Jan. 5, 1973. In response to demands to adjust the under-
QI~uft Qf minorities, the Department of the Treasury asserts that thq
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The Secretary of the Treasury has reserved one percent of
the initial entitlement funds and five percent of the subsequent
payments in order to make adjustments for data errors. Thirty-
eight hundred objections to the data were filed prior to the Feb-
ruary 12 deadline for the initial Entitlement Period.179  This
resulted in massive reallocations.
Perhaps the area of greatest potential concern under the five-
year program is the continued validity of allocation formulas
which utilize substantial amounts of data which reflect fixed re-
lationships existing as of a significantly earlier date. The se-
riousness of this problem varies with the different data elements.
The most severe problem exists with regard to data derived from
the 1970 Decennial Census-i.e., Population, Per Capita Income
and Urbanized Population. Current data will be available on
Adjusted Taxes and Intergovernmental Transfers as a result of
the annual Special Survey by the Census. Information on state
and local taxes, by state, will generally be available in Septem-
ber of each year for the prior fiscal year. Likewise, data on per-
sonal income, by state, will generally be available in October of
each year for the prior fiscal year. State individual income tax
collections and the federal individual income tax liability attrib-
uted to a state will also be available annually.
The very significant problem of out-dated data was recog-
nized at the earliest stages of the legislative deliberations. As
a result two legislative provisions which would facilitate updates
on the decennial census data were considered crucial to the pro-
gram. First, the Internal Revenue Code was amended by adding
a new section requiring individuals to provide information as to
Bureau of the Census has not established the extent of the undercount
for each locality. Since population does not affect the local allocation,
no appropriate adjustment would be possible. It can be argued that
since the Bureau of the Census concedes an undercount of blacks in the
aggregate amount of 7.7%, the Department of the Treasury and the
Bureau of the Census should have the burden of establishing the under-
count by locality. Furthermore, although population does not figure in
the basic local allocation formula, many of the most affected locali-
ties are at the 145 percent limitation and thus receive an allocation
which is a direct function of their population. See Washington Post,
July 24, 1973, § A, at 3, cols. 1-3.
179. See Havemann, Revenue Sharing Report/Problems snag Nixon
plan as complaints from local areas mount, 5 NAT'L J. 389 (1973).
On July 23 the Office of Revenue Sharing announced that it had
completed its review of data, calculated adjustments to past payments
based on new data and closed the books on the first 18 months of the
Revenue Sharing program. See Press Release, Dept. of Treasury, July
23, 1973 at 1.
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their state, county, township and municipality of residence.1 80
Second, a provision was proposed which would have required
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (H.E.W.) to
collect income statistics on welfare recipients and members of
their families by place of residence.18 ' During the final days
of deliberation by the House Ways and Means Committee on
the draft bill, John Veneman, Under Secretary of H.E.W., ap-
peared before the Committee to testify that HLE.W. opposed the
latter provision because the cost of data collection would be as
much as $500 million per year. 8 2 As a result, this provision
was dropped. However, the House Ways and Means Committee
Report and the Senate Finance Committee Report indicate that
H.E.W. should provide this data in the future if welfare reform
or other legislative or administrative change allows the collection
of this data at a reasonable cost.183
The basic objective of the amendment to the Internal Reve-
nue Code was to obtain information from income tax returns
which, when combined with information obtained from other
sources, would make it possible for the Bureau of the Census to
derive workable estimates of population and per capita income
levels for local governments at regular intervals between the
decennial censuses. The income figures used by the Bureau of
the Census reflect total money income. Although the adjusted
gross income'8 4 figure on the Form 1040 does not include many
items of income such as interest on tax-exempt bonds, social
security benefits, railroad retirement benefits and veterans ad-
ministration payments, reasonably accurate estimates should
be possible through the use of various statistical techniques.
Since heads of households representing approximately 90 per-
cent of the population file income tax returns, the Bureau of the
Census, using additional sources of information, should be able
to arrive at a set of workable updates for the population and
per capita income data at least every two years. The H.E.W.
information on welfare recipients would have achieved nearly
a 100 percent sample since it would have provided information
180. AcT § 144, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1264 (1973), which adds Sections
6017A and 6687 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
181. Testimony presented by Dr. George H. Brown, Director, Bu-
reau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Executive Hearings on
H.R. 14370 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. at 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Brown Testimony].
182. Id.
183. HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 30; SENATE REPoRT, supra note
9, at 31.
184. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954 § 62.
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on individuals whose income levels place them below the min-
imum Internal Revenue Service filing requirements.
During the final days of committee deliberations on the
draft bill, Chairman Mills requested that Dr. George H. Brown,
Director of the Bureau of the Census, appear before the Ways
and Means Committee to answer the following question: "Just
how well can you perform here in helping us to keep updated
on these various factors that go into our formula for distribu-
tion of money?"'1 5 Dr. Brown was very careful and conservative
in his testimony. He indicated that even without income tax
form change "it was reasonable to talk of workable numbers
for population estimates for counties to be done on an annual
basis," based on a "considerable amount of experience estimating
population each year in the periods between the once-every-10-
year complete count."'1 6 In fact, the third Entitlement Period
payments (January-June 1973) were based on 1972 estimates of
population for state areas compiled by the Bureau of the Census
rather than the decennial census data.
On the issue of population estimates for cities, Brown was
noncommittal. In his view, "more work is needed in methods de-
velopment to get this kind of information [cities' population]
every year, but it will be only for larger cities [units of 50,000 or
more], not for all cities.' 87 After indicating that the margin of
error on the 1960 Decennial Census population count averaged ap-
proximately 3 percent (with Mississippi having approximately a
6 percent margin of error), he stated that population figures for
cities over 50,000 would be considered workable if they involved
an average error of 5 to 6 percent, but recognized that in some
cases the error might be as high as 10 percent. 88 An inquiry
as to the impact of the additional Form 1040 information and
H.E.W. information on welfare recipients elicited the following
response:
Now we have said on several occasions that the availability
of this kind of information would help us. We cannot tell you
185. Brown Testimony, supra note 181, at 1.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 4. The Bureau of the Census has announced that the
1970 population census missed approximately 5.3 million persons, ap-
proximately 2.5% of the total population. New techniques permitted
the Bureau to reduce the percentage error from approximately 2.7% in
the 1960 Census. However, since there is no estimate of the 1970 error
for individual states, counties or cities, no changes would be made in
the data for purposes of Revenue Sharing. Wall Street Journal, April
26, 1973, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 29, 1973, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
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how much it will help until we have the information and
work with it. But it will certainly enable us to move down
in the size of the political unit for which we can make reports
with reasonable margin of error on the average and hope-
fully with not more than just a handful of very loose ends,
say, beyond 10 percent.' 8 9
The testimony on income figures raised serious doubts not
only on the potential for annual estimates but also on the decen-
nial figures. Dr. Brown indicated that the decennial census
includes a 20 percent sample on household money income. Al-
though he did not know the margin of error on the decennial
income statistics, he indicated that the statistics were "workable"
and that his staff believed the error to be much less than 10
percent in the aggregate.190 Dr. Brown conceded that during
the inter-censal period "we do not have a regular procedure for
making estimates of income for counties at the Bureau of the
Census."'19 He also did not think that the Bureau of the Census
had the capability to develop small area estimates for income.
In response to these problems, the 1973 budget proposed a Census
Bureau survey of one million households to be conducted in
1975 which would produce population estimates and character-
istics for states, counties and cities with population in excess of
50,000.192 It is indicated that "[d] ata derived through this pro-
cess will... be one of the main ingredients in the allocation of
funds under revenue sharing programs."'193
Major problems are posed by the use of selective updates
of the data. At the local level obvious inequities result if the
Treasury uses updated data for a particular municipality and
not for all other municipalities in the same county. The House
Ways and Means Committee reported that:
It is important to note that the data for any unit of local
government used with regard to any allocations must be com-
189. Brown Testimony, supra note 181, at 5.
190. Id. at 8; see Rubin, supra note 129, at 9.
191. Brown Testimony, supra note 181, at 11.
192. SPeciAL ANALYSES, supra note 3, at 91 ("The program envi-
sions a limited size sample survey, approximately 1.5% of the popula-
tion.").
The House Appropriations Committee initially rejected the request
of the Commerce Department for $45 million to commence work on the
mid-decade census. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973, at 24, col. 2. "House
Committee opposition to the proposal was led by representatives of
rural districts who feared that constant revisions of the population es-
timates would result in steady reductions to rural areas of Federal
funds distributed on the basis of population." Ibid. The Department
of Commerce is working to reverse the Committee's initial position.
193. Id. See N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973, at 24, col. 2, indicating that
the House Appropriations Comm. rejected the budgetary request
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parable to the data used for the other units of local government
sharing in that allocation. For example, a special census of
population for a municipality may not be used in allocating
funds among municipalities within a county area unless there
are corresponding updated population data for all the other
municipalities located in that county area.'
94
Therefore, local special surveys and selected data updates for re-
cipient governments at the same allocation level generally should
not be utilized.
Although approximately 75 percent of the 1972 tax returns
contain answers to the Revenue Sharing residence questions, it
appears likely that a high percentage of those returns contain
incorrect or incomplete answers.'0 5 If this trend continues, this
potential source of information will not contribute materially to
the Census Bureau's ability to arrive at estimates. 10 0 If the in-
194. HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 29; SEATE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 30.
195. See Wall Street Journal, Mar. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 5, which
states that the early returns indicated that approximately 93 percent of
the 1972 returns contained incorrect or incomplete answers.
The Department of the Treasury has made a proposal for simplifi-
cation of the Form 1040 tax return. See Statement of George P. Shultz,
Secretary of the Treasury, before the House Committee on Ways and
Means on April 30, 1973.
196. A Bureau of Census official has made the following state-
ments on updating the data:
We have been discussing with Treasury techniques for up-
dating the population and the per capita income estimates.
The Bureau produces annually updated State population esti-
mates as part of its regular program. The latest available are
provisional July 1, 1972 estimates, and these were given to
Treasury. They could be used in calculating the State alloca-
tions for the third entitlement period (January-June 1973)
In terms of population and per capita income updates for
the substate level, we are perfecting techniques for assembling
information from administrative records; those available from
a variety of federal agencies. The Internal Revenue Service is
collecting and coding the place of residence reported by tax-
payers on the tax forms 1040 and 1040a. Those residences re-
ported on the 1040 are being coded in IRS based on a coding
directory which we provided. That file will provide us with a
data base.
In addition to IRS data, we will also be using reported
vital statistics (birth and death) to measure the natural in-
crease component of population change since the last census
Right now IRS data are only one of the elements that go
into the formula. Summary geographic data from Social Se-
curity benefit records, Veterans' benefits records and others
will help in estimating other types of money income. The re-
sult of the process which meshes into information fed to us
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, will be reliable State
and county population and per capita income estimates for mid
1973. These estimates are expected to be available in June of
1974.
Rubin, supra note 129, at 9-10.
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come tax forms cannot be used to update the income data base
for local allocations, only the data on adjusted taxes could be
updated (as a result of the annual Special Survey). If the recent
historical pattern of demographic change involving the exodus of
the wealthy to the suburbs and the influx of the poor to the cen-
tral cities continues, the adjusted taxes of the suburbs will con-
tinue to increase relatively faster than those of the core cities.
However, the benefit to be derived from the lower income levels
in the core cities will only be reflected at the time of the decen-
nial census, while the suburbs will benefit from their increasing
tax effort on a current basis. If the Treasury decides to update
only the data for adjusted taxes, the result would be an artificial
benefit of sizable proportions for the suburbs as compared to the
central cities.
3. Restrictions and Limitations on Expenditure of Funds0 7
a. Categorical Restrictions on Local Expenditures
Section 103 (a) of the Act contains pro forma restrictive cate-
gories for local expenditures. There are no restrictive cate-
gories for state expenditures.
197. The issue must be raised as to whether certain other Federal
statutory restrictions on the use of Federal funds will be applied to
Revenue Sharing funds, e.g.,
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which requires environ-
mental impact statements.
2. Hatch Act which limits the political activities of public employees
paid with Federal funds.
3. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970 dealing with persons displaced as a result of Federally-
assisted programs.
The argument that Revenue Sharing funds are not subject to these
additional restrictions is twofold:
1. The Act expressly provides for all other Federal statutory restrictions
applicable to Revenue Sharing funds-Davis-Bacon Act and the 1964
Civil Rights Act.
2. The Act does not provide Federal funds for specific programs or
projects. Rather it provides general fiscal assistance to recipient gov-
ernments.
The contrary position must basically argue that Revenue Sharing
funds are indistinguishable from other Federal funds, and in the last
analysis the policy objectives reflected in these Federal statutes are
equally applicable to Revenue Sharing funds.
The Office of Revenue Sharing has taken the position that none of
the aforementioned Federal statutory restrictions apply to Revenue
Sharing funds:
"Generally speaking, we take the position that only those federal
laws specifically referenced in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972 apply to the use of revenue sharing funds." Speech by
19731
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Funds received by units of local government under the Act
may be used only for-
(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating ex-
penses for-
(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection,
and building code enforcement),
(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, san-
itation, and pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets
and roads),
(D) health,
(E) recreation,
(F) libraries,
(G) social services for the poor or aged, and
(H) financial administration; and
(2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized
by law.
The phrase "ordinary and necessary"' 08 was added as a
qualification in the Conference Committee in order to provide a
basis for possible future regulatory or administrative action
against purely frivolous expenditures or expenditures which are
Graham W. Watt, Director of the Office of Revenue Sharing, U.S.
Conference of Mayors Workshop, June 19, 1973.
The Guidelines of Council on Environmental Quality provide the
following exclusion from the types of actions covered by the National
Environmental Policy Act:
"Actions" include but are not limited to:
Projects and continuing activities: directly undertaken by
Federal agencies; supported in whole or in part through Federal
contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding
assistance [except where such assistance is solely in the form of
general revenue sharing funds, distributed under the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. with
no federal agency control over the subsequent use of such funds];
involving a Federal lease, permit, license, certificate or other
entitlement for use....
36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
198. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 162 (a) which allows a taxpayer
to deduct all the "ordinary and necessary" expenses of carrying on a
trade or business.
The requirement that expenses be "ordinary and neces-
sary" is interpreted quite broadly. Thus an expense need not
be essential in order to be considered necessary. All that is
required is that the expense be "appropriate and helpful" to
the business. Similarly, an expense can be "ordinary" although
it is not frequently incurred in the taxpayer's business. The
expense is considered ordinary if others in the taxpayer's situa-
tion would ordinarily incur the same expense.
Bureau of National Affairs, 208 Tax Management Portfolio at A-1
(1969).
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primarily for the personal benefit of a local official The con-
ferees could not agree on specific examples of frivolous expendi-
ture which would not be ordinary and necessary, but carpeting
for the police chief's office was discussed at length.
The original Administration proposal and the version passed
by the Senate did not contain categorical restrictions on the use
of the funds since such restrictions were generally considered
inconsistent with the philosophy of returning decision making
to the local level so as to avoid the inefficient and artificial
allocation of resources which exists in the categorical grant pro-
gram. 199 Given President Nixon's commitment to a "no strings"
program, it is safe to conclude that the categories will be ad-
ministered very liberally.20 0
The categories were originally introduced in H.R. 11950 (the
original Mills Bill) .201 According to Representative Byrnes, then
199. The Senate bill omitted any limitation on expenditures to high
priority items as "inconsistent with the broad objectives of general
revenue sharing."
To a considerable extent, the adoption of the revenue shar-
ing program stems from the need to avoid the problems inher-
ent in many categorical programs which specify how the recipi-
ent governmental unit is to spend the funds. Such categorical
aid programs may result in forcing the recipient governmental
unit to spend the funds for the specified purpose even though
the governmental unit may have other more urgent needs to
finance... In the opinion of the committee, forcing local
governments to spend their aid funds for these listed items
would inevitably prevent them from achieving the optimum
expenditure pattern from the standpoint of their needs.
SENATE REPORT, suprm note 9, at 16; see 118 CONG. REc. § 14001 to 02
(daily ed. Aug. 18, 1972) (remarks of Senator Long).
200. See note 204 infra.
201. Section 102 of HLR. 11950, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), pro-
vided for the following "high-priority expenditures"-(1) maintenance and operating expenses for-
(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protec-
tion, and building code enforcement),
(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal,
sanitation, and pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and
streets),(D) youth recreation programs,
(E) health,(F) financial administration, and
(2) capital expenditures for-
(A) sewage collection and treatment,
(B) refuse disposal systems,
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and
street construction),
(D) the acquisition of open space for parks and public facil-
ities, and
(E) urban renewal programs.
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ranking Republican member of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, they constituted one of the major pro forma bases upon
which Mr. Mills reversed his position on the concept of Revenue
Sharing which he had previously opposed.202 The philosophical
justification for the categories was that the federal government
had a duty to see that, at a minimum, the funds were spent for
purposes which were, recognized by the national government as
high priority purposes since it had raised the revenues in-
volved.2
0 3
Although neither the Act nor the regulations contain any
more definitive standards for the various categories, the House
Committee Report provides some additional interpretation for
several of the categories:20 4
202. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 60, at 88 ("The 'priorities' were
plucked out of thin air for the sole purpose of distinguishing the Com-
mittee bill from the Administration's 'no strings attached' revenue shar-
ing proposal which had been consistently denounced by some members
of the Committee.").
203. See Id. at 11-12. The extensive nature of the list makes the
ostensible rationale appear to be merely rhetoric-
In framing the list of priority items for which local gov-
ernments will be permitted to spend the assistance funds, the
Congress was guided by the consideration of items which are
clearly priority items in terms of national objectives. Al-
though the total assistance provided under this bill is sub-
stantial, the fact that it must be distributed to a large number
of local governments led the Congress to the conclusion that the
assistance given to local governments must be concentrated on
priority 'expenditure items if the Act is to have an appreciable
impact. For this reason, the list of priority items excludes ex-
penditure categories which generally are considered worth-
while but which, nonetheless, have a lower order of national
priority than the included items.
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 14-15.
204. GENERAL EXPLANATiON, supra note 63, at 20 (emphasis added).
The Senate floor debates indicate that "law enforcement" is to have the
same definition as in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
including police, courts and corrections. See 118 CONG. REc. § 18021
(daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972) (remarks of Senators Fannin and Long).
Furthermore, Senator Long stated:
In providing that revenue sharing money could be used
to provide social services to the poor and for health, it was
intended that the communities should be permitted to do just
about anything they wanted to provide in the way of a health
service or any other kind of service to the poor. Within any
sort of rule of reason, it is intended that the communities can
define 'the poor' or 'health' for this purpose quite broadly and
that this would clearly cover community programs for the
mentally ill.
Id. at § 18024. Senator Long also indicated that under "health" the
funds could be used in programs for the developmentally disabled. Id.
The Office of Revenue Sharing has released a detailed statement
providing guidance on social services for the poor and aged:
Administrative expenses incurred in the operation of pro-
grams for the poor and aged have been allowed as ordinary and
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Public safety is intended to include law enforcement, police,
courts, corrections, and crime prevention; fire protection,
civil defense, and inspection of buildings, plumbing, elec-
trical facilities, gas pipelines and equipment, boilers, and ele-
vators, as generally categorized by the Bureau of the Census in
its report of governmental finances. Environmental protection
similarly is intended to include certain environmental health
activities [The environmental health activities to be included
are smoke regulation, inspection of water supply, sanitary en-
gineering, water pollution control, and other similar activities
for eliminating or abating health hazards .... ] and sewerage,
street cleaning, and waste collection, disposal and recycling ac-
tivities. Current expenditures for flood control, depending
upon the specific nature of those expenditures, might properly
be characterized under public safety or environmental protec-
tion. Public transportation similarly is intended to include ex-
penditures for highways, transit systems, streets, grade cross-
ings, and the parking, servicing, and storage facilities related
to public transportation. Expenditures related to snow and ice
necessary operating expenses. For example, the cost of admin-
istering a Food Stamp Program is considered an ordinary and
necessary expense of providing social services to the poor. The
cost of operating a Community Action Program providing serv-
ices for the poor and aged has been held to be a valid expendi-
ture of revenue sharing funds....
Salaries of social workers, case workers, and others working
in programs with the poor or aged may be paid from revenue
sharing funds.
The operating expenses of neighborhood social centers and
other neighborhood facilities which are of benefit to the poor
and aged may be partially funded with revenue sharing funds
to the extent that such funding reflects the use made of those
facilities for the benefit of the poor and aged. A reasonable
allocation of funds is required.
Direct welfare payments to the poor and aged are not per-
mitted by the Act but the payment of a portion of a poor tenant's
rent is a permissible expenditure if the money goes to the land-
lord and not to the tenant Revenue sharing funds may also beused to operate and maintain public housing. A day care center
and day care services may be funded through revenue sharing.The local unit of government must etermine eligibility for the
use of a day care center, as families with working mothers may
well excecd the Bureau of Census definition of low incomefamily. Nursing homes and old-age homes for the poor or agedmay be funded with revenue sharing funds.
Other examples of social service uses on which revenuesharing funds may be expended include:
Interest free loans to aid welfare recipients in securing jobs.Adult education programs which benefit the poor and aged.
Youth development programs which aid the po or disad-
vantaged youth.
Youth employment programs which either directly hire poor
or disadvantaged youths or assist them to secure jobs in the
private sector.
As can be seen from these examples, any activity which can
reasonably be called a social service for the poor and aged may
be funded through revenue sharing. As with all revenue sharing
priorities, the final decision as to the use of funds ithin priorityexpenditure categories is exercised by the local unit of govern-
ment, and a reasonable determination by the local officials willnot be questioned by the Office of Revenue Sharing.
Office of Revenue Sharing Newsletter, Vol 1, No. 2, Aug. 1973 at 4.
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removal from highways would appropriately also fall within
the above categories.
In general, the legislative history also indicates that the per-
mitted operating categories are not to be extended to indirectly
involve education and welfare. 205 In particular, "public transpor-
tation expenditures . . . are not intended to include expendi-
tures directly related to school busing .... ,,206 Although edu-
cation and welfare are glaring omissions from the list of permit-
ted categories for maintenance and operating expenses, it must
be emphasized that capital expenditures for education and wel-
fare are permitted. The omissions are questionable given that
the ostensible justification for the categories was "that the Fed-
eral Government ought not make payments under the bill unless
these payments are for the purpose of encouraging or imple-
menting. . . . purposes determined by the Federal Government
to be matters of high priority to the national government. ' '20 7
The omissions were generally explained as matters which should
be handled by separate legislation. 20 8 This is a rather weak ar-
gument since extensive legislation already exists in several of
the other categories such as environmental protection and pub-
lic transportation. Rather, the omissions may have been in-
tended to provide state and local officials with a basis for refus-
ing the demands of organized teacher and welfare groups for
increased benefits.
Great confusion has been caused by the possibility of using
Revenue Sharing funds for payment of principal and interest on
debt which was incurred for purposes within the permitted cate-
gories.20 9 Initially the Department of the Treasury took the po-
sition that repayment of principal and interest on all such debt,
whenever incurred, was a permitted expenditure.210  The Treas-
ury reversed this position primarily due to congressional staff
pressure based on the following language in the House Com-
205. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 20; HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 60, at 19.
206. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 20; HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 60, at 19.
207. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 60, at 17.
208. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 15; HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 60, at 12.
209. Pontiac, Michigan planned to use $1.9 million of Revenue Shar-
ing funds to pay the first two years' interest on a $25 million pro
sports complex. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 1972, at 13, col. 4.
210. See, e.g., Speech by Charles E. Walker, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury, to the Regional Council Conference, in Atlanta, Georgia, Nov.
27, 1972.
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mittee Report:21  o
... an expenditure of funds from borrowing (such as the pro-
ceeds of a municipal bond issue) is generally regarded by the
Bureau of the Census as a currently made expenditure, while
repayment of the debt is not so regarded. However, the repay-
ment of a debt (but not including interest on the debt) is to be
considered a currently made expenditure for purposes of this
bill if: (1) the debt originally was incurred for a high-priority
category purpose (for example, a bond issue earmarked for
construction of special sewage treatment facilities), (2) the ac-
tual expenditure (i.e., for materials, contractors, etc.) was made
on or after January 1, 1972 (the start of the first entitlement
period), and (3) the actual expenditure was not treated as a
currently made expenditure under the bill (this avoids double
counting of amounts regarded as expenditures for high-pri-
ority purposes).
The elimination of the requirement in Section 105 (a) (3) of H.R.
14370, as initially passed by the House of Representatives, that
funds be used only for capital items that are additional and not
of a character for which the local government regularly makes
expenditures on a recurring basis would seem to substantially
weaken the argument for imposing limitations on debt repay-
ment. Furthermore, the substantial expansion of the categories
in the Conference Bill, together with the omission of any refer-
ence to a debt repayment limitation in the Conference Report,
would seem to provide an adequate basis for not imposing any
limitations in the regulations. The limitations were defended
by the general proposition that Revenue Sharing should result
in new programs and capital expenditures..2 12  However, it is
difficult to justify such limitations on local decision making since
most localities will in fact be in a position to use the displace-
ment approach and effectively use Revenue Sharing funds to
retire existing debt. Also, for many localities, improvement of
their credit rating and reduction of their interest payment bur-
den may constitute the highest local priorities.
Nevertheless, the Treasury Department issued Administra-
tive Ruling No. 1 which reversed their earlier position effective
February 15, 1973.213 After that date, repayment of debt quali-
fies as a proper expenditure of Revenue Sharing funds only if:
1. Revenue Sharing funds are not used to pay any interest
incurred because of the debt,
211. HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 18 (emphasis added); see
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 21.
212. See HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 11-12. Also, one might
argue that due to the highly contingent nature of the amount of the
payments it is highly unlikely that such funds would constitute, by
themselves, adequate security for future debt issues.
213. 38 Fed. Reg. 4354 (1973).
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2. The debt was originally incurred for a purpose within one
of the permitted categories,
3. The actual expenditure from the proceeds of the indebted-
ness was made on or after January 1, 1972,
4. The actual expenditures from proceeds of the indebtedness
were not expended in violation of any other restrictions in
the Act.
This position was incorporated in the Final Regulations.
214
One of the most controversial subjects is the use of Revenue
Sharing funds to reduce taxes.215 Although tax reductions are
clearly not within the permitted categories, it was contemplated
that the displacement procedure could be used to achieve a tax
reduction in an amount equal to all or part of the Revenue Shar-
ing funds.21 6  A reading of the legislative history leaves no
doubt that such use of the funds is entirely consistent with the
purposes of the Act.21 7 Congressman Mills stated:
The money can be used to reduce the local taxes of a lo-
cality, and I think that would be a good thing. I would like to
see it all used for that purpose, frankly, because the cities pri-
marily raise their money through property taxes, which I con-
sider to be a very onerous type of tax.2 18
The initial survey of Revenue Sharing recipients by the De-
partment of the Treasury indicated that 63 percent of the re-
spondents intended to use Revenue Sharing funds to reduce
taxes, avoid an increase in taxes, or reduce the amount of a re-
quired increase in taxes. 2 1
9
214. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.31 (b).
215. See, e.g., Anderson, Revenue Sharing-Now It's Up to Us!, 55
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 8, 10 (1973).
216. See Department of the Treasury, What General Revenue Shar-
ing Is All About 13 (1972).
QUESTION: May Revenue Sharing funds be used to reduce
taxes?
ANSWER: Yes.
Whether local governments use the funds for this
purpose is a judgment which each government must
make, based on its evaluation of local needs.
Id.
217. Senator Humphrey offered an amendment in the Senate which
would have required localities to maintain their tax effort. The amend-
ment was tabled. See 118 CoNG. REc. § 14319 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1972).
Senator Long indicated that Revenue Sharing may, and in some in-
stances should, be used for tax reductions. See id. at § 14321. How-
ever, he indicated that excessive use of the funds for tax reductions
would result in future limitations. Id.
218. 118 CoNG. REc. H 9744 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972).
219. Address by Graham W. Watt, Director of the Office of Revenue
Sharing, in San Francisco, California, June 19, 1973:
Eight percent of the respondents intended to use revenue shar-
ing funds to reduce taxes; 40% said that revenue sharing
would allow them to avoid an increase in taxes. Seventeen
percent of the respondents said that while property taxes were
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The maintenance of effort provision contained in the origi-
nal Mills Bill 220 was omitted in order to make the categories
meaningless exercises in cosmetics. 221 The fungibility of money
and the facility with which funds could be displaced at the state
and local level was intended to effectively render the categories
without substantive impact. However, it was recognized that
for a limited number of localities with a high percentage of ded-
icated revenue sources and a financial structure such that Reve-
nue Sharing funds constituted a significant portion of total rev-
enues, displacement would be significantly restricted.
The displacement process, which was generally recognized
and approved by the Congress, has been severely limited by the
decision of Judge Freeman of the Federal District Court, Northern
District of Georgia, in Mathews v. Massell.22 2 The City of At-
going up, the amount of the increase would be less because of
revenue sharing.
220. Section 105(a) (3) of H.R. 11950, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
provided for a local maintenance of effort through a requirement that
localities spend at least as much for the specified categories as they
did out of their own sources (on the average) in the five preceding
years. This provision was eliminated in the Ways and Means Commit-
tee in substantial measure due to concern that localities experiencing a
current operating deficit would thereby be forced to continue this
deficit; also the limitation this provision placed on the ability of locali-
ties to alter spending patterns to reflect changing priorities. For exam-
ple, the City of Rochester projected an $8 million deficit for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1972, which amounted to over 10% of the entire
1971-72 budget. See Letter from Stephen May, Mayor of City of Ro-
chester, to Barber J. Conable, Jr., April 6, 1972. Also, the Committee
did not wish to deny the municipalities the option of reducing taxes
instead of increasing their expenditure level.
221. The Senate Finance Committee Report expressly supports this
conclusion:
Moreover, the adoption of the high priority items in the
House bill merely results in substantially complicating the
mechanics of the aid program without any real substantive ef-
fect on spending by the local governments. A complicated
and elaborate procedure would be required to determine that
local governments spend the aid funds only on the high priority
items. However, since the local governments are not required
to maintain the level of their own prior exepnditures on the
high priority items (ie., expenditures financed out of their own
revenue sources), as a practical matter, they could arrange to
use the aid funds to increase their spending for other than high
priority items. As a result, provision for the high-priority
categories, at best, is illusory.
SENAT REPORT, supra note 9, at 16.
Congressman Broyhill, a member of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee and one of the House Conferees, stated: ". . . these are artificial
restrictions. By shifting funds and programs, local governments should
be able to circumvent these barriers with relative ease." 118 CONG.
REc. H 9757 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972); see id. at H 9752 (remarks of
Congressman Johnson).
222. 356 F. Supp. 291 (NMD. Ga. 1973).
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lanta had anticipated receiving Revenue Sharing funds for 1972
and the first three quarters of 1973 in the approximate amount
of $10,500,000. Its Board of Aldermen passed several ordinances
committing the Revenue Sharing funds to a Trust and Agency
account and appropriated the funds for the payment of fire-
men's salaries. The city's brief indicated that:
[T]he receipt of $10,500,000.00 of revenue sharing funds for the
years 1972 and 1973 freed for other purposes $10,500,000.00
of revenues of the City of Atlanta which otherwise would have
gone for the payment of Firemen's salaries .... [I]t was deter-
mined that only $6,000,000.00 of these . . freed . . up dollars
were necessary for use in the continuing on-going operation of
the City government .... There were, therefore, $4,500,000.00
in revenues which had previously been earmarked for payment
of Firemen's salaries free to be used by the City as it saw fit.
That the Mayor and Board of Aldermen decided to use this
$4,500,000.00 for some form of financial relief to the residents
and citizens of the City of Atlanta was in keeping with one of
the main purposes of the Revenue Sharing Act.2 23
The city admitted that the $4,500,000 of "freed-up" funds was
used to reduce the water/sewer rates.224 The suit, brought by
19 individual plaintiffs on behalf of all Atlanta residents, alleged
that this use of the Revenue Sharing funds was improper under
the Act and also violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Judge Freeman issued a permanent in-
junction against the indirect use of Atlanta's Revenue Sharing
funds for rebates on water/sewer bills, holding such use was not
within the permitted categories set forth in Section 103 (a) .225
223. Brief for Defendants at 4, Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp.
291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
224. Brief for Defendants at 4-5. The Board of Alderman of the City
of Atlanta adopted the following resolution:
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Mayor and Board of
Alderman of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, that it is the inten-
tion of the Mayor and Board of Alderman to utilize approxi-
mately $4,500,000 of these funds made available by the applica-
tion of Federal Revenue Sharing funds to the City's fiscal re-
quirements, to provide some form of meaningful tax relief for
the citizens of the City of Atlanta.
356 F. Supp. at 293. Further, Mayor Massell in his State of the City
Annual Message, delivered on Tuesday, January 2, 1973, stated that he
intended to return directly to the citizenry of Atlanta a portion of the
Revenue Sharing funds in the amount of $4.5 million. On February 12,
1973, in a news release, defendant Massell announced that he was going
to use the Revenue Sharing funds at least in part to "create some relief
for the monthly budget of the average Atlanta household . . . a total
benefit to the public of $4.5 million." Id. at 294.
225. On the matter of jurisdiction over the action, the court held:
As a result of § 123 (a) (3) of the Revenue Sharing Act
which imposes a penalty for violation of § 103(a) of the Act
by a local government, the court holds that a taxpayers' com-
plaint which alleges that a local government'has spent Revenue
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The court's basic error which ultimately resulted in its
reaching the wrong conclusion was its determination that "it
was the intent of Congress that local governments be permitted
to expend Revenue Sharing funds only on priority expenditures
as defined in Section 103 (a)",-2 0 and that Congress intended this
restriction to be "effective." Thus, the court would find a vio-
lation of Section 103 (a) whenever the substance of "defendants'
proposed plan would entail the expenditure of federal Revenue
Sharing funds for other than one of the priority expenditures."
However, the statements of Wilbur Mills, who was the motivat-
ing force behind the initiation and maintenance of the restric-
tions, indicate that unrestricted use of the displaced funds was
to be permitted.2 27 Also, statements by other conferees such as
Congressman Joel Broyhill and Senator Russell Long are to the
same effect.
228
The court's decision is quite ambiguous as to whether all
displaced funds are subject to all of the restrictions in the Act
or whether it is only blatant artificial use of the displacement
process resulting in a "sham transaction" that is prohibited.
Judge Freeman stated:
It is true that the Revenue Sharing Act does not specifically
impose any restrictions upon the use of legitimately freed-up
funds. Thus the Act seems clearly to have contemplated that
the infusion of Revenue Sharing funds into state and local gov-
ernments would permit future tax relief.... Further, there is
no requirement that a local government maintain at pre-Reve-
nue Sharing levels its spending on priority expenditures. There
is a clear difference, however, between funds which are legiti-
mately freed up by the designation of federal Revenue Sharing
funds to provide municipal services which otherwise would
have to have been paid for out of general city funds, and
funds which are transferred from one account to another simply
to avoid the restrictions imposed by § 103(a) of the Act.
Sharing funds in violation of the priority use requirements of§ 103 (a) constitutes a case or controversy within the meaning
of Article II.
356 F. Supp. at 296-97.
226. The court considers the inclusion of the categories in the
final legislation, after removal in the Senate, determinative of the con-
gressional intent. "The fact that the language of § 103 (a) is identical
to the language of the original house version of the bill, except for a
broader list of priority expenditures, clearly demonstrates that the re-
striction of the funds to priority expenditures was to be taken seri-
ously." Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. at 300. It may be argued to
the contrary that since the Senate conferees recognized that the "provi-
sion for the high-priority categories, at best, is illusory," SENAr RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 16, the inclusion in the conference bill was con-
sidered a harmless exercise.
227. See text accompanying note 218 supra.
228. See notes 217, 220 supra.
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[A]n attempt to avoid the clear restrictions of a federal
statute cannot be accepted. . . [The] courts have long made it
clear that Congressional intent cannot be overridden by sham
transactions. . . Thus the court must recognize that the de-
fendants have merely transferred funds from one account to
another in an effort to disguise the fact that they plan to dis-
tribute $4.5 million of Revenue Sharing funds to the holders of
water/sewer accounts.229
This statement suggests a narrow construction of the decision,
limited to funds displaced by the application of Revenue Sharing
funds directly and expressly to purposes for which a formal or
informal prior commitment existed. Even recognizing that the
use of Revenue Sharing for any purpose always reduces the
theoretical burden on other potential revenue sources, this con-
struction would not extend the Act's restrictions to all displaced
funds. The court's reference to "funds which are legitimately
freed-up" may imply a maintenance of effort standard in the
sense that absent use of the funds to satisfy a formal or in-
formal prior commitment or an existing level of expenditure for
the category of use, there will be no inquiry as to the use of the
displaced funds. However, the significant number of more
sweeping conclusions in the opinion provide an adequate basis
to cite it for a strict application of the Act's restrictions to all
displaced funds.
The court's opinion indicates in dicta that its reasoning ap-
plies not only to the Section 103 (a) categories, but also to all
the other restrictions in the Act, including Davis-Bacon, pre-
vailing wage and nondiscrimination provisions. 230 Extensive liti-
gation throughout the nation on the use of displaced funds can be
safely predicted since the displacement process has been widely
and expressly utilized.2 3 1
229. 356 F. Supp. at 299-300 (emphasis added).
230. The court states:
If defendants were to prevail on their arguments, other
statutory restrictions placed on the use of Revenue Sharing
funds would likewise become meaningless. This court cannot
conclude that Congress intended for its prohibition against the
use of funds in a manner that discriminates on the basis of
race, color, national origin or sex (§ 122) to be so easily read
out of the Act. Similarly, the restrictions set forth in § 123
(a) (6) and § 123(a) (7), establishing standards for wages paid
with Revenue Sharing funds, and § 123 (a) (8), requiring that
funds received by certain local governments be expended for
the benefit of certain Indian tribes, would be nugatory accord-
ing to defendants' analysis of the Act.
Id. at 301.
231. An interesting postscript to the Mathews v. Massell suit is the
decision by the Atlanta Board of Aldermen to use $750,000 of Revenue
Sharing funds for Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., the local "war on
poverty agency," and additional amounts for a new public-safety build-
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On June 19, 1973, in a speech to the Conference of Mayors,
Graham W. Watt, Director of The Office of Revenue Sharing
stated:
The Office of Revenue Sharing will continue to administer
the general revenue sharing program without modifying our
original view that funds freed-up in accordance with the laws
and procedures applicable to a government's own revenues may
be used without restriction to priority categories for operating
and maintenance purposes.23 2
One of the most disturbing aspects of the categories is that
they induce the use of the displacement approach thereby pro-
viding an opportunity for nondisclosure of the "real use" of the
funds to the public. The categories provide a convenient justi-
fication by which local officials can choose a non-controversial
item as the ostensible use of the Revenue Sharing funds on the
basis that this minimizes exposure to penalty for failure to com-
ply with the provisions of the Act, while they actually spend
the funds for another purpose which is highly controversial
The disclosure and reporting provisions of the Act and the reg-
ulations do not require or promote reporting on the "real use"
of the money in an aggregate sense.23 The inducement to place
the funds in a cosmetic category, coupled with the absence of
any requirement or inducement toward "real use" reporting,
could undermine one of the philosophical premises of the Act,
namely that accountability to the federal bureaucracy should be
replaced with accountability to the local citizenry through com-
plete and accurate disclosure. The absence of rigorous public
disclosure requirements lends support to the judicially imposed
restrictions on fund usage found in a broad interpretation of the
Mathews v. Massell decision.
b. Prohibition on Use to Match Federal Funds
The House Bill 23 4 provided that Revenue Sharing funds
ing, traffic control signals, park acquisition and development, and ex-
pansion of library facilities. See Christian Science Monitor, April 13,
1973, at 2, col. 5.
232. See Treas. Press Release, Remarks by Graham W. Watt, at
13, June 19, 1973.
233. See "Some Observations on the Information Requirements,"
§ 4C(3), p. 97 infra.
234. H.R. 14370 (§ 101), 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The Admin-
istration Bill placed no restrictions on using funds for matching. The
original Mills Bill provided that "subject to the conditions and limita-
tions provided in this title, such government [localities] may use such
funds for the purpose of matching Federal funds if such payments and
funds are used for high-priority expenditures and if the amount of
such Federal funds are limited by law." ILRL 11950 § 101), 92d
Cong., lst Sess. (1971).
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were not to be used by local governments to match federal funds
for other programs where matching non-federal funds were re-
quired by federal law.235 The Senate Finance Committee ex-
tended this provision to apply to cases where the matching for-
mula provided by federal law allows matching from either non-
federal or federal funds. It also extended the prohibition to use
of Revenue Sharing funds by state governments. However, the
most significant Senate modification was a prohibition of indirect
as well as direct use of Revenue Sharing funds to obtain federal
matching grants. This modification was added in direct response
to an indication that the prohibition in the House Bill was essen-
tially meaningless because it did not prevent displacement of
other local funds to be used for matching purposes.2 3 0
The use of Revenue Sharing funds to supplement other fed-
eral grant funds is not prohibited.237 For example, if a project
costs more than the amount available from non-federal matching
funds plus the federal matched funds, the local government could
use Revenue Sharing funds to defray the excess cost, if (1) the
Revenue Sharing funds were not being used to match other fed-
eral funds, and (2) the program qualifies under one or more of
the priority expenditure categories.23 8
The legislative history of the Act also evinces an intent to
prohibit indirect matching by multiple transfers or transfers
through independent or quasi-independent agencies. The Gen-
eral Explanation of the Act stated that:
[w]hile funds received by a local government from a State
government generally can be used for matching Federal grants,
it must be clear that the funds derived from the State are not
in themselves funds provided by the Act. If a local government
is receiving funds from the State and is matching Federal
funds, the Secretary of the Treasury may require the local gov-
ernment to show that the funds it received from the State had
not been originally received by the State as funds under the
Act.23 9
235. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.30(a) provides "[t]his
prohibition on use of entitlement funds as matching funds applies to
Federal programs where Federal funds are required to be matched by
non-Federal funds and to Federal programs which allow matching from
either Federal or non-Federal funds."
236. On the floor of the Senate, Senator Long unequivocally indi-
cated his view that the provision on indirect matching was intended to
prohibit use of the displacement process to circumvent the prohibition.
118 CONG. REC. § 14392 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972).
237. See Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.30 (g).
238. Id.
239. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 22; see SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 36.
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The Final Regulations expressly apply the matching prohibition
to a recipient government's funds which are transferred to an-
other governmental unit or private organization. 240
Due to the fact that governmental funds are fungible, the
prohibition on indirect matching is potentially a source of major
difficulty in regulating compliance under the Act. Strict en-
forcement would require major reporting requirements on all
aspects of the recipient's budget, and rigid maintenance of effort
provisions. The potential impact of this prohibition on local ac-
counting practices and expenditures was increased by the Sen-
ate Finance Committee Report which indicated that the burden
of proof of compliance with this prohibition was on the recipi-
ent governments. The Report stated that:
[i]n determining whether the governmental unit has indirectly
used revenue sharing funds to match Federal funds, it is ex-
pected that the Treasury will generally hold that revenue shar-
ing funds are used for matching purposes unless it can be
shown that the matching funds came from other sources.24 1
The extent of the burden posed by the matching prohibition
was further reinforced by the discussion of the reporting require-
ments in the Senate Report:
[T]hese reports will set forth the amounts and sources of
non-revenue-sharing funds used for matching Federal grants
and the amounts of Federal grants thus obtained... The com-
mittee is also concerned that the funds not be used directly or
indirectly as State or local matching funds for Federal match-
ing programs. The reports are also intended to serve as a
way of being sure that the revenue sharing funds are not used
for this purpose. 242
The Administration's representatives expressed great con-
cern over the burden that such reporting requirements would
have placed both on the Department of the Treasury and on
state and local governments. Compliance with the require-
ments would have required a dramatic change in accounting
practices, since in general, state and local governments do not
have federal funds accounting. In fact, many major cities appear
not to have the information on either total federal matching
grants received or the local matching obligation to obtain those
grants.2 43 Dr. Charls Walker, Deputy Secretary of the Treas-
240. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.30 (b). A violation of
the matching prohibition by a secondary recipient constitutes a viola-
tion by the recipient government and the penalty provided by the
Act shall be imposed on the recipient government. Id.
241. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 36.
242. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 34; see GENRAL FxPLANA-
TION, supra note 63, at 44.
243. See Clark, Iglehart & Lilley, New Federalism II: Philosophy,
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ury, emphasized these problems to the Conference Committee
and proposed the language which is now found in Section 104 (e)
of the Act. This language was intended to provide that filing
the certification would constitute prima facie satisfaction of the
burden of proof of compliance with the prohibition on direct and
indirect matching unless other facts came to the attention of
the Secretary of the Treasury which would indicate that a par-
ticular certification is unreliable. Thus, the conferees overrode
the earlier indications with respect to reporting on the matching
prohibition. However, a state or local official continues to bear
the burden of ascertaining whether there has been indirect
matching before he executes the certification provided for in Sec-
tion 104(e).
Section 104(c) 244 of the Act provides a "safe harbor" in the
sense that fulfillment of the conditions set forth in that subsec-
tion results in a conclusive presumption of compliance with the
prohibition on matching. However, failure to fulfill those con-
ditions does not result in a determination or presumption of non-
compliance with the basic prohibition. An increase in net reve-
nues from a recipient government's own sources for any entitle-
ment period over the net revenues from its own sources for the
base period commencing July 1, 1971, will be presumed to have
been used for matching purposes, and to that extent, there would
be a presumption of compliance with the matching prohibition.
For example, if net revenues from the recipient government's
own sources for the 12 month period commencing July 1, 1971
were $100,000 and for the corresponding period commencing July
1, 1973 were $150,000, while the local contributions to federal
matching programs were $25,000 in 1971 and $110,000 in 1973,
4 NAT'L J. 1913 (1972), citing the example of San Jose, California
which received a grant under the Planned Variations program intended
for review and comment on all federal grants to the city. However, it
was soon discovered that no one knew the extent and nature of federal
aid to the city. The top staff man on the project is quoted: ". . . we
had no idea that we were so heavily committed, or in what areas we
had agreed to put up matching money. City agencies were applying
right and left for money, and the mayor's office never knew what the
extent of the city's matching commitments were." Id.
244. Section 104(c) provides:
No State government or unit of local government shall be
determined to have used funds in violation of [the matching
prohibition] ... with respect to any funds received for any en-
titlement period to the extent that the net revenues received by
it from its own sources during such period exceed the net
revenues received by it from its own sources during the one-
year period beginning July 1, 1971 ....
31 U.S.C. § 1223 (c) (1973).
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$50,000 of the increase in local matching contributions would be
deemed to be attributable to the increase in net revenues from
its own sources. Therefore, $35,000 ($110,000, less $25,000, less
$50,000) of local matching contributions in 1973 would remain
unaccounted for and could potentially have come from the Rev-
enue Sharing funds. If the Revenue Sharing funds to this par-
ticular recipient government amounted to $95,000 for the 12
month period commencing July 1, 1973, the recipient govern-
ment must prove that at least $35,000 of that amount was not
used directly or indirectly for matching purposes. It would be
consistent with the philosophy of this "safe harbor" to also con-
clude that the remaining $10,000 ($95,000, less $50,000, less $35,000)
was not used for matching purposes. However, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury has not publicly indicated its position on
this matter.
This statutory "safe harbor" caused the Treasury and the
Office of Management and Budget great concern about possible
discouragement of tax reductions at a time when the President
was publicly expressing his hope that Revenue Sharing would
reduce or prevent further increases in property taxes. However,
this concern seems misplaced since, as previously indicated, fail-
ure to come within the Section 104 (c) "safe harbor" does not
constitute a violation of the matching prohibition, nor a pre-
sumption of such a violation. A reduction in net revenues as
compared to the base period or earlier entitlement periods does
not result in a conclusion that there has been a violation of the
matching prohibition because the difference in net revenues must
be considered in relationship to increases in matching fund con-
tributions and the amount of the Revenue Sharing grant.
The Senate Finance Committee Report245 suggests several
other potential "safe harbors":
1. Proceeds from one or more bond issues that exceeded bond
issue proceeds in fiscal year 1972; and
2. Discontinuance of a fiscal year 1972 expenditure program,
but only if the recipient government's Revenue Sharing
funds are not being used for an essentially similar pro-
gram in order to avoid the intent of the anti-matching rule.
Furthermore, the Final Regulations2 46 provide that when the fol-
245. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 36; see GENERAL ExPLANATION,
supra note 63, at 21-22.
246. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.30(e). The language
in the Regulations is in the form of an indirect double negative--'No
recipient government shall be determined to have used entitlement
funds in violation of the indirect prohibition of paragraph (a) of this
subsection to the extent that.... ."
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lowing situations occur there will be no presumptions of "non-
compliance":
1. The expenditure of Revenue Sharing funds was accom-
panied by an aggregate increase in non-matching expendi-
tures.
2. The receipt of Revenue Sharing funds permits that gov-
ernment to reduce taxes, provided revenue from sources
other than Revenue Sharing is sufficient to cover all
matching funds contributions; 247 and
3. The matching funds contribution in question is accounted
for by an in-kind contribution which was not financed di-
rectly or indirectly with Revenue Sharing funds.
The "non-presumption" which results from an increase in
non-matching funds expenditures seems inconsistent with the
general framework of the statutory scheme which generally
considers only the revenue side of a particular transaction. The
very significant problem raised by this approach is exemplified
by a recipient whose aggregate increase in non-matching funds
expenditures resulted from an overall budgetary deficit in an
amount in excess of the amount of Revenue Sharing funds re-
ceived, rather than an increase in non-matching funds revenues.
In general, it simply is not valid to assume that an increase in
aggregate non-matching funds expenditures supports a conclu-
sion that non-Revenue Sharing sources of revenues were used for
the purposes of contributions to matching programs. Further-
more, it is unclear whether a causal connection will be required
under category (2) between the tax reduction and the receipt
of Revenue Sharing funds. For example, a municipality may
reduce taxes as a result of increased transfer payments from the
state, a reduction in the number of employees or reduction in
the level of services.
It therefore appears that the concern about discouraging tax
reductions is misplaced insofar as it relates to the statutory
"safe harbors" and the matching prohibition, and that the ob-
jective of providing additional "safe harbors" could better be
served by alternative means. It should be possible to formulate
247. It is interesting to compare the language in the Final Regula-
tions to the same provision in the Proposed Regulations:
The receipt of entitlement funds permitted that govern-
ment to decrease its other revenues without a commensurate
reduction in its nonmatching expenditures: Provided, Nonen-
titlement revenue is not less than the local matching funds con-
tribution.
Proposed Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.30 (d) (2). Obviously, the
Department of the Treasury decided to deal with the political issue
of tax reductions directly. However, the result appears to signifi-
cantly weaken the matching prohibition.
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a regulation whereby a presumption of compliance would exist
so long as aggregate expenditures in the broad categories of
usage for Revenue Sharing funds were increased by at least the
amount of the particular expenditures of the Revenue Sharing
funds. For example, if a recipient government indicated that its
Revenue Sharing funds were used for the purchase of a fire
engine, and the aggregate expenditure for the category "fire pro-
tection" increased by at least the amount of the Revenue Sharing
funds so used, one would presume that in fact the funds were
used as specified, rather than indirectly for matching purposes.
The weakness of this approach is that it implies a crude aggre-
gate maintenance of effort concept and does not deal with the
argument that the increase in the aggregate categorical expendi-
tures may be for another purpose or that the displacement was
otherwise planned. Nevertheless, it is far more defensible than
an aggregate expenditure test.
It is unlikely that such a stringent prohibition on use of the
Revenue Sharing funds for matching purposes would have been
included were it not for the "tale of horrors" under considera-
tion simultaneously by the Senate Finance Committee with re-
spect to the Social Services provisions under the Social Security
Act.248  The great danger in this prohibition is that Revenue
Sharing will be used to "police" the matching programs and their
administration. If all the matching programs had limitations on
aggregate and specific expenditure amounts, the prohibition on
the use of Revenue Sharing funds for matching purposes could
be omitted from the Revenue Sharing program as an undue lim-
itation on local decision making.2 49 For example, the highest
priority local need in many localities is a new sewage-disposal
system. However, the prohibition on matching will effectively
preclude use of Revenue Sharing funds for this purpose by many
localities since the prohibition would be violated if they seek ad-
ditional federal assistance for this purpose on a matching basis.
James E. Smith, Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury,
has indicated that although the Administration did not seek the
matching prohibition, it is a prohibition fully in keeping with the
248. See, e.g., text accompanying note 92 supra.
249. It is interesting to compare the anti-matching provision in the
Revenue Sharing Bill originally introduced by Wilbur Mills:
Subject to the conditions and limitations provided in this
title, such government (localities) may use such funds for the
purpose of matching Federal funds if such payments and funds
are used for high priority expenditures and if the amount of
such Federal funds are limited by law.
ILR. 11950 (§ 101), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (emphasis added).
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philosophy of the program since one of the objectives of the
program is to give states and localities a chance to exercise
their own creativeness and ingenuity. He hoped "that their cre-
ativity could take a somewhat higher form than merely using
the funds to obtain other Federal funds. ' 250  This, of course,
implies an extremely negative evaluation of the desirability of
the goals and objectives reflected in the existing federal match-
ing programs. Since the matching programs reflect a value
judgment of the Congress as to the highest priority needs of
the nation, it is difficult to conclude that local officials should
be penalized for concurring in that conclusion and using their
Revenue Sharing funds for those purposes.
c. State Maintenance of Effort
In order for a state to receive its full entitlements under the
Act it must maintain the level of its aid to units of local govern-
ment (excluding limited purpose governments and special taxing
districts) within that state25 1 since Revenue Sharing is intended
to provide assistance to localities in meeting their needs, to pro-
vide additional services and to relieve local financial pressures.
The Act provides for the comparison of a two-year average
of aggregate state transfers of revenue from its own sources to
localities in order to eliminate the effects of temporary reduc-
tions arising from the financing needs of the state.2 52 The base
period for the purposes of this comparison is the one-year period
beginning July 1, 1971.253 Obviously the state may reduce the
amount it potentially would have spent so long as it does not
fall below the base period level and reallocate its local transfer
payments among localities to redistribute the impact of the Rev-
enue Sharing funds. Therefore, although the state may change
the within-state formula only once within the five year life of the
program within the limits set forth in the Act, the state legis-
lature may reallocate state assistance to localities in a way which
will indirectly affect the impact of Revenue Sharing. For ex-
ample, if the state determines that the allocations under the Act
unduly favor a given locality, the state could appropriately re-
allocate its assistance funds so as to readjust the situation so
250. Transcript of Press Conference of James E. Smith, Deputy Un-
der Secretary of the Treasury, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 8, 1972, at 14.
251. ACT § 107(b), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1226(b) (1973).
252. Id. at (1) (A). The average is for the Entitlement Period in
question plus the preceding Entitlement Period.
253. Id. at (1) (B).
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long as the aggregate funds transferred to all localities within
the state exceed the base year level.
Section 107(b) (1) of the Act requires maintenance of reve-
nue transfers from the states' own sources, thus requiring "each
state government to continue to use its own funds to assist all
units of local government... within the State to the same ex-
tent that had been done previously."25 4 The Final Regulations
define "own sources" as meaning "all sources of State revenue
(including debt proceeds and the State's revenue sharing entitle-
ment funds) but excluding intergovernmental revenues received
from the Federal Government. ' 25r The inclusion of the Revenue
Sharing funds in the state's own source revenues appears to ex-
tend the statutory language and congressional intent The Final
Regulations2 56 further provide the following formula to apply
in those situations where the state's accounting system cannot
ascertain the source of transfers to units of local government
(e.g., transfers from a commingled fund with no identification
as to specific revenue sources):
State's transfers to State's total State's own source
localities from = transfers to X revenues
its own sources localities State's total
revenues
The underlying assumption of the formula is
that the ratio of a State's own source intergovernmental trans-
fers to units of local government to that State's total inter-
governmental transfers to units of local government is equal
to the ratio of that State's own source revenues to its total rev-
enues. 2 57
The validity of this -assumption is subject to serious question
where a state has restricted revenue sources which cannot be
used for intergovernmental transfers. At a minimum, all reve-
nues from such sources should be removed from the denom-
inator of the formula.258
The Act recognizes two instances in which a state may jus-
tifiably reduce its assistance to its localities for reasons extrinsic
to Revenue Sharing: (1) the state's assumption of responsibil-
ity for a category of expenditures previously assumed by lo-
calities, and (2) the state's conferring a new source of tax reve-
254. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 22.
255. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.26 (a) (emphasis added).
256. Id at (b).
257. Id. at (b) (1).
258. The Regulations provide that the Secretary of the Treasury
may use any other formula, procedure or method deemed equitable if
the prescribed approach provides an inaccurate or unfair measure of
transfer effort. Id. at (c).
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nues on the localities in lieu of transfer payments.210  The per-
mitted reduction in state transfers based on state assumption
of responsibility for a category of expenditures applies only to
those categories which were previously the responsibility of lo-
calities. For example, a state could not lower its level of local
assistance by assuming responsibility for enforcing federal en-
vironmental control standards if the localities would not thereby
be relieved of any responsibilities.
Neither the Act nor the regulations define "categories of ex-
penditures." A broad definition of "categories" would restrict
the state's ability to adjust its level of local support. For ex-
ample, if the categories set forth in Section 103 (a) of the Act
define the term, a state which assumed responsibility for law
enforcement, where that function had previously been the re-
sponsibility of localities, could not correspondingly reduce its as-
sistance to the localities because the category of public safety
is far broader than the category of law enforcement. It is incum-
bent upon the Treasury to provide some guidance in this area.
A dramatic application of this provision allowing reduced
assistance to localities where the state assumed a category of
expenditures would have occurred if the Rodriguez2 10  case had
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Many states would have
been forced to assume all or part of the responsibility for financ-
ing education within the state. However, state court decisions
similar to Robinson v. Cahill261 which are based on state consti-
tutional grounds may have the same practical effect. This raises
interesting questions under Section 107 (b). First, would the
state be considered to have assumed responsibility for a category
of expenditures if it merely provided a standard grant to each
student within the state, leaving a local option to supplement
259. ACT § 107(b) (2) and (3), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1226(b) (2) and (3)
(1973).
260. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 93 S.
Ct. 1278 (1973). The Supreme Court held that the use of local property
tax revenues to finance public education did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment even though the result
was per-pupil expenditure disparities among school districts.
261. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the use of the property tax to finance public education
which results in per-pupil disparities among school districts violates
the following provision in the state constitution:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all of the children in this state between the ages
of five and eighteen years.
N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1 1.
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this amount out of the localities' own revenue sources? Second,
what level of reduction in state assistance would be justified
by a given assumption of responsibility? Section 107(b) (2) in-
dicates that the allowable reduction in assistance is measured by
the increased state government spending from its own sources
rather than the prior level of expenditures by the localities for
that category of expenditures. For example, if the localities ex-
pend an aggregate of $10 million for education prior to assump-
tion by the state, but thereafter the state government only ex-
pends an additional $8 million because of greater efficiencies or
a reduction in the level of services, the state would be justified
in reducing transfer payments only in the amount of $8 million.
Correspondingly, if the state expends an additional $12 million,
the permitted reduction would be in that amount. However, if
the source of $3 million of the expenditures was federal grants
to the state, such expenditures are not from the state's own
sources of -revenues and to that extent, a reduction in transfer
payments would not be justified.
The second instance in which a state may justifiably reduce
its transfer payments is when the state has conferred the au-
thority to levy a new kind of tax upon a locality lacking such
prior authority.2 62 Thus, by conferring new sources of taxa-
ation on City A, transfer payments to City B can be reduced,
since conferring new taxing authority upon one or more units of
local government justifies an aggregate reduction in transfer
payments. Section 107(b)(3) expressly states that an increase
in the authorized rate of an existing local tax does not generally
justify transfer payment reduction.2 0 3 For example, authorizing
an increase in the local sales tax rate from 3 to 4 percent will not
justify a reduction in transfer payments. However, an increase
in the rate of an existing local tax will justify a reduction in
state transfer payments if it results in a decrease in a "related
state tax." There is some question as to the extent of the requi-
site relationship between the state and local tax. If the state
allows local governments to levy a personal income tax, is a cor-
responding reduction in state corporate income tax a decrease
in a "related state tax"? It is also not clear whether the reduc-
tion in the related state tax must correspond in amount to the
increase in the local tax. If the state confers the right to increase
the local sales tax from 1 to 4 percent resulting in collections of
$2 million, does a reduction from 5 to 4% percent in the state
262. ACT § 107(b) (3), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1226(b) (3) (1973).
263. Id.
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sales tax rate, with a reduction in state collections of $500,000,
justify a state reduction in local transfer payments?
Regarding the extent of any permissible reduction, the Act
indicates that the state may reduce its local transfer payments
to the extent of the larger of
1. an amount equal to the amount of the taxes collected by
local governments by reason of the exercise of such new
taxing authority, or
2. an amount equal to the loss of revenue to the State by
reason of such new taxing authority being conferred on such
local governments. 264
Therefore, it would appear that a reduction of $2 million would
be justified, notwithstanding the fact that the state itself only
lost revenues of $500,000. Furthermore, the last clause of Sec-
tion 107 (b) (3) does not require a proportionate or substantially
equal reduction in the related state tax to justify reductions in
the local transfer payments if there has been an increase in the
authorized rate of an existing local tax.
If a state fails to maintain its effort as the Act requires, the
amount that otherwise would be distributed to the state is to be
reduced in an amount equal to the unwarranted reduction in
transfers to its localities after the state has had reasonable no-
tice and opportunity for a hearing.265 Any reduction in a state
entitlement is transferred to the general fund of the Treasury;
it does not increase the entitlements of other states or the lo-
calities in the offending state.260 The remedy thus fails to im-
prove the position of the injured locality.
d. Davis-Bacon Act and Prevailing Wage
Section 123 (a) (6) of the Act requires payment of the pre-
vailing wage rates as determined by the Secretary of Labor in
accordance with the amended Davis-Bacon Act2-6 7 to all laborers
and mechanics who are employed by contractors or subcontrac-
tors on any construction project which derives 25 percent or
more of its funds from the recipient state or local government's
Revenue Sharing trust fund.268 By providing that the wage re-
264. Id. at (3) (A) and (B).
265. Id. at (6).
266. Id. at (7).
267. 40 U.S.C. § 276a et seq. (1970). Basically, the Davis-Bacon
Act empowers the Secretary of Labor to determine wage rates for
employees of contractors or subcontractors engaged in any construction
activities supported by federal funds.
268. Neither the Act nor the Regulations contain a definition of the
term "construction project." Obviously the scope of this definition
will determine the impact of the 25 percent limitation.
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striction applies only when "25 percent or more of the costs of
the project are paid out of its trust fund" (emphasis added), Sec-
tion 123 (a) (6) contrasts with other sections of the Act. For ex-
ample, Section 104(a) provides that "[n]o State government or
unit of local government may use, directly or indirectly, any
part of the funds it receives under ... [the Act] as a contribu-
tion" to obtain federal matching funds (emphasis added), and
Section 122 (a) provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall on the ground of race, color, national origin, or sex be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity funded in
whole or in part with funds made available under" the Act
(emphasis added).
The House-passed version of Section 123 (a) (6) would have
required payment of all laborers and mechanics employed by
contractors or subcontractors of construction financed in whole
or in part out of government trust funds at rates not less than
those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as deter-
mined under the Davis-Bacon Act.2 9 However, the Senate F-
nance Committee omitted this provision because it seemed in-
consistent with the general "no strings" approach to Revenue
Sharing.270 Also, the Davis-Bacon provisions were considered
to result in increased costs for governmental services and facili-
ties which were inconsistent with the intended relief from the
fiscal crisis.27 1 When the provision was reintroduced on the
floor, Senator Humphrey, a traditional ally of labor, proposed
the limitation that the Davis-Bacon Act would apply when 25
percent of the total costs of the project were derived from the
recipient government's trust fund.27 2 This provision deals with
the fungibility-displacement problem in the matching area by
circumscribing the inquiry to the prima facie use of the funds
as demonstrated by the transfer from the trust fund. If the di-
rect transfer from the trust fund is for purposes other than
construction, the inquiry as to Davis-Bacon should end. Thus,
this provision may be circumvented by displacing other expen-
269. HELR. 14370 § 105(a) (6) ), 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
270. SExATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 17, 38.
271. See 118 Cong. Rec. § 14189 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Fanin); id. at § 14192, § 14196, § 14200 (remarks of Senator
Long); id. at § 14197 (remarks of Senator Tower).
272. Senator Humphrey's original proposal would have limited
the application to those projects where 50% or more of the costs of the
project are paid out of the recipient's trust fund. 118 CONG. R c.
§§ 14194-95 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1972). Senators Long and Hartke com-
promised on the 25% limitation. Id. at § 14202.
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ditures with Revenue Sharing funds. For example, a munici-
pality with a police budget of $100,000 could write a check from
its trust fund to the police fund for $100,000 representing all or
substantially all its annual Revenue Sharing funds, while the dis-
placed funds from the police department are used for the con-
struction by contractors of a new town hall.
The provision applies only to construction projects financed
with Revenue Sharing funds and imposes no limitation what-
ever on acquisitions or purchases. The House Report stated that
[T]his provision is to apply only to work on construction fi-
nanced under this provision and is not to apply to an item merely
because it has been purchased by the local government. As a
result, it would apply to a building or to a sewage treatment
plant constructed by or to the order of the local government.
However, it would not apply to a sewage treatment plant al-
ready in existence which is purchased by the local govern-
ment.
2 73
The provision does not apply to employment by the local gov-
ernment directly, but only to employment by contractors and
subcontractors.
274
Section 123 (a) (7) requires state governments and units of
local government to pay to its employees whose wages are paid
in whole or in part out of the recipient government's trust
fund wages which are not lower than the prevailing rates of pay
for its similarly occupied employees. This requirement must be
met only if 25 percent or more of the wages of all employees of
the recipient government in the same category of employment
are paid from its Revenue Sharing trust fund.
Since a violation requires a finding of a direct expenditure
out of the trust fund for the payment of 25 percent of the ag-
gregate employee wage payments, few violations should occur
unless the Treasury gives "category of employment" an ex-
tremely narrow definition. But even if the restriction is applica-
ble, it merely requires payment of the prevailing rate of pay for
persons employed in similar public occupations by the same em-
ployer. It is not the prevailing wage in the community gener-
ally, nor is it the federal minimum wage applicable to the em-
ployee under the Fair Labor Standards Act, nor the state or local
government minimum wage for the most nearly comparable cov-
ered employment.2 7 5 Thus, only a complete absence of planning
could result in a violation of this restriction.
273. Houss REPORT, supra note 60, at 34; GENERAL EXPLANATION,
supra note 63, at 47.
274. HousE REPORT, supra note 60, at 34; GENERAL EXPLANATON,
supra note 63, at 47.
275. All of these requirements were strongly urged by the AFL-
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Circumvention of Davis-Bacon and prevailing wage require-
ments could result from the transfer of Revenue Sharing funds
through independent or quasi-independent entities as intermedi-
aries. For example, a unit of local government might transfer its
funds to an entity such as an independent or quasi-independent
sewage district for the purpose of constructing a new facility.
Although the restrictions of Section 123 (a) (6) should apply to
the construction by the sewage district, if the transfer is for the
purpose of employing additional personnel, the restriction of Sec-
tion 123 (a) (7) requiring a recipient government to pay its pre-
vailing wage will only apply if such employees are considered
employees of the transferor unit of local government. If the
transferee is a completely independent entity whose employees
are not considered employees of the transferor for other purposes,
Subsection (7) should not require the transferee to pay either the
transferor's or its own prevailing wage to those additional em-
ployees.2
7 6
e. Non-Discrimination
Section 122 (a) of the Act provides that no person shall on
the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity funded in whole
or in part with Revenue Sharing funds.2 7 7  The Final Regula-
CIO. See Testimony July 21, 1972 of Jerry Wurf, President American
Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFL-CIO),
Hearings on H.R. 14370 Before Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 208 (1972). They were adopted by the Senate on a floor
amendment by Senator Hartke, 118 CoNG. REc. § 14188 (daily ed. Sept
6, 1972), but eliminated by the Conferees.
276. If the Department of the Treasury intends that the Subsection
(7) restriction on wage rates follows the funds, it should specify
whether the transferor's or transferee's prevailing wage rate applies.
To ensure the Labor Department's legal position to sue on behalf
of affected workers if the Davis-Bacon wage rates and standards are
not met, the Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.33(b), impose the
following requirements on recipient governments in situations where
the Davis-Bacon standards are applicable. The recipient must (1) file
with the regional office of the Department of Labor a request for a
wage determination for each intended project at least 30 days before
the invitation for bids; (2) ascertain that the issued wage determination
and required contract clauses are incorporated in the contract specifica-
tion (See 29 C.F.R. §§ 5.5 and 5a.3); and (3) satisfy itself that the
contractor is made aware of his labor standards responsibilities under
the Davis-Bacon Act See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 61, at 47.
277. Section 122 of the AcT is patterned after Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.). However, there are two
major extensions in Section 122: (1) prohibition on sex discrimination
and (2) no specific exemption of certain employment practices.
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tions define "program or activity" as "any function conducted
by an identifiable administrative unit of the recipient govern-
ment, or by any unit of government or private contractor re-
ceiving entitlement funds from the recipient government."278
The italicized disjunctive clauses were not present in the Pro-
posed Regulations. 279 Their addition suggests that shifting the
noncomplying function to other units of the recipient govern-
ment or to a private contractor will not limit the scope of a Title
VI order. However, in many cases it will be difficult or im-
possible to trace Revenue Sharing funds to a particular "func-
tion." For example, if the Planned and Actual Use Reports
refer to a transfer to the Transportation Department for public
transportation purposes, it will be difficult to ascertain whether
any of the funds were in fact used to finance a particular "func-
tion" conducted by the Transportation Department. The flexi-
bility with which the Treasury Department interprets "func-
tion" will determine the scope of this problem.
The phrase "funded in whole or in part with Revenue Shar-
ing funds" is defined in the Final Regulations as a transfer of
the Revenue Sharing funds "in any amount from the recipient
government's trust fund to an identifiable administrative unit
and disbursed in a program or activity. s2 8 0 Since no change was
made in this definition to parallel the amendment to the Pro-
posed Regulations' definition of "program or activity," a transfer
from the recipient government's trust fund to the general fund
and ultimately to a program or activity, or a transfer to an in-
dependent or quasi-independent unit, seems to insulate future
expenditures from the anti-discrimination provision.
Similarly, the definition of "funded in whole or in part with
Revenue Sharing funds" gives broad latitude to the use of the
displacement approach, i.e., the use of Revenue Sharing funds
for noncontroversial purposes and expenditure of the dislaced
funds for activities which might have a discriminatory impact.2 8 '
278. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32(a) (emphasis added).
279. Proposed Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32 defined "program
or activity" as "any function conducted by an identifiable administra-
tive unit of the recipient government."
280. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32(a) (emphasis added).
281. See Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178:
State and local governments are granted wide discretion in
how they will use revenue sharing funds, allowing them to
choose those programs or activities to be funded with assistance
provided through revenue sharing and those to be funded by
other sources. The use of revenue sharing funds for a particu-
lar expenditure can free State and local funds for other uses.
This type of allocation enables a State or local government to
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The federal district court's opinion in Mathews v. Massell re-
fuses to allow this approach:
If defendants were to prevail on their arguments [that displaced
funds are not subject to the restrictions in Section 103(a)],
other statutory restrictions placed on the use of Revenue Shar-
ing funds would likewise become meaningless. This Court
cannot conclude that Congress intended for its prohibition
against the use of the funds in a manner that discriminates on
the basis of race, color, national origin or sex § 122) be so
easily read out of the Act.282
If this opinion prevails, the definition of "funded in whole or in
part with Revenue Sharing funds" in the Final Regulations is
invalid.
However, given the historical development of the Regula-
tions, the Treasury apparently concluded that use of the dis-
placement approach and insulation of the general fund must be
preserved as basic to the "no strings" philosophy. The Com-
mission on Civil Rights concedes that "the Revenue Sharing Act
does not provide any mechanism to expand the coverage of its
civil rights provisions to programs or activities made possible by
Revenue Sharing entitlements but not directly financed with
those funds. 2 8 3 But the Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights
Under Law disagrees:
The range of programs and services eligible for revenue
sharing makes it possible for state and local governments to
use revenue sharing funds to displace local funds from one
program to another. This will mean that any government,
which believes or is informed that one or more of its programs
and services might be susceptible to a charge of discrimination,
can simply apply its revenue sharing funds directly to other
programs, and displace local funds from those programs to the
program it feels might be subject to attack. There can be no
question that, where revenue sharing funds are so used, the
suspect program is being funded in whole or in part by Reve-
nue Sharing funds within the meaning of Section 122 of the
Act.284
Nondiscrimination restrictions are enforceable by the Trea-
sury. If the Secretary has conducted a compliance review based
upon an investigation which leads to a determination of non-
compliance, he can request the governor to secure compliance
of the state or local government. If within a reasonable period
use its own funds for activities which might have a discrim-
inatory impact ....
Id.
282. Mathews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291, 301 (ND. Ga. 1973).
283. Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178.
284. Letter from Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
(signed by Stuart E. Benson) to Samuel R. Pierce, General Counsel of
Department of the Treasury, Dec. 21, 1972.
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of time the governor fails or refuses to secure compliance, the
Secretary is authorized to (1) refer the matter to the Attor-
ney General with a recommendation to institute civil action, (2)
exercise the powers and functions provided by Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, or (3) take such other action as may be
authorized by law.28 5
The Final Regulations 28 6 provide that an order under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall become effective only
after (1) the Secretary of the Treasury has advised the recipi-
ent government of its failure to comply and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means, (2) there has
been a hearing and an express finding on the record of noncom-
pliance, (3) action has been approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury, and (4) 30 days have elapsed after the Secretary
of the Treasury has filed with the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Committee on Finance a full written re-
port of the circumstances and grounds for the action. With re-
spect to the payment of Revenue Sharing funds, the order may
provide for termination, refusal to grant, refusal to continue, de-
mand of forfeiture, demand of repayment or withholding.
While an order demanding forfeiture or repayment of Rev-
enue Sharing funds must be limited to the particular program
or activity in which noncompliance has been found,28 7 a with-
holding order applies to all Revenue Sharing funds of the non-
complying government until the Secretary of the Treasury is
satisfied that there will be compliance.28 8 Thus, the Final Reg-
285. ACT § 122(b), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(b) (1973).
286. See Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32(f) (3).
287. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32(f) (3) (v); see § 602
of Civil Rights Act of 1964. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights had
the following recommendation on this matter:
The regulations should prohibit the reallocation of revenue
sharing funds once prima facie evidence of discrimination has
been given, including receipt of a nonfrivolous complaint. The
regulations should also require that in the event that sanctions
are imposed upon a State or locality for discrimination in a
particular program, the revenue sharing entitlement will be re-
duced by the amount previously allocated to that program until
correction of the violation, again permitting no reallocation of
funds.
Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178.
288. In response to the Proposed Regulations, which did not provide
for the withholding of all entitlement funds, the office of Civil Rights
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare recommended
that "the regulation should provide the Secretary with the authority
to withhold an entire entitlement to a recipient government on the
basis of a Title VI finding of discrimination." Letter from Patricia A.
King, Acting Director, Office of Civil Rights, Dept. of Health, Education
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ulations forbid avoidance of the penalties by shifting the funds
to other functions which have not been found to be in non-
compliance. Similarly, the provision2 8 9 governing noncompli-
ance with other restrictions in the Act2 90 provides that after no-
tice, an opportunity for hearing and 60 days for corrective ac-
tion, the Treasury will withhold all future payments until such
time as it is satisfied that appropriate corrective action has been
taken and that there will no longer be any failure to comply.29 1
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law would ex-
tend the Regulations "to withhold all Revenue Sharing funds to
a jurisdiction when discrimination is found in any program eli-
gible for revenue sharing funds,"2 92 but such an extension of
the withholding penalty would exceed the Treasury's general
regulatory authority.
Many civil rights groups2 93 have expressed strong concern
about the adequacy of the nondiscrimination provisions in the
Act and the Regulations thereunder. They particularly believe
that since state and local governments have widely engaged in
discriminatory practices in the areas designated as high priority
under the Act, the recipient governments should be required to
file affirmative action plans setting goals and timetables to cor-
rect deficiencies in their employment of women and minorities
before funds are distributed.294 Reporting requirements which
follow the guidelines in Bulletin 73-3 of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget have also been suggested. Such reports would
provide data by race and ethnicity on the beneficiaries of the
program and reveal the nature of any adverse effects of the pro-
gram on the minority populatio 2 95
and Welfare, to Sam R. Pierce, General Counsel, Department of the
Treasury, Feb. 9, 1973.
289. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.3.
290. See generally AcT § 123(a), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(a) (1973).
291. See letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178.
292. Letter from Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
supra note 284 (emphasis added).
293. See, e.g., Letter from Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, supra note 284; Letter from National Urban League, Inc.
to Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., Nov. 22, 1972; Letter from Leadership Confer-
ence on Civil Rights to Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., Nov. 20, 1972.
294. See Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178. This recom-
mendation would require compliance with standards similar to those
set forth in 41 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1972) ("Revised Order Number 4" issued
by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of
Labor).
295. See Letter from Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, supra
note 293; Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178; Letter from Pa-
tricia A. King, supra note 288 ("Recipient governments should be re-
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The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also expressed concern
"that the remedies for non-compliance with the civil rights re-
quirements of the Act are weaker than those for non-compliance
with the other sections. '29 6  For example, the specific regula-
tory provision applicable to nondiscrimination in the Final Reg-
ulations seems contrary to the general provision that the viola-
tion of any prohibition or restriction (including nondiscrimina-
tion) on the use of funds by a secondary recipient shall consti-
tute a violation by the recipient government.29 7 The inconsist-
ency arguably is avoided by the Act's exclusion of discrimination
as a potential violation for a recipient government since the defi-
nition of a violation of the nondiscrimination provision excludes
those situations where there has not been a transfer "from the
recipient government's trust fund to an identifiable administra-
tive unit." But unfortunately the conclusion is inescapable that
Congress meant the distinctions to exist.2 9 8 The Treasury Regu-
lations are not the proper vehicle to alter this legislative deter-
mination. By stating "the Act should be amended to make the
penalties for discrimination as strong as all other violations," the
Commission seems to recognize this conclusion.
299
Although the Final Regulations set forth the type of actions
that will be considered discriminatory, 30 0 including the discrimi-
natory effect which results from the site location of facilities,
there is no requirement of affirmative action to overcome the
consequences of past discrimination.30 1 Rather, there is a pro-
vision which states:
quired to provide data as to the race, national origin, and sex of the
beneficiaries and of the employees of particular programs and projects
funded" and "the extent to which the needs of the minority com-
munity are to be met under planned expenditures.").
296. Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178.
297. See text accompanying notes 275-76 supra.
298. Compare AcT § 123(b), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(b) (1973), with
ACT § 122(b), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(b) (1973).
299. Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178.
300. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32(b).
301. See the revised Title VI Regulations of the Department of
Transportation:
Where previous discriminatory practice or usage tends, on the
grounds of race, color or national origin, to exclude individuals
from participation in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject
them to discrimination under any program or activity to which
this part applies, the applicant or recipient has an obligation
to take reasonable action to remove or overcome the conse-
quences of the prior discriminatory practice or usage, and to
accomplish the purposes of the Act.
49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b) (7) (1972).
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law recommends
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A recipient government shall not be prohibited by this section
from taking any action to ameliorate an imbalance in services
or facilities provided to any geographic area or specific group
of persons within its jurisdiction, where the purpose of such
action is to overcome prior discriminatory practice or usage.30 2
Broad remedies are available for alleged racial discrimina-
tion on a variety of constitutional and statutory grounds,
03
and Section 122 of the Act provides additional administrative
remedies which may be desirable for "political" reasons or as a
less expensive method of obtaining relief.3 0 4 It is likely that a
substantial number of complaints will be filed based on dis-
criminatory practices regarding municipal services and facilities
financed in whole or in part with Revenue Sharing funds. Var-
ious civil rights groups have suggested that the small staff of
the General Counsel's office of the Treasury will not be able to
conduct the compliance investigations and reviews required by
the Final Regulations.3 0 5 It is expected that a major portion of
that the regulations 'require, rather than simply permit, such use
[correction of imbalances in services or facilities which are the result
of prior discriminatory practices] of revenue sharing funds where dis-
crimination is found." Letter from Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, supra note 284.
302. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32 (b) (4).
303. The existing remedies for discriminatory provision of munici-
pal services are illustrated by the Fifth Circuit decision in Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), which found a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment based on
statistical evidence showing a substantial qualitative and quantitative
inequity in the level and nature of services accorded "white" and
"black" neighborhoods. The evidence indicated that 98 percent of all
homes fronting on unpaved streets were occupied by blacks and 97
percent of homes not served by sanitary sewers were in black neighbor-
hoods. The court stated that "[ifmprovements to existing facilities
provided in a discriminatory manner may also constitute a violation
of equal protection." Id. at 1290 (emphasis in original). Further-
more, the court went on to say that the fact that extensions of the
sanitary sewers were currently being made to new areas in a non-
discriminatory manner was not sufficient when the effect of such a
policy is to "freeze in" the results of past discrimination. The court
required the town of Shaw to submit a plan for the court's approval
detailing a proposed program of improvements that would, within a
reasonable time, remove the existing disparities. For other examples
of discrimination in municipal goods and services see Hadnott v. City
of Prattvile, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (municipal parks); Gau-
treaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (ND. Ill. 1969)
(public housing).
304. After exhausting their administrative remedies, complainants
alleging an improper abuse of discretion by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury for failure to invoke the termination or withholding provisions
under a Title VI order may seek appropriate judicial relief to obtain
such a result.
305. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32 (d) and (e).
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the responsibility for compliance investigation and review will
be delegated to other federal agencies, with overall coordination
and supervision in the Treasury Department.30 6
4. Accountability for Decision-Making-Budgetary Procedures
a. Reporting and Accounting
The underlying objective of Revenue Sharing is to achieve
the most efficient use of the federal money for the highest pri-
ority needs of the individual recipient entities. In order to reach
this objective, decision making should be returned to the local
level, where the decision makers are closer to the local problems
and more informed about local options and priorities. 0 7 How-
ever, opinions diverge regarding the mechanics of assuring the
proper degree of accountability and responsibility in connection
with the local decision making. At one extreme is the position
that the Revenue Sharing funds should be identical to other
sources of local revenue. Therefore, the federal government
should merely distribute checks in the appropriate amount with
no further requirements or restrictions on the recipient govern-
ments since state and local laws, practices and procedures are
adequate to insure the appropriate expenditure of the money. At
the other extreme are advocates of rigorous accounting guide-
lines, reporting requirements and evalution procedures. While
the decisions on specific items of expenditures should be made by
state and local officials rather than through the application-re-
view process within the federal bureaucracy, the federal govern-
ment arguably must insure adequate review, evaluation and com-
pliance through the imposition of stringent controls over the
expenditure process. The Act attempts to steer a middle course
between these extremes through a scheme which seeks to insure
306. There is a provision permitting delegation of the responsibili-
ties to officials of other departments or agencies of the federal govern-
ment. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32(g).
307. Senator Russell Long unequivocally stated the philosophy of
Revenue Sharing:
The accountability, in the last analysis, should be to the people
in those communities rather than to the Treasury Department,
or a committee of Congress .... The main thing we wanted
was that the people should know what their money went for,
because the people of each community will be far better police-
men on the expenditure of their money than any committee of
Congress would be . .. [W]e are delegating accountability to
local people.
118 CONG. REC. § 14291 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1972) (remarks of Senator
Long).
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accountability and responsibility to the local citizens rather than
to the federal bureaucracy. It uses reporting requirements cal-
culated to fully inform citizens concerning the decision making
process so that they are in a position to exercise their formal
and informal remedies under the local system of democracy.
This view reflects the realization that effective federal review of
the expenditures of 39,000 governmental units, having a wide
diversity of characteristics and procedures, would be extremely
inefficient and expensive.
The traditional approach of federal grants is represented by
the categorical grant process of extensive detailed applications,
substantial federal auditing staffs and regional offices to moni-
tor performance and compliance. Regarding an informed pub-
lic&08 as crucial not only to the quality of the decision making
but also to insure compliance with the statutory restrictions is a
revolutionary concept in the area of federal grants. However,
rePance on local accountability and responsibility is basic to the
loi,;-term success of Revenue Sharing, whether General or Spe-
cal. Although state and local officials have argued that local
decision making is always responsive to local needs and ac-
countable to the people, requiring no additional federal rules,
regulations or guidelines, Congress has required certain mini-
mum standards of disclosure and procedural safeguards with
respect to Revenue Sharing funds in order to insure a high qual-
ity of decision making.30 9 The requirements are a response to
a frequently voiced concern that the taxing function should not
be separated from the spending function since it is the public
reaction to the former which acts as a constraint on the latter.
Revenue Sharing requires informing the public that it is an ef-
fective participant in the decision making and compliance proc-
ess, since with respect to these federally collected funds neither
the Congress nor the federal bureaucracy exercises any substan-
tial review or restraint.3 10
308. See id.
309. See id. (remarks of Senator Bennett) ("[W]e have built into
this bill an effective, if unusual method of controlling the actual expendi-
ture of these funds at the local leveL").
310. See GENEmAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 16 ('This re-
quirement was provided in large measure because the Congress be-
lieves that full disclosure to the local citizenry in advance as to how it
is proposed to spend the funds as well as how the funds are actually
spent will help to ensure that the funds are spent wisely.").
One of the few precedents in this area is the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act which reflected an emphasis on community action and
maximum feasible participation as a method for ending poverty. The
impact of this approach has been summarized as follows:
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The basic framework provided in the Act to achieve the de-
sired local accountability and responsibility is as follows:
1. Budgetary Procedures: Funds must be expended only in
accordance with the state or local laws and procedures
applicable to the expenditure of the recipient government's
own revenues.
311
2. Reporting: Reports on planned and actual use of the funds
must be filed with the Department of Treasury and pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation within the
geographic area of the recipient government."12 Such an-
nual and interim reports as are reasonably required must
be filed with the Treasury."1'
While the planners of the Act might have supposed origi-
nally that organized pressure by the poor could be accommo-
dated by the system-as the system had accommodated so
many interest groups---and conversely, that the organized poor
would for this purpose abide by the rules of the game, the real-
ity from the point of view of community organization was quite
different. Community action based upon maximum participa-
tion was more than a tactful concept. It was the release of a
potentially great force, namely, territorially organized citizen
power. No other interest group has that "sovereign" base.
Thus, organizations based on this principle were quite extra-
ordinary compared to the normal varieties of interest groups
which pressure the government. It soon appeared to the gov-
ernment not that the poor would willfully break the rules of
pressure politics, but that the government had endorsed a
principle of organization that itself transcended the character
of interest group politics.
The Politics of Community Economic Development, 36 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 3 (1971).
311. ACT § 123(a) (4), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(a) (4) (1973).
312. ACT § 121, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1241 (1973). Many of the civil rights
groups were concerned that the requirement in § 121 (c) of the Act for
publication in a newspaper which has "general circulation within the
geographic area of that government" will not adequately inform mi-
nority groups. See, e-g., Letter from Stephen Horn, supra note 178:
Because minorities have traditionally failed to receive Fed-
eral assistance in the same quality and quantity as non-minor-
ities and because the brunt of negative effects of Federal pro-jects has frequently been disproportionately borne by minority
citizens, it is essential that they receive full information about
activities funded by Revenue Sharing.
Federal agencies are beginning to recognize that too often a
newspaper with wide circulation will not adequately reach
minorities....
H.U.D., in its affirmative marketing regulations, strongly
suggests that builders and developers publicize the availability
of housing opportunities "through the type of media customa-
rilyutilized by the applicant, including minority publications.
The Revenue Sharing Act's implementing regulations
should therefore define "general circulation" to include both
minority and majority groups and indicate that publication
in the minority press is an essential means of meeting the goal
of general circulation.
As a result, Final Regulations, supra note 106, provide that in addition
to advising the general news media, recipient governments must advise
minority and bilingual news media.
313. ACT § 123(a) (5) (c), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(a) (5) (c) (1973).
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3. Audits: Audits, evaluations and reviews will be conducted
by the Secretary of the Treasury and Comptroller General
to evaluate compliance and operations.3 14
b. Budgetary Procedures
The requirement that the Revenue Sharing funds be ex-
pended in accordance with state and local laws and procedures
applicable to expenditure of the recipient government's own
revenues should not be an onerous provision. The provision was
added in the Senate Finance Committee to assure the Senators
from certain southern states that the sizable Revenue Sharing
grants would not become a "slush fund" for the governor to use
at his discretion for "special" projects.31, While state law prob-
ably would have been an adequate safeguard, the Senate report
indicated that the provision was "intended to assure that the ex-
penditures of the Revenue Sharing funds are provided for not
only by the executive but also by the legislative branch of the
governmental unit as well"316
The question raised by this provision is whether funds may
be added to the general fund of the state or locality and proc-
essed through the legislative process as merely a line item in
the budget, or whether the Revenue Sharing funds must be
treated as a separate and distinct budgetary item and acted
upon as a unique matter. It is probably in keeping with the
overall philosophy of this requirement that the Revenue Sharing
funds be the subject of a separate budgetary determination.3 17
314. AcT § 123(c), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(c) (1973). The General Ac-
counting Office is conducting an initial survey of the 50 state govern-
ments, with the objective of presenting a report to Congress in July,
1973. The survey will include an investigation of the extent to which
the various restrictions in the Act influenced the states' decisions on
the use of the Revenue Sharing funds, with particular emphasis on the
prohibition on the use for matching purposes. Further, inquiries will
be made as to the equity of the distribution formulas and any adjust-
ments in existing fiscal relationships between state and local govern-
ments.
315. See 118 CONG. REc. § 14392 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Long).
316. SNTEA REPoRT, supra note 9, at 37.
317. An interesting aspect of this provision is highlighted by a
proposal in New York State to ostensibly use the funds for every item
in the budget on a percentage basis-i.e., Revenue Sharing will be
used for 3 percent of every item in the budget. This seems to be a
rather ill-advised determination by state officials since it subjects every
item aid activity in the budget to the additional restrictions, limita-
tions and requirements of the Act and the regulations thereunder.
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c. Reporting
1) Legislative Provisions
The reporting requirements in the Act provide for informa-
tion flow to the federal government and to the local public. The
following "reports" are required to provide information to the
Treasury: (1) Assurances of Future Action (§ 123(a)), (2)
Planned Use Reports (§ 121(b)), 3 1 1 (3) Actual Use Reports
(§ 121(a)), (4) Other Required Annual and Interim Reports
(§ 123(a) (5) (3)), and (5) Compliance Evaluations and Reviews
(§ 123(c) (1)). To insure adequate information at the local
level, expenditure of funds must be in accordance with the laws
and procedures applicable to the expenditure of the recipient's
own revenues (§ 123 (a) (4)). Additional requirements are Pub-
lication and Publicity of Planned Use Reports (§ 121 (b) and
(3)), Publication and Publicity319 of Actual Use Reports (§
121 (a) and (3)), and Other Required Annual and Interim Re-
ports (§ 123 (a) (5) (c)). The nature and specific requirements
of these reports will be determined by the Treasury.
2) Objectives
The information system should be structured to achieve sev-
eral broad categories of objectives. It should encourage local
public participation and local accountability and responsibility,
while deterring questionable practices and fraud through dis-
closure. The number of federal audits should be kept at a min-
imum by providing a factual basis for the Treasury to deter-
mine prima facie compliance. Performance and compliance un-
der the program should be documented to Congress and the na-
tional media. The information system can provide a technical
data base for in-depth performance evaluation by administra-
tive agencies and independent research entities. However, the
overriding administrative restraint on the reporting system is
the President's statements that: 32
0
318. Congress has clearly indicated that as the planned use of the
funds is changed, supplements or amendments to the planned use report
must be filed and published. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 37; GEN-
ERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 46.
319. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 45 ("This provision
is included in order to facilitate the public scrutiny-by the citizenry as
well as by the Congress and the Treasury Department-of the uses to
which funds provided by the Act, are to be put and the extent to which
the planned uses are carried out.") (emphasis added).
320. 4 NAT'L J. 1911 (1972). However, John D. Ehrlichman, for-
merly Assistant to the President, has been quoted as stating "[w]ithout
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[He is] determined to keep red tape out of this program. States
and cities will not have to worry about filing complicated plans,
filling out endless forms, meeting lots of administrative regu-
lations or submitting to all sorts of bureaucratic controls. When
we say no strings we mean no strings.
3) Some Observations on the Information Requirements
Although the transmission of information to the federal gov-
ernment is less important than transmission to the local level,
every recipient government should provide the federal govern-
ment some information as to the use of the funds to form a ba-
sis, however slight, for a presumption of compliance.3 2 1 The
legislative history indicates that these reports should at least
"provide both information on dollar expenditures by purpose
and information on the additional employees and capital equip-
ment that the funds were used for."32 2 Section 123(a) requires
"assurances" documentation solely to provide a basis for admin-
istrative action against noncompliance with the requirements
of the Act. Such requirements include the spending restriction
on all but the high priority categories, the prohibition against
matching, and the requirement of paying Davis-Bacon wage
rates. Section 123(a) does not require a state government or
unit of local government to assure the Secretary of the Treasury
that it will comply with the prohibition on discrimination in
Section 122 (a). However, the Secretary of the Treasury has re-
quired such an assurance -3 23 pursuant to his broad regulatory
power under Section 142 (a), providing that the "Secretary shall
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title."
The Planned Use Report generally must be filed prior to the
beginning of an Entitlement Period.32 4 The level of planning as
strict program evaluation and audit, general revenue sharing could find
itself in real trouble very early in the history of the program." J.
Haber, Revenue-Sharing Report/Ehrlichman promises audits, strict eval-
uation of local program, 5 NAT'L J. 234 (1973).
321. GENERAL ExPLAxATON, supra note 63, at 44 ("In part the pur-
pose of these reports is to indicate to Congress whether the discretion
left with the States and localities as to the purpose for which the Act's
funds are to be spent has led to misuse of the funds."); see SENATE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 34.
322. GENmEAL EXPLAxATON, supra note 63, at 16; see SENATE RE-
PoRT, supra note 9, at 34.
323. See Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.32 (c).
324. AcT § 121(b), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(b) (1973). However, due to
the tremendous time pressures Treasury did not promulgate a Planned
Use Report form which would allow filings prior to the Entitlement
Period beginning January 1, 1973. The form for that period must be
filed by June 23, 1973.
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of the Report's filing date should be accepted. Thus, executive
proposals (by governors, mayors or chairmen) may be accepted
if the legislative body (state legislature, town council or county
supervisors) has not acted as of the filing date.325 The Report 20
requires information on the amount of planned expenditures for
operating and maintenance expenses in each of the priority cate-
gories set forth in Section 103 (a) of the Act with a percentage
breakdown in each category between maintenance of existing
services and new or expanded services. Further requirements
include disclosure by category of planned capital expenditures,
with a percentage determination for equipment purchases, land
acquisition, construction and debt retirement. The report form
presents a series of questions in order to determine whether the
Revenue Sharing funds are expected to have an effect on tax
levels in the form of a rate reduction of a major tax, the avoid-
ance of enaction of a new major tax or of a rate increase in a
major tax, or the reduction in the rate increase of a major tax.
Whether amendments or supplements to the plans should
be required as the decision making process proceeds is an im-
portant issue. The legislative history indicates that Congress
expected recipients to periodically update the information sub-
mitted on the Planned Use Report, thereby facilitating public,
congressional and Treasury Department comparisons with the
Actual Use Reports to determine the extent to which the planned
uses are carried out.3 27 However, the Treasury Department has
indicated that no amendments to the Planned Use Reports will
be required.3
28
325. Instruction A to the Planned Use Report provides:
This report may be based on:
-Budgetary action on the part of your government; or
-Executive proposals made as the basis for future legislative
or budgetary action.(This option is intended for use by those governments which,
due to the timing of their normal fiscal planning procedures,
will not have considered the use of Revenue Sharing funds un-
til after the due date of this report .... ).
326. The Planned Use Report forms for the entitlement period
January-June 1973 must be returned to the Department of the Treasury
by June 20, 1973.
327. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 37; GENERAL EXPLANATION,
supra note 63, at 46 ("It is expected that those regulations [Treasury
regulations] will require the State or local government to periodically
update the information it submits as to its intended uses for the
funds.").
328. Treas. Press Release, Planned-Use Reports Mailed Out, April
18, 1973 (" 'The Treasury Department will continue to stress the im-
portance of this local process and will not ask for updates to these
reports when local plans are changed,' Watt said.").
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Except for the initial report, there appears to be no policy
justification for requiring the filing of the Planned Use Report
with the Treasury. The submission of a Planned Use Report to
the federal bureaucracy is uncomfortably close to the categori-
cal grant scheme of application and review of grants. However,
the provision as enacted was the only acceptable alternative to
a proposal strongly advocated in the Senate Finance Committee
that the plan for use of the funds be made subject to a popular
referendum at both the state and local levels. Although the
Nixon Administration strongly supported the concept of public
disclosure of the planned use of the funds in order to encourage
effective public participation in the decision making process, it
strenuously opposed this filing requirement. Dr. Charls
Walker, Deputy. Secretary of the Treasury, advised the Senate
Finance Committee that the Treasury was opposed to the re-
quirement and intended to file the Planned Use Reports in the
Treasury basement without substantive review. During the ini-
tial period, however, these Planned Use Reports may have some
purely informational value to the Treasury as an indicator of
the initial response to a significant infusion of money.
The Actual Use Report is in a different category from the
Planned Use Report since the Treasury has a strong interest
in utilizing this Report as an information gathering device to
perform its functions under the Act, including its obligation to
report to the Congress. 329 The Report requires the same general
type of information as the Planned Use Report on the actual
use of the funds. It also requires information on the amount of
any surplus or deficit for the fiscal year. The Interim Regula-
tions provided that the report on actual use of the Revenue
Sharing funds received for the Entitlement Periods January 1
to June 30, 1972 and July I to December 31, 1972 need not be filed,
nor presumably published locally, until March 1, 1974.330 Thus,
there would be no required disclosure of fund usage until nearly
15 months after the first check was received. The Final Reg-
ulations which apply to Entitlement Periods commencing on
or after January 1, 1973 provide that the Actual Use Report must
be filed annually on or before September 1 and must provide a
"status of fund" report as of June 30 of each year.3 31  The
"status of fund" report discloses the amounts and purposes for
329. See AcT §§ 105 (a) (2) and 123 (c) (1), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1224 (a)
(2) and 1243 (c) (1).
330. Interim Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.10 (b).
331. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.11(b).
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which funds have been spent or otherwise transferred from the
trust fund during the reporting period. As a result of the
"status of fund" format utilized by the Actual Use Report, it
will be impossible to associate particular expenditures with
funds received for a particular Entitlement Period. Accord-
ingly, it will be impossible in most circumstances for the Treas-
ury or local citizens to ascertain whether funds have in fact been
spent in accordance with the published Planned Use Report.
This is contrary to the expressed desires of the Senators on the
Senate Finance Committee who insisted on the Planned Use
Report, and it significantly weakens the public participation role
of the Planned Use Report.
The extensive practical problems in the area of effective in-
formation disclosure at the local level are best illustrated by
the difficulties of "real use" reporting. The existing public ac-
counting systems are understandably not structured to link a
particular use of funds with the source of those funds. For
example, a municipality receiving Revenue Sharing funds may
ostensibly use those funds to purchase a fire truck, while the
funds previously intended for the truck were in fact used to in-
crease the budget for teachers' salaries. Displacement of funds
could effectively reduce or eliminate public disclosure of the
"real" use of the funds. The purchase of a fire truck may be
noncontroversial, but utilization of the funds for increased teach-
ers' salaries may be of significant interest to various public in-
terest groups. Therefore, if it is impractical to impose account-
ing guidelines to insure disclosure of "real use," the underlying
philosophy of reliance on an informed public as a substantive
participant in Revenue Sharing must be questioned.
The "trend analysis" argument recognizes that local citizens
should not be concerned with the specific application of funds
from any specific source. The argument postulates that local citi-
zens should rather inquire as to the contribution of Revenue Shar-
ing funds to shifts in emphasis and quality of services over a
period of time. The local reporting requirements should be struc-
tured to disclose the data necessary for such a trend analysis. It is
not sufficient merely to provide the detailed budgets for a number
of years. Rather, the figures must be presented in a manner
which is readily comprehensible and facilitates this type of analy-
sis by the layman. Obviously, this implies reporting by category
of expenditures on a comparable basis from one period to the next.
For example, a comparison of the percentage of total expendi-
tures for categories of operating functions such as police protec-
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tion, fire protection, education, health, or social services, with
subcategories for personal compensation and administrative
costs would provide a possible basis for analyzing the shifts of
priorities in the delivery of services. Some difficult technical
questions are involved concerning the definitions for categories
of functions, but this problem is susceptible to solution.
The critical objection to this approach is that it may impose
significant additional accounting requirements for areas of the
budget which are not involved in Revenue Sharing. However,
the Treasury is mandated to "provide for such accounting and
auditing procedures, evaluations and reviews as may be neces-
sary to insure that the expenditures of funds ... comply fully
with the requirements of this chapter. ' 332  Arguably, the only
method by which the Treasury could insure full compliance is
to require identifiable source and application of funds account-
ing-and reporting. Therefore, given the fundamental nature of
the need for local information on the actual use of the funds,
it is not feasible to accept the existing local accounting proce-
dures if they do not provide the necessary information.
If the Mathews v. Massell33 3 decision is followed in other
jurisdictions and strictly interpreted to subject all displaced
funds to the restrictions and limitations of the Act, recipient gov-
ernments would be forced to adopt some form of source and ap-
plication of funds accounting and reporting. It would seem ad-
visable for recipient governments to urge the Treasury to adopt
effective reporting requirements to deal with the displacement
problem in order to strengthen their position in future litiga-
tion.
The basic problem in designing reporting forms is achieving
the many intended objectives. Since the information require-
ments of the Treasury are significantly less exacting than those
332. AcT § 123(c) (1), 31 U.S.C. § 1243(c) (1) (emphasis added).
333. 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
One final argument by defendants is that § 103(a) has
no effect because it is so difficult to enforce. They draw sup-
port for this argument from the Senate report on the Senate
version of the bill, in which the committee justified the Senate's
deletion of the restrictions on a local government's use of the
funds by the argument that enforcement of the restrictions
would be impossible and that therefore any restrictions would
be illusory. And facially this argument is persuasive, but, as
noted above, it was in effect overruled by the action of the
House-Senate conference and by the passage of the Act in its
present form by both houses of Congress. Moreover, the Act
itself provides an enforcement mechanism by requiring the
Secretary of the Treasury to establish accounting and auditing
procedures (§ 123(c) ) and also by providing for imposition of
a penalty if funds are spent in violation of § 103 (a).
Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).
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of the local public and press, a separate federal reporting form
should be designed to meet the minimum information needs of
the Treasury, the Congress and the national press. But some
additional vehicle should be utilized to facilitate information
flow at the local level, insuring adequate information for local
monitoring of the decision making and compliance review proc-
ess. The design of such an additional vehicle for information
flow at the local level requires a preliminary consideration of
the auditing and accounting requirements of the Act and its
Regulations.
d. Auditing and Accounting
The basic mandate of the Act is that "the Secretary shall
provide for such accounting and auditing procedures, evalua-
tions, and reviews as may be necessary to insure that the ex-
penditures of funds . . .comply fully with the requirements of
[the Act] ."334 A program which utilizes the surveillance of an
informed local electorate and press to initially establish compli-
ance, combined with effective local disclosure requirements is
considered the most responsible performance under the Act. Ac-
cordingly, the Treasury should not attempt to initiate its own
compliance audits of any significant number of recipients. This
approach would initially rely on local publicity and remedies to
compel compliance. If this initial level of compliance effort is
not effective, complaints to the Treasury could then be used as
the basis for further enforcement activity, including audits.
There simply is no efficient method by which the Treasury
can audit approximaely 39,000 recipient units. The Treasury's
much publicized statement that its proposed staff of 25 auditors
could perform 300 audits a year, including each of the 50 states
and 50 largest cities, representing two-thirds of the aggregate
funds, was simply wishful thinking.3" 5 It is doubtful that a
334. AcT § 123(c) (1), 31 U.S.C. § 1243(c) (1).
335. See Department of Treasury, What General Revenue Sharing
Is All About 14-15 (1972). In an address to the National Association of
Minority Certified Public Accounting Firms in Washington, D.C., on
May 4, 1973, Graham W. Watt, Director of the Office of Revenue Shar-
ing, stated that compliance reviews were planned of the 100 recipients
of the largest amounts of Revenue Sharing funds (which receive more
than 50% of the funds). The audit teams will be composed of one
Office of Revenue Sharing staff member and one auditor borrowed from
another federal department. According to Mr. Watt, the compliance re-
view by this two-member team will include review of compliance with
the non-discrimination provision in Section 122 of the Act. See Treas.
Press Release, Compliance Check -on Revenue Sharing Funds to Begin
May 9, May 4, 1973.
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staff of 25 federal auditors could properly perform an in-depth
audit of more than California, New York State and New York
City in any one year.
The Treasury intends to rely as much as possible on state-
conducted audits or independent certified public accountants'
audits of the localities,33 6 but to effectively implement such a
system would require detailed accounting guidelines in order to
form the basis for a certification by the auditing entity.337 The
Regulations provide that audits must be performed in accord-
ance with generally accepted auditing standards and encourage
the use of the Standards for Audit of Governmental Organiza-
tions, Programs, Activities and Functions issued by the Comp-
troller General in June, 1972.338 For many localities in this
country which are not now subject to a regular state or C.P.A.
audit, the expense of obtaining such an audit could be substan-
tial in relation to the amount of Revenue Sharing funds re-
ceived.339 The scope of audit contemplated by the encouraged
Standards far exceeds the usual governmental financial report-
ing:
The Audit standards [of the Comptroller General] are a set
of criteria that call for an audit of a much broader scope than
336. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.41(c); see SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 38-39 ("The Treasury Department has indicated
to the committee an intention to rely on State audits to a significant ex-
tent. The committee intends to encourage such reliance upon the ac-
tions of State officials, to the extent consistent with the purposes of
this bill. However, if the Treasury Department wishes, it may also
make use of private audits.").
337. See Staats, Auditing the Federal Funds, 55 PuBLic MANAGE-
wM 5, 6 (1973).
The Department of the Treasury has indicated that to a great
extent it plans to rely on the staffs of stat% county and munici-
pal audit organizations and independent public accountants to
audit the revenue sharing funds that are received by the state
and local governments. Before accepting the work of these
auditors, the Secretary of the Treasury must determine that the
audit and the audit procedures are sufficiently reliable to ful-
fill the Secretary's own audit responsibilities under the act.
We will be interested especially in the guidance that the Sec-
retary of the Treasury gives to other orgnizations that audit
expenditures made with revenue sharing funds and the manner
in which Treasury satisfies itself that these audits are ade-
quately and competently conducted.
Id,
338. Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.41 (c) (1).
339. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, has
expressed serious reservations about the Treasury's reliance on state and
C.P.JA audits because of insufficient audit resources, the inexperience
of auditors in assessing management, administration and results of a
program or activity, and the generally inadequate records at the local
level. Staats, supra note 337, at 7.
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the traditional, financially-oriented, governmental audit. In ad-
dition to requiring a review of compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, the standards specify that the audit should
include reviews of efficiency and economy in the use of re-
sources and of the effectiveness of the results of the program or
activity under review. The standards also are quite demand-
ing as to staff competence, independence, and the requirement
for professional proficiency.340
In general, C.P.A. firms do not perform effectiveness and effi-
ciency audits. 341 Therefore, state conducted audits and C.P.A.
audits will not provide an effective basis for nationwide satis-
faction of the audit requirements under the Act.
The Conference Report dearly indicates that Revenue Shar.
ing was not intended as the vehicle to impose major uniform
accounting changes on states and localities. 3' 2 In general, re-
cipient governments were to use the same fiscal, accounting
and internal reporting procedures relative to Revenue Sharing
funds as they used with respect to expenditures from revenues
derived from their own sources. 3' 3 However, it was recognized
that the existing accounting systems would not always be suffi-
cient to meet the disclosure objectives of the Act.
The accounting burdens posed by the restrictions on cate-
gories of expenditures and the prohibition on matching were
recognized during the legislative process. The Conference Re-
port indicates that Sections 104 (e) and 103 (b) of the Act were
added to authorize the Treasury to accept a certificate of compli-
340. Staats, supra note 337, at 6.
341. See Letter from Ernst & Ernst to Graham Watt, Mar. 19, 1973
("The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has suggested
that certified public accountants should not perform these types of
audits [GAO effectiveness and efficiency audits] until useful quantita-
tive units of measure are agreed upon in advance or are inherent in
the subject matter under examination.").
342. Conference Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-1450, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
343. This is based on the following language in the Conference Re-
port added at the Treasury's insistence:
The committee of conference expects that, insofar as possible,
guidelines established by the Secretary of the Treasury with
respect to fiscal, accounting, and audit procedures ... will per-
mit State and local governments to use the fiscal, accounting,
and audit procedures used by them with respect to expendi-
tures made from revenues derived from their own sources.
Id.
The Final Regulations have altered this concept by providing,
"The accounting for entitlement funds shall at a minimum employ the
same fiscal accounting and internal audit procedures as are used with
respect to expenditures from revenues derived from the recipient gov-
ernment's own sources."
Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.40 (d) (emphasis added).
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ance as fulfillment of the audit and compliance requirement with
respect to these restrictions, unless the Treasury has reason to
believe that a particular certificate is not sufficiently reliable
to enable the Treasury to carry out its duties under the Act.3 44
These sections were added in direct response to a request of Dr.
Charls Walker, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, based on his
explanation of the major accounting problems posed by the
prohibition on indirect matching. Thus, despite earlier indica-
tions in the House Report and Senate Report concerning report-
ing requirements with respect to matching, Congress clearly in-
tended to avoid the imposition of any additional accounting bur-
dens, relying on the certification as prima facie evidence of com-
pliance.
Under the Final Regulations recipients must maintain sep-
arate fiscal accounts in such a manner as to (1) permit the
reports required by the Treasury to be prepared therefrom, (2)
permit the tracing of Revenue Sharing funds to a level of ex-
penditure adequate to establish that such funds have not been
used in violation of the restrictions and prohibitions of the Act,
and (3) document compliance with the matching funds certifi-
cation 34 5 The Regulations in this regard are consistent with
the Act and the legislative history. The Treasury has effec-
tively notified the recipient governments that although the cer-
tification would be accepted as evidence of prima facie compli-
ance, the burden is on the recipient governments to document
compliance if there is reason to believe that the certification is
not accurate. Category (2) above may prove to be a major
latent problem for recipient governments since maintenance of
fiscal accounts to support a presumption of compliance with the
nondiscrimination, prevailing wage and Davis-Bacon Act pro-
visions will require a high degree of detail and specificity. For
example, it might not suffice to indicate expenditures for "street
repairs" or "street lights" without detailing their location, since
a limitation to white neighborhoods may be discriminatory. Sim-
ilarly, expenditures for hiring new employees would require doc-
umentation identifying employees hired and the conditions of
their employment to support compliance with both the non-
discrimination and prevailing wage requirements. Surveillance
by local organized labor and minority groups could render this
requirement a major burden.
344. Conference Report, supra note 342.
345. Fina Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.40 (d).
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
e. A Recommendation
Recipient governments ultimately must either disclose more
information at the local level or increase their reporting to the
federal government and cope with a significant federal audit
effort. The only solution to the need for local information
which avoids burdensome reporting to the federal bureaucracy
and preserves a presumption of local compliance so as to avoid
unnecessary federal auditing is a local disclosure booklet con-
sisting of a detailed standardized questionnaire and data sheet
designed to provide adequate information on the decision mak-
ing process, highlighting instances of noncompliance.340 The
information should be maintained at the state and local level
for public inspection and review, maximizing the information
flow to the local citizens while minimizing the flow to the fed-
eral government. State and local officials oppose additional dis-
closure requirements, contending that their existing laws and
procedures provide adequate public access to all local records
and documents. However, the information must be readily
available and comprehensible to the ordinary citizen,34 7 lending
itself to an analysis of the performance and compliance criteria
established by Congress and the Treasury. Access to massive
records and documents, without assistance and guidance for
interpretation, does not meaningfully encourage general public
participation in the decision making and compliance review proc-
ess.
The disclosure booklet should set forth the planned and ac-
tual use of funds in a specific and detailed manner. In addition
to the broad categories of use established in the Planned and
Actual Use Report, e.g., Public Safety, the specific use must be
346. The Final Regulations provide the following limited require-
ments with respect to public inspection:
Each recipient government shall make available for pub-
lic inspection a copy of each of the reports required under
§ 51.11(a) and (b) [the Planned and Actual Use Reports] and
information as necessary to support the information and data
submitted on each of those reports.
Final Regulations, supra note 106, § 51.13(c) (emphasis added). Due to
the limited information required on the Planned and Actual Use Report,
this provision does not adequately provide for support documentation
on compliance with the provision of Davis-Bacon, prevailing wage
and non-discrimination; nor does it require detailed information as to
the specific use of the funds within the categories set forth in Section
103.
347. See 118 CONG. REc. § 14392 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Long) ("We require that they put it on a standard form so
it would be intelligible .... ").
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disclosed, e.g., two police cars. Other items of information
which should be available regarding Revenue Sharing funds in-
clude (1) the number of additional employees and wage rates
of such employees, (2) the specified recipients of any salary in-
creases and the magnitude of those increases, (3) copies of all
executive, administrative and legislative actions dealing with the
planned or actual expenditure of Revenue Sharing funds, (4)
the amount of any tax reduction directly or indirectly attribu-
table to Revenue Sharing funds, (5) comparative expenditure
patterns for major functions over the past three years, with a
trend analysis presentation indicating the extent to which vari-
ations are attributed to the Revenue Sharing funds by local of-
ficials, (6) data revealing compliance with the matching restric-
tion., together with the aggregate amount of all transfer pay-
ments received during the period, 48 (7) opinions of municipal
counsel indicating that the Revenue Sharing expenditures com-
plied with the requirements of the Act, and (8) additional de-
tailed information to indicate compliance with the nondiscrimi-
nation, Davis-Bacon wage rate and prevailing wage provisions.
IV. POLICY ISSUES FOR FUTURE STUDY
The following discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive
treatment of the many complex policy issues presented by Rev-
enue Sharing. Rather, it has the limited purpose of suggesting
areas for further investigation.
A. REDISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE
Revenue Sharing has been criticized because it fails to re-
distribute revenue sources 349-"the rich get richer and the poor
get poorer." Documentation for this criticism has been found
in the following table which indicates relatively lower per cap-
ita grants to many of the states with lower per capita incomes.
The counter-arguments are several. First, redistribution of rev-
enue -sources was not one of the justifications for and objec-
tives of Revenue Sharing as it was advocated by the Nixon Ad-
348. This would be for the purpose of assisting citizens in evaluat-
ing the efficiency of the local government in delivering services for
the locally exacted tax dollar, since only by knowing the other revenue
sources is it possible to evaluate the overall performance.
349. See Armstrong, A Better Way to Pay for Schools, FoRzuxN
MAGAZnIN, Feb. 1973, at 160; HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 60, at 121-25
(dissenting views of Congressman Gibbons); Reischauer, Revenue Shar-
ing: Matching the Money and the Needs, Washington Post, May 11,
1972, § A, at 22, col 3.
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ministration, Chairman Wilbur Mills or Chairman Russell
Long. 350 Second, a comparison based on relative per capita in-
comes is inadequate in its failure to adjust for significant cost
differentials in many of the states. Third, the redistribution
analysis should be considered in terms of the respective costs
and benefits when viewed in terms of financing the program
through the federal individual income tax.
Per
Capita
Income Rank'
(Thirds)
Alabama 3
Alaska 1
Arizona 2
Arkansas 3
California 1
Colorado 1
Connecticut 1
Delaware 1
District of Columbia 1
Florida 2
Georgia 2
Hawaii 1
Idaho 3
Illinois 1
Indiana 2
Iowa 2
Kansas 2
Kentucky 3
Louisiana 3
Maine 3
Maryland 1
Massachusetts 1
Michigan 1
Minnesota 2
Mississippi 3
Missouri 2
Montana 3
Nebraska 2
Nevada 1
New Hampshire 2
New Jersey 1
New Mexico 3
New York 1
North Carolina 3
Percentage
of
Initial
Revenue
Sharing
Payments 2
1.71
.11
.91
1.03
10.59
1.03
1.27
.30
.45
2.77
2.07
.45
.40
5.16
2.15
1.43
.98
1.64
2.32
.58
2.02
3.12
4.24
2.00
1.67
1.85
.38
.73
.22
.31
3.15
.59
11.13
2.57
Percentage
of
Federal
Individual
Income
Taxes Paid
by Residents 3
1.04
.17
.72
.52
10.83
.96
2.38
.34
.44
3.05
1.78
.40
.22
7.08
2.51
1.14
.92
1.08
1.21
.36
2.36
3.27
5.03
1.65
.47
2.13
.26
.61
.35
.33
4.50
.32
11.34
1.73
350. In the opinion of Messrs. Heller and Pechman redistribution
of income was the major philosophical justification for Revenue Shar-
ing. Hearings on S.1770 and S.241 Before the Subcomm. on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1971); Statement of Joseph A. Pechman, id.
at 91: "The basic purpose of revenue sharing is to provide supplemen-
tary financial assistance to states and local governments with fiscal
capacity impaired by low incomes."
Per Capita
Initial
Revenue
Sharing
Payments
Annualized'
26.86
22.37
28.65
28.90
28.42
25.02
22.49
29.65
32.04
21.99
24.40
31.64
30.52
24.96
22.13
27.06
23.58
27.52
34.37
31.73
27.64
29.33
25.56
28.24
40.94
21.18
30.06
26.50
23.86
22.96
23.51
33.07
32.76
27.41
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North Dakota 3 .41 .18 36.33
Ohio 1 4.04 5.75 20.29
Oklahoma 3 1.11 .93 23.58
Oregon 2 1.00 .95 25.78
Pennsylvania 1 5.24 5.98 23.82
Rhode Island 2 .46 .45 26.25
South Carolina 3 1.36 .76 28.58
South Dakota 3 .45 .19 36.46
Tennessee 3 1.87 1.41 25.76
Texas 2 4.69 4.79 22.56
Utah 3 .57 .35 28.84
Vermont 2 .27 .17 33.56
Virginia 2 2.01 2.08 23.40
Washington 1 1.47 1.78 23.26
West Virginia 3 .98 .61 30.55
Wisconsin 2 2.51 1.97 30.52
Wyoming 2 .19 .14 30.40
1 Source: Bureau of the Census, Decennial Census (1970).
2 Source: Data Elements-Entitlement Period I, Department of the
Treasury (1972). The figures represent the aggregate pay-
ment to the state area-allocation to state government plus
aggregate allocations to all units of local goyernment.
3 Source: Internal Revenue Service, Master File tabulations.
4 Source: Initial grant data is from Department of the Treasury, Ini-
tial Payment-Entitlement Period I, Department of the Treas-
ury (1972). The figures reflect the aggregate payment to
the state area. Population data is from Bureau of Census,
Decennial Census (1970).
The Table indicates that every state ranking in the lower
one-third by per capita income receives a higher percentage of
the initial Revenue Sharing payments than the percentage of
federal individual income taxes paid by its residents. The sig-
nificance of the redistribution can be observed by comparing
Mississippi and Louisiana with Connecticut and Illinois. With
the exception of Colorado and Hawaii, every state in the top
one-third of per capita income receives a lower percentage of
the initial Revenue Sharing payments than the percentage of
federal individual income taxes paid by its residents.
However, a complete consideration of redistribution requires
an analysis of the broad range of alternative costs and foregone
opportunities associated with Revenue Sharing. Analyzing ben-
efit distribution alone or compared only to the cost distribution
of the federal individual income tax neglects alternative possi-
bilities for financing Revenue Sharing such as a personal income
tax surcharge or a categorical grant substitution. 35' For ex-
351. See NATIONAL Psmoms-1972, supra note 70, at 135-36:
Revenue sharing is but one of several possible ways of
strengthening the fiscal position of State and local governments.
One alternative would be to increase federal funding for ex-
isting categorical aid programs; another would be for the fed-
eral government to assume one or more major functions now
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ample, although Walter Heller initially believed Revenue Shar-
ing more desirable than a reduction in federal income taxes,
President Nixon's recent budget message suggests that Revenue
Sharing is partially financed by reductions and foregone in-
creases in categorical grant programs. A meaningful analysis
thus requires comparing the geographic distributions8 5 2 of these
alternative costs with the distribution of Revenue Sharing bene-
fits.353
Effective discussion of redistribution requires an analysis of
cost and benefit distribution not only geographically but by in-
come class. Determining the income levels of the ultimate in-
dividual beneficiaries would require a detailed study of the Rev-
enue Sharing expenditure decisions by states and localities. For
example, in a poor rural state the budgetary decision making
process at the local level may result in using significant
amounts of the funds to benefit a few wealthy individuals, while
the states with higher average aggregate income levels may in
fact siphon the funds into benefits for the urban poor.
financed by State and local governments .... Federalization
of the welfare system would similarly relieve state and local
governments of a major burden for support of the poor. The
federal government could also make it easier for state and
local governments to increase their taxes. It could reduce its
own taxes on particular items, leaving those potential tax
sources to State and local governments...
352. See SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 218.
Within these totals [of federal aid to regions], however, an
important qualitative shift is taking place-the increasing
emphasis on urban areas. The American population is becom-
ing increasingly urban; today, about 70% of the population
lives in the 269 standard metropolitan statistical areas(SMSA's). SMSA's include the bulk of that urban population
which places heavy pressure on public service requirements-
areas where population growth and population density are high.
$31.4 billion or 70% of Federal grants will be either spent in
or directly affect these SMSA's in 1974. This is an increase of$25.8 billion, or nearly 460% more than the level provided to
these urban areas in 1964.
Id.
353. See Dresch, An "Alternative" View of the Nixon Revenue
Sharing Program, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 131 (1971). An analysis of the origi-
nal Administration proposal led to the following major conclusions:
(1) revenue sharing as financed through a personal income
tax surcharge redistributes income from urban to rural states
and from high income to low income states; (2) the overall
redistribution effected by special purpose or categorical grants
is even more discriminatory against urban states and is to some
degree beneficial to high income states at the expense of low
income states; and (3) in consequence, a revenue sharing-
categorical grant substitution redistributes income from rural
to urban states and from high income to low income states.
Id. at 131,
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B. CEmiAL CIrS-SuBupBs BIs
In recent years increasing attention has focused on the
plight of the nation's core cities. Many of the problems have
been attributed directly or indirectly to the growth of the sub-
urbs:
The cities' fiscal crisis stems from the interaction of two
developments. First, the levels of per capita local expendi-
tures are higher and are generally growing faster than those
of the surrounding suburbs. While some of the reasons for this
lie in deliberate choices made by central city governments,
others spring from demographic, economic and social develop-
ments that are outside their control. Second, although the rev-
enue base in most central cities is still somewhat higher than
in surrounding suburbs, this advantage is steadily eroding. Re-
tail sales, personal incomes, and property values, which form
the basis for taxation, have been growing more slowly in the
central cities than in the suburbs.
The interaction of these two developments intensifies the
fiscal squeeze on central cities. Public services appear to be
deteriorating while tax rates climb. Compared with the sub-
urbs, the central city is becoming a less desirable place to live,
to shop, and even to work especially for middle-and upper-in-
come groups. The resulting change in the cities' economic
and demographic structure increases its need for public ex-
penditures-for welfare, crime control, and social programs--
while reducing its ability to pay for them.3 54
Since any relative shift in revenue sources from the urban
core cities to the suburbs arguably will contribute to the rate
of decline of the core cities, it is important to determine whether
the allocation formulas under the Act distribute the funds in
a manner which is relatively more beneficial to the suburbs than
the urban core cities. The Brookings Institution has criticized
Revenue Sharing as an inefficient method of dealing with the
problems of the urban core cities because significant amounts
of the money will be distributed to suburban governments which
are not facing critical fiscal problems. The criticism was subject
to the political reality that "such a general distribution may be
the price necessary to persuade a nation of suburbs to support
increased aid for its cities."3 55
The following table compares the per capita entitlement
payments for the initial Entitlement Period and the per capita
incomes of New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago and Detroit,
with the data for their respective suburbs.
354. NATiONAL Plpoarnrs-1973, supra note 76, at 291-92.
355. Id. at 314.
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New York City
Nassau County
Cedarhurst
Brookville
Old Westbury
Oyster Bay
Massapequa Park
Hempstead
Westchester County
Rye
Larchmont
Scarsdale
Bronxville
New Rochelle
Suffolk County
Huntington Bay
Los Angeles City
Los Angeles County
Beverly Hills
Palos Verdes Estates
San Marino
LaPuente City
El Monte City
South Gate
Baldwin Park
South El Monte
Chicago
Cook County
Evanston
Wilmette
Flossmoor
Barrington
Winnetka
Markham City
Lake County
Highland Park
Lake Forest
Detroit
Wayne County
Gross Pointe Farms
Gross Pointe Shores
Oakland County
Bloomfield Hills
Pontiac
Actual Per Capita
Payment Payment
First Entitlement First Entitlement
Period Period
$100,847,538 $12.77
6,547,860 4.58
14,790 2.13
6,844 2.13
5,683 2.13
2,813 2.13
47,119 2.13
241,884 6.13
1,811,482 2.03
92,127 5.81
15,348 2.13
40,975 2.13
14,222 2.13
256,969 3.41
6,733,164 5.97
3,812 2.13
15,781,264 5.62
41,964,660 5.96
61,879 1.85
25,242 1.85
26,253 1.85
69,143 2.22
321,322 4.60
167,327 2.94
129,900 2.75
84,256 6.27
31,185,549 9.26
7,273,303 1.32
234,861 2.93
52,294 1.63
12,769 1.63
23,138 2.67
22,780 1.63
71,680 4.48
510,303 1.33
54,938 1.70
35,650 2.28
18,302,265 12.09
5,852,176 2.19
19,515 1.67
6,603 2.17
1,096,752 1.21
6,125 1.67
1,031,183 12.09
Per
Capita
Income
$ 3,698
4,644
5,320
5,882
10,287
9,811
3,747
3,778
5,059
7,602
7,199
11,293
10,369
5,029
3,350
7,049
3,951
3,864
11,159
7,621
9,859
2,430
2,862
3,642
2,601
2,413
3,402
3,771
5,139
7,019
7,573
5,081
9,904
2,793
4,179
7,432
7,619
3,200
3,485
9,011
12,769
4,496
20,496
2,843
Source: Initial Payment-Entitlement Period 1, Department of Treasury,
(1972) Data Elements-Entitlement Period 1, Department of
Treasury, (1972)
The initial allocations did provide substantially greater as-
sistance to the urban core cities than to their surrounding sub-
urbs. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation stated
that:
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[T]he combination of tax effort and relative income [under the
Act] tends to provide larger allocations per capita to central
cities than to suburbs (the central cities having both greater tax
effort and lower relative income than the surrounding suburbs)
and generally allocates relatively larger per capita amounts to
rural areas (which tend to have lower tax bases and lower levels
of public services) than to suburban areas.356
However, some of the poorer municipalities in the suburbs (par-
ticularly those outside Los Angeles) received significantly lower
per capita grants than did the urban core cities. The result of
this infusion of funds into the urban core cities which, although
large in absolute terms, represents only a small percentage of the
total budget, awaits study. Although the per capita amounts to
the core cities may be substantially larger than to the suburbs,
the additional assistance to the suburbs may provide the critical
increment necessary to accelerate their advancement relative to
the core cities.
C. FRAGMENTATION
Most students of the local problems, both rural and urban,
argue strongly for the consolidation of units of local government
in order to maximize the efficient delivery of goods and services:
[A]lthough cities may not be able to do much by themselves,
most metropolitan areas as a whole do have the capability for
dealing with the growing imbalance between the resources and
needs of their core cities. One way is to expand the city's re-
source base by annexing surrounding areas or consolidating the
central city with a larger unit of government, such as the
county. In effect, this would allow the city to share in the
growth occurring in the suburbs and would shift its demo-
graphic makeup toward families that are less in need of local
government services. 357
Urbanologists generally conclude that "[t] he bewildering multi-
plicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative, overlapping local juris-
dictions cannot cope with the staggering difficulties encoun-
tered in managing modern urban affairs. ' '3 51 Many rural areas
-re also desperately inadequate in providing needed services.
Revenue Sharing will apparently discourage consolidation of
inefficient units since the new influx of revenue, constituting
50 percent of the existing revenues in many areas, will provide
the resources to continue their independent operations. This
may be particularly true of the many townships in the Midwest
356. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 63, at 31.
357. NATIONAL PaoRrnEs-1973, supra note 76, at 308.
358. Committee for Economic Development, MODERNIZIC LOCAL
GOVERNM=T TO SECURE A BALANCED FEDERALISM, A STATEMENT oN NA-
TIONAL POLICY BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY Commn=rr 44 (1966).
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which were slowly "dying on the vine" from declining revenues.
If Revenue Sharing encourages fragmentation or decelerates the
consolidation trend, the legislation should be amended to in-
crease substantially the level of activity necessary to qualify as
a recipient. For example, a minimum population and revenue
test might be required together with some additional indication
of the level of services provided. Although such minimums
were politically unacceptable to the rural representatives on the
powerful Ways and Means Committee, strong evidence of frag-
mentation may reverse the original determination. It may also
be necessary to modify the limitation on allocations to a lower
percentage (e.g., 35 percent rather than 50 percent) of adjusted
taxes and intergovernment transfers, and a lower percentage
(e.g., 10 percent rather than 20 percent) of the state-wide per
capita amounts.
V. CONCLUSION
As compared to the categorical grant programs, particularly
those with a matching element, Revenue Sharing appears to offer
a more efficient method of providing governmental services.
Experience must determine whether the improvement is merely
marginal or truly significant. When President Nixon signed the
Act he asked the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations to "monitor and evaluate" the program. Furthermore,
program performance will be evaluated in a nationwide study
by the Brookings Institution.
The Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations
conducted an initial survey of 750 municipal officials which in-
dicated a general tendency to commit Revenue Sharing funds
to capital improvements, officials' salaries, public safety and tax
relief.35 9 However, a study by the General Accounting Office in-
dicates that 58 percent of the expenditures by state governments
were being directed toward education 0 0 The initial limited
survey by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
359. See Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1973, § A, at 2; Havemann, Reve-
nue Sharing Report/problems snag Nixon Plan as complaints from local
areas mount, 5 NAT'L J. 389, 390 (1973).
360. General Accounting Office, Revenue Sharing: Its Use By and
Impact on State Governments (1973). The report indicates that as of
March 31, 1973 the authorized and planned expenditures of the state
governments were as follows:
Percentage of
Total Authorized and
Function Planned Expenditures
Education 57.5%
Hospitals 5.1
Highways 3.8
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tions also showed that "a large proportion of both State and
local officials indicated they would use revenue sharing funds
for non-recurring expenses."30' All such surveys are of limited
Public Safety 1.1
Public welfare and social services 1.9
Corrections 3.2Recreation and natural resources 10.1
General control .8
Financial administration 1.3
General public buildings 2.2
Salary increases and employee retirement 6.0
Debt retirement and interest 1.7
Insurance benefits and repayments 2.5
Assistance and subsidies 1.8
Other .6
Total 100 %
Furthermore, 39% of the total authorized and planned expenditures
were designated for capital expenditures-mainly construction and land
acquisition.
However, recognizing the widespread use of the displacement ap-
proach, the report cautions:
The actual impact of revenue sharing on a state may be quite
different from and more elusive than the apparent impact mdi-
cated by the use a state makes of its funds. When a state uses
the funds to wholly or partially finance an activity which the
state's own revenues previously financed, it becomes difficult
to objectively identify the actual impact.
Id. at 2.
State officials responded as follows to inquiries concerning their
subjective assessment of the broad fiscal impact that revenue sharing
funds would have on their states:
-18 said the funds would help to permit some form of tax re-
lief.
-16 anticipated that the funds would postpone future tax in-
creases.
-14 expected the funds to increase, at least temporarily, the
year-end balance available for appropriation in the succeeding
year.
Id. at 3.
361. A preliminary survey dated March 7, 1973 by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations yielded the following re-
sults:
1. Survey of state budget officials from 43 states:
A. How the state planned to use its Revenue Sharing funds:
12 No decision yet
15 For non-recurring expenses
24 For recurring expenses
B. 21 budget officers indicated that uncertainty about the fu-
ture had an important bearing on the utilization determina-
tion. Twelve of those budget officers indicated that the uncer-
tainty led to use for non-recurring expenses.
2. Survey of officials in 88 counties in 30 states:
A. How the county planned to use the Revenue Sharing funds?
13 No decision yet
61 For non-recurring expenses
32 For recurring expenses
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Information
Bulletin No. 73-3, Revenue Sharing: View From the Field (1973).
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utility in evaluating the impact of the program due to wide-
spread operation of the displacement process. Fairly extensive
use of the initial funds at the local level for capital improve-
ments has been recommended by national organizations such
as the National League of Cities and Conference of Mayors since
visible nonrecurring expenditures were considered desirable to
support continuation of the program, minimize opportunities to
violate restrictions in the Act and avoid the necessity of cut-
backs if the program is terminated by Congress.30 2
The relative importance of any increased efficiency result-
ing from Revenue Sharing has already been questioned by those
who believe that General Revenue Sharing was used as the jus-
tification for terminating many social welfare programs for the
poor and disadvantaged. 30 3 A general skepticism has been ex-
pressed concerning the ability of the poor and disadvantaged to
compete locally for their share of the Revenue Sharing dollars.0 4
362. See Large, infra note 364. Wayne Anderson, City Manager of
Alexandria, Virginia, indicated that it is a widely accepted principle of
public management that one-time revenues should to the extent possible
be devoted to non-recurring purposes, and the first two Revenue Shar-
ing checks for December, 1972 and January, 1973 were generally viewed
as non-recurring fiscal windfalls. Anderson, Revenue Sharing-Now
It's Up to Us, 55 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 8, 9 (1973).
363. See Statement of Vernon E. Jordon, Jr., Executive Director of
National Urban League, Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1973, at 1,
col. 1.
364. Richard Lugar, Mayor of Indianapolis, provides an interesting
response to the view that priorities are better served by categorical
grants, with detailed regulations aimed at aiding those specific groups,
than by revenue sharing. He stated:
But what happens in actuality is that if the political sen-
timent of the local community is just hell bent not to help those
people, then they will not be helped. The guidelines will be
bent, or the money will simply be misspent.
Any really tough-minded congressional examination ofjust what happened to a well-meant categorical-grant program
will show that. Look at the Title One grant program for edu-
cating poverty-stricken children. Lots of educationally viable
things were done with the money, but the categorical purpose
of the program was subverted and localities found all kinds
of ways to spread the money around.
Clark, Iglehart & Lilley, New Federalism I, 4 NAT'L J. 1908, 1917 (1972).
See Senator Muskie's statement that the President's budget and
reorganization proposals "bestow added blessings on the affluent and
added cares on the weak." Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1973, § A, at 2.
He opined that the Revenue Sharing money "will go to the most power-
ful-and that means, by and large, the most privileged-elements in
every local power structure." Id.; see Large, Putting Strings on Fed-
eral Aid, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1973, at 20, col. 4.
On the basis of a survey by the Christian Science Monitor of the
use of Revenue Sharing funds, it was concluded that:
Cities and towns across the United States are saying "yes" to
paying for police stations, fire trucks, tax rebates, and new
[Vol. 58:1
REVENUE SHARING
The success of the program will depend upon its ability to im-
plement the national commitment to solve social problems of
the poor, handicapped and disadvantaged by delivering a broad
range of services, including health care and social services.30 5
If experience indicates that a broad range of goods and services
which satisfy the highest priority needs of the recipient govern-
ment are efficiently delivered through Revenue Sharing, but that
a particular segment of the population is not able to compete ef-
fectively for the funds, a separate effort must be made to help
that minority, including an improved system of categorical
grants.
The single most important aspect in determining the pro-
gram's future will be the participation of local citizens in the
decision making process, actively reviewing performance and
compliance by the local decision makers to achieve the local re-
sponsibility and accountability basic to Revenue Sharing. A
"New American Revolution" of democratic participation in the
local decision making process will be required. In this instance
the political rhetoric and labels do reflect substantive needs.
Past experiences provide little basis for expecting a reversal of
the existing indifference and apathy at the local level How-
ever, the Nixon Administration's commitment to the "New Fed-
eralism" or the "New American Revolution" will be tested by
the extent to which it adopts policies to induce and encourage
the necessary local participation. The initial survey of the Treas-
ury Department found that only 20 percent of the respondents
noted an increase in public participation in their planning and
budgeting process as a result of Revenue Sharing.30 A require-
town halls but "no" to saving poverty programs cut back by
President Nixon.
Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-2.
365. Senator Humphrey argued strongly that the funds should be
used for services rather than capital expenditures. 118 CoNG. Fir
§ 14310 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1972).
366. Address by Graham W. Watt, supra note 219. The Summary of
the Report concludes:
Given that the normal budgeting process was used and that
the statutory requirement for publicizing planned and actual
use reports had not been implemented at the time of the sur-
vey, the increase in public participation, though modest, should
be encouraging to those who felt that this was an important
objective of the program. There are indications that the re-
cipients who experienced increased participation were those
who encouraged it; e.g., by holding public hearings .... [T]he
Office of Revenue Sharing should ... urge recipient govern-
ments to encourage public participation in the local planning
and budgeting process.
Department of the Treasury, Summary of Report of Preliminary Survey
of General Revenue Sharing, at 3 (1973).
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ment of information disclosure and participation at the local
level is not inconsistent with the "no-strings" rhetoric. Rather,
it is the only justifiable basis for that approach.
The allocation formulas and the supporting data elements
will continue to draw increasing criticism. The pragmatic an-
swer to the criticism of the formulas is that any method of allo-
cation evolving out of the political process must of necessity be
a compromise between many competing interests. Nevertheless,
the formulas do distribute significant amounts of money to the
large urban core cities and the poor rural areas. Furthermore,
there is a redistribution of the federal personal income tax
revenues to the poorer states. The availability of the optional
formulas should limit the intensity of the criticism.
The problem of the substantial variations between the cen-
sus data determinations and the actual or imagined figures
claimed by local officials will continue. It is clear that the over-
all quality of the individual data determinations must be im-
proved. This will require dramatic efforts by the Bureau of
the Census which traditionally operates on the basis of nation-
wide or statewide aggregates. However, unless a concentrated
effort is made to utilize the information from the federal income
tax forms to update income statistics with some reasonable fre-
quency, the program will be jeopardizedY" T  In 1976 it will be
impossible to justify allocations based on 1970 indications of rel-
ative "need" for the funds.
The controversy concerning the use of the displacement
process to circumvent the restrictions in the Act will become
more serious as labor and civil rights groups observe the ease
with which the protective provisions in the Act are avoided. Al-
though the decision in Mathews v. Massell is erroneous in its
reasoning, it illustrates the difficulty of achieving the congres-
sional objective of local accountability under circumstances
where the displacement process operates freely. Therefore, a
great danger exists that either the restrictions in the Act and
the concept of local accountability become "dead letters" or sub-
stantial accounting and reporting burdens will be placed on the
367. It appears that the Department of the Treasury may have
abandoned its efforts to use the federal income tax form as a source to
update the income data. The preliminary indications are that the tax
form for taxable year 1973 will not include a question as to the mu-
nicipality of residence notwithstanding the fact that this is expressly
required by Section 6017A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See
Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 3.
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recipients.3 68 Hopefully, the concerned parties will realize the
danger of judicial and congressional reaction to circumvention
of the letter and intent of the Act and accept reasonable regula-
tions to achieve the objective of local accountability. If effective
local accountability exists, adequate compliance with the restric-
tions should result.
Although the various levels of government-state, county,
local--effectively combined to advocate passage of Revenue Shar-
ing, a substantial probability exists that fierce competition will
develop between officials at the various levels for the power
which was previously wielded by the federal government.3 9 Un-
less the balance of power at the various levels stabilizes, in-
creased efficiency in the provision of service may never be re-
alized.
The inevitable local scandals concerning the use of Revenue
Sharing funds will result in great pressure to restrict or termi-
nate the program. Although it is difficult to predict congres-
sional reaction, it is probable that additional restrictions will be
imposed on the program, including some form of maintenance
of effort requirement. It is likely that Congress will have ap-
proved an extension prior to expiration of the program on De-
cember 31, 1976, since 1976 is again a national election year. How-
ever, the absence of a Closed Rule in the House of Representa-
tives, and the increased awareness of the political reality that
Revenue Sharing represents a diminution in congressional power
and influence, will materially increase the task of state and local
governments in obtaining favorable congressional action.
While General Revenue Sharing resulted in large measure
from massive lobbying efforts of state and local governments
based on the assumption that the funds would be in addition to
the existing federal programs, Special Revenue Sharing merely
replaces existing programs with the same amount of funds. Fur-
thermore, while categorical grant programs have a greater pros-
pect for future increases in funding since there is a constant
demonstration of need in the backlog of approved but unfunded
368. See 118 Cong. Rec. § 14391 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Buckley). Senator Buckley proposed an amendment to elim-
inate all restrictions in the Bill which was defeated.
[B] ecause of the fungibility of cash, any attempt to attach fed-
eral strings to the funds distributed under the general revenue-
sharing program will either be an exercise in futility or an
open invitation to attack virtually any State or local expendi-
ture which is made in a manner which displeases the Congress.
Id.
369. See Clark, Iglehart & Lilley, supra note 364, at 1910, 1912.
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applications, no such mechanism to demonstrate the need for
additional funding exists in the Special Revenue Sharing pro-
posals. It is thus unlikely that the same coalition of support will
exert pressure on behalf of Special Revenue Sharing.1 0 At a
minimum, no support will be forthcoming from those states and
cities which have developed the expertise to derive more than
their proportionate share from the categorical grant programs.
In the last analysis, General Revenue Sharing must be judged
by its efficiency in delivering the widest range of goods and serv-
ices to the general population which satisfies the highest pri-
ority needs of each of the recipient governments.3 71
The most ignored aspect of Public Law 92-512 is Title II
which provides for the federal collection of state individual in-
come taxes. If a significant number of states elect to have the
federal government collect the state income taxes, the concept
of Revenue Sharing could be dramatically altered. Instead of
the federal government transferring $5 billion per year to the
states and localities in the form of a transfer payment, a trans-
fer of a portion of the federal income tax base directly to the
states and localities could be used to achieve the same result.
Thus, pure revenue sharing may result from this dormant pro-
vision in the legislation. Although congressional approval of
this shift in the tax base will be difficult to obtain because it
represents a further diminution in the power of Congress, the
long term interests of the federal system will be best served by
sharing this efficient, progressive and responsive tax source with
state and local governments.
370. The Nixon Administration has decided not to pursue congres-
sional action on The Better Schools Act in 1973. Also, the Congress has
passed a three year, $3.25 billion extension of the law enforcement assist-
ance program which does not include the major elements of the Special
Revenue Sharing proposal. See Washington Post, Aug. 13, 1973, § A, at
22, col. 1.
371. Walter Heller has made the following statement on efficiency
in state and local governments:
[E]conomic efficiency is not just a matter of administrative ef-
fectiveness, but of channeling any given amount of money to
the highest priority uses. Dollars spent "efficiently" for low-
priority uses may yield considerably less benefits than dollars
spent "inefficiently" for high priority purposes.
So let's be careful to distinguish between efficiency in the
sense of an ideal administrative set-up that can carry out a
function at least cost with efficiency in the sense of using dol-
lars for the purposes where they are needed most.
Hearings, supra note 59, at 65.
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